Location of Jingyingtan (Blue: Lake Qinghai, Red: Jingyingtan, Black: Haiyan)
(Written by Yin Shusheng, Former Executive Deputy Director of
Public Security Bureau,
Anhui Province, also worked in Public Security Bureau, Qinghai
Province)
Translated by Jianglin Li
Edited by Matthew Akester
*All notes and square brackets added by
translator*
Located in
Haiyan[1]
County, Jinyintan[2]
tops the list of tourist attractions in Qinghai Province. One reason is that it
was here that the story that inspired Wang Luobing’s classic folk song In a
Faraway Place took place. Just imagine the spectacular pastoral landscape
and graceful herder girls, how can one not want to take a trip here? However,
nowadays visitors are more attracted to the place where our country’s first
atomic and hydrogen bombs were created and want to see how it looks.
In the 1950s and 1960s, a factory was built in
Jinyintan. Code named “Factory 221” (known
to the outside as Qinghai General Machinery Factory), it covered an area of
1,170 square kilometers, with a total construction area of more than 600,000
square meters composed of 18 factories and 4 staff compounds. It was here that
the first atomic and hydrogen bombs were researched and built, effectively breaking
the nuclear monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union, making China
the fifth country to master nuclear weapons after the US, the USSR, Great
Britain and France. This greatly increased China's overall national strength
and influence. In the past, Factory 221 was listed as top secret. As a result, the
place name Jinyintan, where the factory was located, vanished from newspapers
and magazines since the late 1950s. The movie Jinyintan was only shown
for a few months before it was banned. Now that the restrictions on the place
have been lifted, people want to see this place shrouded in mystery, not to be
seen or even mentioned in the past.
This is a
place really worth seeing. So many stories took place here. Before 1959, China and the Soviet Union
enjoyed good relations. The Soviet Union promised to help China to research and
develop nuclear weapons by providing technology and samples, training Chinese
scientific and technological personnel, and assisting China to research and
manufacture the atomic bomb. The
selection of Jinyintan as the site for Factory 221 was also approved by Soviet
experts coming to China to lend a hand in the nuclear research effort. From the early days when the factory was built,
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, cooperated with Taiwan's intelligence agencies,
continuously conducted aerial reconnaissance with U-2 aircraft, and repeatedly
dropped spies in Qinghai to steal information. After the Sino-Soviet break-up,
the Soviet experts withdrew, taking technical information with them. However, through
spies and various channels, they were very surprised to learn that our research
and manufacturing continued to progress. As Sino-Soviet relations further
deteriorated and war was imminent, the Soviet Union was said to have contemplated
a surgical, pre-emptive strike to destroy our research and manufacturing bases.
Our
country made great efforts to keep the nuclear research and production base
secure and confidential. A series of measures was created, to ensure that no
breach would happen. A special department was established in the Qinghai Public
Security Bureau. Supported by the Ministry of Public Security,
professional staff were brought in to handle security and counter-espionage
using advanced science and technology. A separate office was set up in Factory
221 called“Minefield Public
Security Bureau,” responsible for security and confidentiality within the
factory. This bureau was under the dual leadership of the provincial public
security bureau and related offices at higher levels, but no outsiders knew of
its existence. All personnel working in Factory 221 had undergone strict
training to guard the secret. Communication between different units,
departments, groups and personnel regarding each other’s work was forbidden.
Different work units even had to take different routes to their worksites and
were not allowed to enter other areas of the factory. Only a small number of
experts and leaders with special passes were able to walk freely around the
factory. Every factory building and unit was guarded by soldiers, no one could
get through without a pass.
All communications between insiders and outsiders
went through a specially arranged confidential mail system. People who contributed
their youth and knowledge to the “two bombs and one satellite” might not have known
that the letters they sent or received had been carefully examined before going
out or reaching the recipients. Those who revealed secrets (mostly unintentional)
would be criticized, transferred, dismissed, sent to “education through labor”,
or even receive criminal punishment. Family members of Factory 221 personnel had
no idea where their relatives worked or what kind of work they did. In addition
to all this, there were a large number of armed police and People’s Liberation
Army troops, including anti-aircraft units, guarding the outer range around
Jinyintan pasture, in case of sudden attack. However, even such strong security
measures failed to prevent information leaks.
