Youren, A Vanished War: The Full Story
of Magnification and Reassessment of the 1958 Suppressing Rebellion in Qinghai.
HK: Tianyuan Shuwu (Greenfield Book Store), 2013.
by Jianglin Li
Edited by Matthew Akester
*All notes are original unless specified. All square brackets added by translator*
The Xunhua Incident was designated as the starting point of the Qinghai rebellion in 1958. But how were incidents in other prefectures, counties, and regions designated to be rebellions? Had those incidents been scientifically [analyzed]? Was the designation accurate? Let’s analyze one example:“From examining one spot, the whole leopard may be inferred”, as the saying goes.
On July 3, 1958, the party committee of Gangcha County, Haibei Prefecture, reported the county’s current situation to its superiors: “Chaermin District in Gangtsa [County] was the only region that openly rebelled, from June 12 to 22. To be specific, three tribes and four monasteries, a total of 250 people, were involved [in the rebellion].” In August of the same year, the Headquarters of Qinghai Military Command issued a briefing called "The Situation of Armed Rebellion in Qinghai Region", which provided more details: "The rebellion openly broke out on June 12, involving three tribes and some monks of four monasteries (Huancang, Kecai, Rimang, Xigeleng) in Chaermin district of Gangcha County, Haibei Prefecture, with some 250 people, led by Tudan [Tubten], Qingzhibu [Trichenpo], Zarou [Tanor], and more than 150 guns. It was completely put down by 24th."
Both documents specified that the "rebellion" in Gangcha County started on June 12, 1958. So, what happened in Gangcha on June 12th?
The first incident was the so-called "stealing guns from the Huangcang [Wangtsang] workgroup." Herders on the grasslands had always carried guns in order to protect their herds against wolves. In addition, carrying a gun was also a symbol of masculine valor and pride, like the saying "the herders’ three jewels: steeds, hunting guns and swords". However, in accordance with the provincial authorities’ unified arrangements, Gangcha County was collecting civilian weapons at that time as a method to prevent rebellion. The workgroup stationed in the Huangcang tribe took three rifles from the herdsmen in the name of "borrowing". Xiang Ba [Changpa], the assistant team leader, "borrowed" a German-made "Seven Nine" rifle from middle-rank herder Soke [Chokor]. In the early morning of June 12, Soke [went to the workgroup] and asked Xiang Ba to give his gun back. He explained that his pack animal had scabies and had to be smeared with wild horse blood, according to traditional remedy, he needed his gun to hunt a wild horse. When the team leader Zhang Xinhe learned about this, he criticized Xiang Ba and the two had a row. Finally, deputy District Chief Zhao Bingyan made a clear statement: “No guns that have been retrieved are allowed to be returned. It is wrong to return the gun.” Xiang Ba, having suffered criticism, ran into Soke’s tent and took the gun away in spite of Soko’s son Kezhibu [Khochupo]’s effort to stop him. Soko and his son rode to the workgroup, and explained to Zhang Xinhe the reason for the need to use his gun. However, Zhang Xinhe didn't understand Tibetan, and the two sides couldn't understand each other to clarify the issue. Kezhibu, young and impatient, grabbed the gun and left. Zhang Xinhe and Xiang Ba rushed over later, and tried their best to stop them. In the end, the father and son were able to take the gun. This constitutes the first accusation of "stealing guns from the workgroup" to designate the incident as rebellion.
In the early morning of the 12th, a gun was "robbed" in Huangcang; the same night, a gunshot was “fired” in Xigeleng, constituting the second charge to label the incidents as rebellion. The "gun shooting" incident went like this: at that time, like other pastoral areas, Gangcha was at the high tide of commune and ranch building. To demonstrate the superiority of cooperatives, government raised 100,000 yuan of idle money from various segments of the society to build a canal in the Denglong [Tenlung] area of the Xigeleng tribe. For a time, people were gathered at the construction site, tents pitched, and a workgroup under the direct leadership of Qi Yuandan, deputy secretary of the county party committee, was also stationed there. On the afternoon of June 12, after the day’s work ended, workgroup members had drinks with ranch and cooperative heads, Baihuguan Quehu [Choku ?] and headman Gentai [Kunthek], to celebrate the founding of two animal husbandry cooperatives and a joint public-private ranch, then got the masses together for a general meeting. By then it was 9 o'clock at night. In the drizzling rain and dim light, Secretary Qi was making an impassioned speech when suddenly a gunshot was heard in the northwest. "Who fired that shot?" Secretary Qi asked. Not a trace could be found in the darkness of the night. However, when Dan Muzhen [Tenchen ?], assistant party secretary of Quanjie, returned to his tent a hundred meters away, he found a hole in his quilt, and a crack on the butt of his rifle that was wrapped in it. He determined that it had been hit by the shot that had just been fired, which was obviously targeted at the workgroup. Someone had the guts to fire a gunshot at the workgroup? Secretary Qi immediately summoned Baihuguan Quehu who was at the water canal construction site, and furiously demanded an answer. He specifically wanted to know why headman Gentai didn't come to the mass meeting and ordered on the spot that the Baihuguan and other headmen were not allowed to leave their tents at night. From Secretary Qi's attitude Quehu had the feeling that he had become the suspect. After returning to his tent, he told everything to Gentai, who had missed the assembly for being drunk and fallen asleep in the tent. The latter was greatly shaken, feeling that he could no longer defend himself. The two discussed the situation and decided to flee the construction site.