On October
16, 1964, before our country's first atomic bomb test in Lop Nur, Xinjiang, the
CIA discovered through spy satellite that China was about to conduct an atomic test,
and was the first agency to release this news, shocking the whole world. However,
most of the employees and technicians of the Factory 221 had no idea what kind
of work they had been doing. Once it had completed its sacred mission, the
central government decided in the 1980s to shut the factory down. On May 15,
1995, Xinhua news agency announced to the world that "China’s first
nuclear weapons research and development base has been completely
decommissioned". In November 2005, the State Council designated the “China
Atomic City” (Factory 221) as a national-level patriotic education base. It has
since become an important tourist destination in Qinghai Province.
This author
used to work in the Qinghai Provincial Public Security Bureau and is no
stranger to Factory 221. After a lapse of more than 40 years, I revisited Qinghai
and accompanied my friends on a visit to Atomic City (to be honest, it is
totally different from the original factory 221). During the tour, I didn't pay
much attention to the tour guides’ explanations, because I knew all about its
history. My mind was churning with thoughts of being there more than 40 years
ago. After returning to Anhui, I went through my diary and the materials I had
kept, and felt that it was necessary to organize them into an article, to let
people know that huge damage was hidden behind the beauty and splendor of
Jinyintan.
On May 18th,
1963, Li Qian, director of the Administrative Office, Qinghai Provincial Public
Security Bureau, called me to his office. He told me that letters of appeal had
been forwarded by the ministries of Public Security, Supervision and Civil
Affairs to our bureau, complaining about problems related to the suppression of
counter-revolutionaries campaign and relocation in Haiyan [County] in 1958. Investigations
had been conducted a few years back by concerned departments of [CCP] Central
Committee, the Northwest Bureau and the province, and some individual cases had
been handled, however, appeal letters and visitors with grievances continued to
arrive. The provincial party committee had issued instructions directing the public
security bureau to organize and lead a joint investigation group, together with
participants from the Department of Civil Affairs, to do another round of
investigation. He told me that the group included four people, one from the
bureau’s First Department, one from the Second Department, one from the Civil
Affairs, plus me. “You will be the one to write the investigation report,” he said
to me, “So you need to get prepared. The task for all of you is to look into
the matter and write a detailed report regarding the suppression of
counter-revolutionaries and relocation in Haiyan in 1958. Don’t give any
opinion about right or wrong. The bureau will study the report before
submitting it to the provincial party committee.”
Upon
accepting the task, I had the feeling that nothing would come out of this
investigation. The previous investigation teams had been headed by bureau and
department directors and failed to solve any problem, and our group leader was
Section Chief Ma from our bureau’s First Department, and the other members were
but two office staffers and one clerk, what could we accomplish? Not to mention
that at the time there was an understanding that nothing was wrong with the
suppression of counter-revolutionaries campaign and the relocation of the local
populace in Haiyan County. Those actions had contributed to the security of our
country’s nuclear research base.
On May 19th, the four of us held a
meeting to discuss how to accomplish the task. Section Chief Ma was
straightforward: “The Haiyan County investigation is not hard to do. All we
need to do is write a report, isn’t it? Writing the report of course is Little
Yin’s job, since you are a college graduate. We just help you to look for
materials and archives and find people for meetings. You are responsible for taking notes and
organizing them into a report, that is all. I think we should be able to finish
the investigation in 10 to 15 days.”
Just as
Chief Ma had said, our trip took only 15 days, of which five were spent in
Qilian[3]
and Gangcha[4]
counties, where most of the relocated people had been settled. We intended to
conduct an on-spot review of the settlements and find out the real situation regarding
relocated people’s life. However, all our requests were turned down with the
reason that investigation teams from the Central Committee and the province had
come down several times and had written reports, all we needed to do was to
read them, and that they could not send anyone to accompany us to the
settlements.
After the
investigation was done, I quickly wrote the report. In our discussion meeting,
not a voice was raised regarding the situation of suppressing
counter-revolutionaries and relocation in Haiyan County from 1958 to 1959.
However, all of them demanded that I delete the last section, which I took the
liberty to add in, pointing out that the events took place against the
background of the “Great Leap Forward”. They argued that it was out of the
scope of our investigation. I had to follow their opinion.
For the
purposes of the present article, I cannot proceed without presenting the
general background of those events.
In 1958,
when the “Great Leap Forward” movement was in full swing, the CCP Qinghai
Committee actively responded to it and raised the slogans of “combining the two
steps of democratic revolution and socialist revolution in one stride”,
“completely accomplishing the task of democratic revolution at the same time as
accomplishing socialist revolution”, “finishing socialist reform in animal
husbandry” in two to three years.
At that
time, the agricultural cooperative movement had basically finished in Qinghai’s
farming regions. The pastoral regions were inhabited by ethnic minority peoples,
many still under the tribal system, and the cooperative movement was yet to
begin. The provincial party committee demanded that cooperatives in animal
husbandry be set up immediately, all the herders were to hand over their
pastures, yaks, sheep and horses, becoming cooperative members. In this way, the
herders’ property was entirely snatched away. They had no right to handle their
animals, and had to get meat, milk, butter and tsampa from the
cooperative. Individual herder families were scattered over vast areas, it was
common for neighbors to be separated by many kilometers. Cooperativising animal
husbandry was a crazy thing to do, and it was not only opposed by the herders,
but strongly resisted by Party and Youth League members and grassroot cadres as
well. It was naturally opposed by the ethnic minority upper strata. For a
period of time, it caused great social panic. Instead of reviewing the lines
and policies they formulated, the provincial Party committee consistently
worked in a reckless and foolhardy way, using authoritarian and high-pressure
methods to handle problems. They believed that since ethnic minority herders listened
to their leaders, all problems would be easily solved once the upper strata
were put under control. Based on this way of thinking, on April 14th,
1958, the provincial committee issued a directive to all prefectural and county
party committees, stating that in order to speed up founding of cooperatives in
animal husbandry, it was requested to “collect ethnic minority upper echelons
together in the name of meetings and study classes, and place them under
control,” cutting them off from other herders and the outside world, and depriving
them of their freedom of speech and movement.
In accord with the provincial party committee’s
directive, the Xunhua Salar Autonomous County Party Committee summoned the
deputy head of the county, the Wendu[5]
Lama (who stayed in the monastery all year long chanting scriptures), and Jnana Pal Rinpoche,[6]
who had been Panchen Erdeni’s tuitor for a period of time, and other upper
strata figures to the county seat in the name of a meeting, effectively placing
them under house arrest and cutting them off from contact with the outside
world. Meanwhile, the county’s work group was starting the animal husbandry
cooperative campaign in Gantsa Township, where Wendu monastery was located, and
was strongly resisted by the masses, including Party and Youth League members. Keeping
Jnana Pal Rinpoche under house arrest further intensified the conflict and
became the fuse that ignited the riot.
The herders repeatedly appealed to the
government that Jnana Pal Rinpoche be allowed to return to the monastery, but
their appeal was ignored. This aroused the anger of religious believers. Instigated
by a few people, they detained the township head, killed the work team leader, and
destroyed the communication cables. It was
the first township to rebel. The rebel masses,
joined by a large number of Salar people resentful of the agricultural
cooperatives, marched towards the Xunhua county seat. On April 24, 1958, a
crowd of more than four thousand people surrounded the town, demanding the
release of Jnana Pal Rinpoche and others, the abolition of animal husbandry
cooperatives and disbanding of agricultural cooperatives, and return of cattle
and sheep to their owners. The Lanzhou Military Command urgently mobilized
troops to suppress the rebellion. It was put down on April 25, resulting in 719
casualties (of whom 435 were killed) and 2,999 captives, most of whom were
ordinary ethnic minority people. The counter-insurgency troops suffered 17
casualties. The property loss was 900,000 yuan, and 200 private houses were
damaged. Some party members and 69.5% of youth league members from Xunhua
County participated in the rebellion, and 156 party members and 26 youth league
members took part in attacking the county seat.
Although the
Xunhua rebellion was quickly put down, it soon spread to 5 prefectures, 24
counties, 240 tribes, and 307 temples, with a total of nearly 100,000 people
participating. Mao Zedong commented in the report by the CCP Qinghai Provincial
Committee on the Xunhua Rebellion: "It is a great thing that the Qinghai
reactionaries have staged a rebellion. The opportunity to liberate the working people
has arrived." In fact, in a rebellion triggered by the cooperativisation
of agriculture and animal husbandry, most of the participants were working
people. Not only were they not liberated, they were plunged into the abyss.
On April 28,
1958, Gao Feng, secretary of the provincial Party committee, said in the
committee secretariat meeting discussing measures for suppressing the
rebellion: “The rebellion is good! It has provided an excuse for us to strike the
enemy. Local [officials] and the army must know in advance who the bad guys
are, and have a good idea about this, so as to knock them out in battle. Specific
personnel should be appointed to take care of this matter. The struggle now is
more serious than in 1949, and the frontline is very wide. The public security
organs must turn Qinghai into a monolith within three years." On June 16,
Gao Feng said at the party committee secretariat meeting: "This time we
are determined to remove the lid of feudalism, together with the pot itself,
and the two revolutions will be completed at once. As for the stumbling blocks,
just kill those who can be killed in battle; in pastoral areas, doing battle is
the main method to take off the lid of feudalism. Catching their leaders is 50%
of the task; as for executions, executing them completes 100% of the task.” On June
28, Gao Feng said at the Party Committee’s standing committee meeting: “There
is also a good situation in the pastoral area, that is, we have captured 7,000
counter-revolutionaries (this refers to the number of arrests in pastoral areas
under the Public Security Work Arrests Plan deployed by the provincial party committee.
During the year 1958, more than 49,000 people were arrested in Qinghai Province.
See the author's article "The Great Leap Forward in Public Security
Work," published in "Yanhuang Chunqiu" 2010, Issue 1). This good
situation is brought to us by the rebellion. In facing this great situation,
the biggest obstacle was that the thinking of some of our leaders could not
keep up with the situation, and revealed a rightist sentiment. In one county,
Guinan, 42 enemies were killed at one time. That deserves a notice of
commendation."
What was the
story of killing 42 "enemies" for which Gao Feng wanted to circulate
a notice of commendation? On May 13,
1958, in accordance with a notice from the provincial party committee, the
Guinan County party committee summoned 42 upper-class ethnic minorities and
United Front targets and sent them to the prefecture in the name of studying
and attending meetings. At a place called “Guomayin”,[7]
the vehicle stopped, all the people on board were asked to get out and were
locked in a large room. The police and militiamen arranged there in advance
shot into the room from the windows, killing all 42. Such was the event, a crime of indiscriminately
killing innocent people that violated laws and discipline, for which Gao Feng, as
the secretary of the provincial party committee, wanted to circulate a notice
of commendation.
On October 26, 1958, at the provincial party committee’s
standing committee meeting, Gao Feng had this to say: "Now it is time for a
great break and a great reestablishment. It is necessary to completely destroy
religion and repudiate it. Looking at the situation now, the more reactionary
the religion is, the better [it is for us]. Only when they are counter-revolutionary
and involve in sabotaging activities do we have excuses to strike hard [at them]
and do it thoroughly. We should not be afraid to overdo it, the more thoroughly the better, otherwise we
will not become the rear.”[8]
On September
14, 1958, Xue Keming, deputy governor
and member of the standing committee of the provincial party committee in
charge of political and judicial departments, said at a meeting on political
and judicial works: "All religious elements with real power and reactionary
headmen must be captured, don’t let a single one remain at large, and don’t
release a single one. If they are dying, let them die in prison. It is better that
they die in prison than die in society."
Yang
Shufang, director of the Public Security Department, said: "Running dogs, jackals
and religious powers of the feudal class, and reactionaries who insist on a
reactionary stand, must be finished off within three years, leaving none
behind."
Such was the
general background of the suppressing counter-revolutionary campaign and the
barbaric relocation in Haiyan County. On top of this were added the excuse of guarding
the safety of the atomic bomb experiment and manufacturing base. Under such
circumstances, social repression in the Jinyintan in the form of indiscriminate
killing of innocent people and barbaric relocation of the populace became
inevitable. At that time, Haiyan County had a population of only 19,000, and
80% lived in the beautiful Jinyintan and its surrounding areas, mainly Tibetan
and Mongolian compatriots, with a small number of Han and other ethnic groups.
The Tibetans and Mongolians still retained their tribal systems.
Under the
guidance of the deputy director of the provincial public security bureau, from
June to October 1958, Haiyan County "cracked" a counter-revolutionary
rebel group called a “counter-revolutionary conspiracy and insurgent group in
the name of wolf-hit (hunting) ", also known as "The
counter-revolutionary conspiracy in the name of wolf (hunting)” - since no
rebellion ever took place in Haiyan County,
the word "conspiracy" was added. It was also sometimes referred
to as the "rebellion conspiracy group". In short, name of this
"counter-revolutionary rebel group" was changeable, not fixed. When
we read the case file, there were seven or eight charges. The file provided by
the Public Security Bureau recorded that a total of 734 (some say 800) people
were accused of being members of this "rebel group" and were
arrested. For a small county with a population of only 10,000 or so, the shock
caused by the mass arrests was not hard to imagine. Besides that, the majority of
those arrested were Tibetans and Mongolians living in Jinyintan and surrounding
areas.
Why were
they suspected of rebellion? The reason was that according to ethnic minority custom
and actual needs, every family had hunting guns in order to protect their herds.
In the 1950s, wolves were a severe plague in Jinyintan area. Under the
instructions of the county Party Committee and the county government, and under
the guidance of the county public security bureau, young herdsmen were
organized into hunting teams. After several years of hard work, the wolf
problem was basically solved. When the "Great Leap Forward" campaign started,
coupled with the rebellion in Xunhua County, the [Haiyan] county party committee
and county government leaders believed that these herdsmen had the potential to
rebel and must be pre-emptively arrested to prevent them from rising up. Among
the more than 700 arrested, 631 were members of wolf-hunting teams, including
231 militiamen, 14 township and community (cooperative) heads, 8 deputy
county-level officials, and 34 ethnic and religious middle and upper-class
figures. The arrested also included 69 party and youth league members, all from
poor herder families. They were the people the Communist Party relied on in the
pastoral areas, but were arrested on groundless charges.
The arrest
list was proposed by the county party committee’s Political and Judicial Leadership
Group (group leader being the director of the Public Security Bureau who was
also a member of the standing committee, but was actually decided by the Bureau),
and was approved by the standing committee after study. As for the manner of
arrest, notices to attend meetings, study classes and briefings were sent to
cadres, ethnic minority and religious upper-class personnel, and united front
targets, and each and every one of them was arrested when they showed up. The
others were arrested by sending policemen down to their locations and grabbing
them on the spot. Sentences were proposed by the Public Security Bureau after a
preliminary trial. Sentences for cadres, persons of ethnic and religious upper
strata, and united front targets were decided by the standing committee. There was a variety of more than ten charges,
such as "attempting to rebel in the name of hunting",
"organizing a wolf-hunting team in an attempt to overthrow the Communist
Party", "reactionary ideological attempts to restore reactionary rule",
"spreading rumors, hoping that Chiang Kai-shek will counterattack the
mainland", "dissatisfied with the Communist Party, kowtowing to living
Buddhas, lighting butter lamps," "reactionary thoughts, exploiting
and oppressing the herder masses", "corrupted way of life, raping
women", "organizing and participating in counter-revolutionary
groups", and so on.
How were the
terms of sentence determined? What were the principles? The general rule was
that the young people must be given long prison terms; the rationale was that
if they were given shorter prison time, what if they rebelled again after being
released? The elderly should be given
shorter sentences because they were likely to die in prison before the end of
their term. For example, while studying the sentencing of a 71-year-old
Mongolian headman, the county party secretary chairing the standing committee
meeting asked: "How old is this man?" The case handler replied:
"He is 71 years old." “Ten years is enough for him. He will die in
jail and never be able to rebel.” Out of the over 700 people arrested, only 63 had
been tried in court (based on court trial records), and the rest had never
received a court hearing. After the preliminary trials, the Public Security
Bureau decided the terms of imprisonment, and all the court did was to write a
verdict based on the decision, affix the official seal, and the case was closed
and the accused sent to the reform-through-labor farm. None of the defendants
admitted the crime he was accused of committing, but said that they had never
thought of rebelling. During the Public Security Bureau’s preliminary trials,
some defendants refused to admit the crime and were tortured to extract a
confession, resulting in 17 deaths and 40 people becoming disabled.
After Wang
Zhao[9]
came to Qinghai to take charge of administrative work, he vigorously
rehabilitated unjust, false and wrong cases, but the major case in Haiyan
County that involved more than 700 people, namely, the case of "using the
excuse of wolf-hunting to organize a counter-revolutionary clique in an attempt
to rebel", had not been fundamentally redressed. Leaders
of the county party committee whom we contacted still believed that it was due
to their timely action to smash the enemy conspiracy that rebellion did not break
out in Haiyan County. Individual mistakes could be corrected on an individual basis,
but the general case could not be redressed. By the time we went to
investigate, 57 people had been rectified, either released separately or employed
by labor farms as farm hands, but were not allowed to return to Jinyintan.
After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee,[10]
this unjust case was completely rehabilitated. However, by then the majority of
the arrested people had been starved or tortured to death in labor farms, few
had survived.
The case was
determined by a deputy director of the provincial Public Security Bureau at
that time. The county leadership had different opinions. They proposed that as the
wolf-hunting teams were deployed by the county party committee and county
government, and organized by the county public security bureau, it was
unreasonable to accuse them of conspiracy to rebel. Those who held this opinion
were not the leaders of the county party committee and had no decision-making
power. Besides, they were criticized for being “rightists” and soon transferred
to other counties. However, they were not able to escape the fate of being
purged in the "Four Cleanups" campaign.
The same
deputy director of the provincial Public Security Bureau, who supported the
county Party committee in refusing to reassess the "major
counter-revolutionary conspiracy and rebellion group" in 1962 and 1963, went
to Qilian County (also under the
jurisdiction of the Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture) as deputy head of the
"Four Cleanups" working group in 1965. Once again, he managed to unearth
a “major counter-revolutionary rebellion group headed by Guo Zhengguo", Guo
being the county head. 414 people were dragged into this group,
including the county’s chief justice, the director of the Public Security Bureau,
the director of the United Front Work Department, etc. The county leadership
was almost completely wiped out. Of the county’s 28 commune Party secretaries
and presidents, only one was spared - all the rest were classified as members
of this counter-revolutionary rebellion group.
For this
reason, the masses made up a doggerel “Four times seven is twenty-eight, and
Liu Chunfa is the only one who escaped the net." Only this Liu Chunfa, who
had been transferred from the army to Qilian County as a commune president for
a short time, was not counted in this counter-revolutionary rebel group. 34
people committed suicide, including the chief justice. The deputy director had a
sharp political perception: he believed that counter-revolutionary armed
rebellion did not break out in Haiyan County in 1958 due to the fact that it
was discovered early and nipped in the bud, contributing to the safety of the
221 factory and the success of the atomic bomb test. However, the suppression of
counter-revolutionaries had not been done thoroughly, for the roots were yet to
be dug out. The roots were the people headed by Guo Zhenguo, who was
transferred to Qilian County as the county head. County leader Guo Zhenguo was
therefore convicted of a conspiracy to rebel, on the ground that he had
convened several meetings at the grassroots level to study issues related with production
and herdsmen’s livelihood. This so-called "counter-revolutionary rebel
group” was duly rehabilitated, but the disasters and the pain it brought to the
people can never be healed.
In order to
build Factory 221, relocation of local people was necessary. However, the relocation
practices at Jinyintan were extremely barbaric. Cracking a large “counter-revolutionary
rebel group” had laid a social foundation [of fear], [and at the time of
relocation], there was no propaganda, explanation or meetings to make the
situation clear to the masses in advance. Instead, an order was issued, giving the
herders two to three days to get ready to leave. Three cows [yaks?] were allowed for each
family to carry their belongings and what they could not take with them had to
be left behind. Some herders received notice the night before and had to leave
the next morning. They were escorted by armed police and militiamen throughout
the process, and were abused all the way. Hundreds perished on the road.
The construction
of Factory 221 required 1715 households totaling 9325 people to be relocated.
It was relatively easier for those resettled in the vicinity of Haiyan and
Huangyuan Counties. For the 461 households or 2183 people resettled in Qilian County and 474 households or
2649 people sent to Gangcha County, it was a journey of hundreds of kilometers.
Relocation began on October 20, 1958. Those who were sent to Qilian County encountered
a blizzard in the Qilian mountains. They drove hundreds and thousands of
livestock, dragging their sons and daughters along with them, enduring all
kinds of hardship. At night, several families had to camp in a single tent. They
suffered hunger, cold, and abuse [from the escorting police and militiamen]. It
took 26 days of walking for them to reach their destination. Quite a few elderly people and young children
died in the wind and snow. Our
investigation team failed to find out the actual number of deaths, however, the
list of resettled people in Qilian County shows that 879 were accepted from
Haiyan County. This means that 304 people had died during the process. 20,000
livestock also died [on the road]. After arriving in Qilian, all the livestock
were allocated to Tuocai Ranch, depriving the herders of their ownership, and
the herders became pastoral workers. Since the county denied our request to go
there and find out the actual condition of resettled families, we only learned some
of their experiences from appeal letters. [Out of the 2649 people] relocated to
Gangcha County, more than 400 had died
on the way. Their livestock were also classified as collective property. Relocated herders had nothing left, and had to
make a living by working for the ranch.
The disaster
in Jinyintan fell not only on the relocated herders; employees of Factory 221, who
contributed their youth and knowledge to the "two bombs and one satellite",
were not spared either. In 1969, when the "Cultural Revolution" was
in full swing, Factory 221 launched a "class clean-up" movement, and
cracked a "major counter-revolutionary [group]". More than 80% of workshop and department
cadres, and 90% of high- and intermediate-level scientists and technicians were
investigated and persecuted. In a period of two years, more than 4,000
employees were persecuted and subjected to cruel torture to extract confessions,
resulting in the injury or disability of more than 310 and suicide of more than
40 employees. In addition, 5 were executed on unreasonable charges (see Wang
Jingheng: The Secrets of China's Nuclear
Weapons Base, published in Yanhuang
Chunqiu 2010 No. 1). For a period of time, the beautiful Jinyintan was
reduced to a blood-stained place. People who lived and worked there, including Factory
221 employees, whether Han or ethnic minorities, were not immune from the
disasters.
This
undoubtedly was a painful history.
However, the past, if not forgotten, can serve as a guide for the future.
Thankfully, building a harmonious relationship between nationalities has become
the main theme of our time. By writing about this history, I hope it will help
the cause.
Yanhuang Chunqiu No.3, 2012.
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Document 6
[1]
Tib. Dashi.
[2] Jinyintan (Gold-silver grassland) is the
Chinese name for the pastoral area located in today’s Haiyan County, Haibei （Tib.
Tsojang）Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture. Traditionally it is divided into two parts, referred to
as Ngulthang and Serthang in Tibetan. Both areas underwent a few administrative
changes from townships to communes and back to townships again in 1983. In 2001
Ngulthang Township was dissolved to establish
Sanchotring town.
[3]
Tib. Dola.
[4]
Tib. Kangtsa.
[5]
Tib. Bimdo. A historic monastery in Xunhua (Tib. Yadzi) county.
[6]
Tri Gyanakpa Yeshe Pel, the senior incarnate Lama of Bimdo monastery.
[7]
Tib. Gomang, in today’s Gomang Township, Guinan (Mangra) County, Hainan
(Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province.
[8] In
August 23, 1958, CCP started shelling Quemoy. The CCP planned to use the
northwestern regions, including Qinghai, as the “great rear” in case of
American military intervention.
[9]
Wang Zhao (1917 – 1970), a Korean War veteran awarded the first-class national
flag medal and second-class independence freedom medal in North Korea. In 1953
he was appointed deputy minister of Public Security. In 1961 he was appointed
second secretary of CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee and governor of the
province. During the Cultural Revolution he was persecuted to death. He was
politically rehabilitated in 1979.
[10]
Held in Beijing between December 18 to 22, 1978.
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