Before the suspicious cases on the 12th had been cleared up, in the early morning of the following day, a messenger from the nearby Huangcang tribe rushed over to Secretary Qi with an urgent report: "More than a dozen armed men on horseback were found on the hilltop engaged in some activity." “Another six or seven people came to the Huangcang tribe workgroup and asked to have their horses and guns back, and wanted the workgroup to leave.” Based on this information, Secretary Qi determined that a rebellion was underway in the area and ordered the workgroups stationed in Huangcang and Xigeleng to withdraw to the county seat. Thinking that the rebels at large in the hills might block the road to the county seat, they made a last-minute decision to retreat in the opposite direction—to nearby Tianjun County. They removed the bolts from the seized guns and handed them to the herdsmen for safekeeping, along with other materials. More than 30 workgroup members, riding lightly-loaded horses, rode to the Lower Hecha district of Tianjun County. On arrival, they immediately sent people to Tianjun County seat and telegrammed the provincial [party committee] to report the "rebellion situation".
After getting ammunition from Tianjun County, the workgroup members returned to Gangcha riding along the river bank, arriving at the county seat in the early morning of the 14th without any incident. Meanwhile, the provincial party committee made urgent counter-insurgency arrangements with Fu Ding, secretary of Gangcha County Party Committee, who was attending the party congress in the provincial capital. Fu Ding returned to the county armed with orders from his superiors, and meanwhile, motorcycle troops arrived from Xining on the evening of the 14th to crush the rebellion. On the 15th, the [battle of] suppression began. The troops had expected to encounter strong resistance, little did they suspect that when they entered the "rebel zone", namely Xigleng and Huangcang area, it would resemble a deserted region. There was neither armed resistance nor anyone resisting arrest or trying to escape. Mass arrests were easily accomplished without even firing a shot. In addition to all the upper strata figures who had been summoned to the prefecture and county seats in the name of study classes and meetings, the county also arrested 768 “rebels”, which accounted for about 10% of the Tibetan population of 8,000 in Gangcha at that time.
The Gangcha County Party Committee was quite confident about labelling the "rebellion" in 1958. In order to substantiate the "rebellion”, supplementary materials were later created and summarized into ten major issues. On July 7th, after the counter-rebellion campaign ended, documents such as "Special Materials on Counter-Revolutionary Bandit Leader Huabaozang’s Crimes", "Special Materials on Bandit Leader Niangba's Crimes", "Special Materials on Bandit Leader Sangdaihai's Crimes", and "Special Materials on Bandit Leader Gengtai’s Crimes”. As a matter of fact, Huabaocang and Niangba were not in Xigeleng at the time, but were implicated by making baseless charges and were accused of being behind-the-scene commanders and decision makers. Gengtai was the headman who missed the mass meeting at the Xigeleng canal construction site because he was drunk. He was a member of the county Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference [CPPCC], representative of the county People's Congress and assistant director of the ranch. As he had feared, he was indeed accused of directly participating in the rebellion: "On June 11, he sent someone to Sangdaihai, the chief Baihu, to receive the rebellion order. On June 12, he and others fired [a gunshot] at the working group, and then ordered the [rebels] to surround the workgroup. The bandits surrounded the workgroup and forced the herders of the Xigeleng tribe to participate in the rebellion."
In July 1977, during an interview trip to Haomen, the capital of Haibei Prefecture, I visited Qi Yuandan, who had experienced the whole affair. Qi was the deputy party secretary responsible for designating the Gangcha rebellion. During the Cultural Revolution he was dismissed from his position and was waiting for his own rehabilitation at the time of my visit (he later served as deputy governor of Haibei Prefecture, director of the State People’s Congress, etc.). When he recalled the "gun shooting incident" on June 12, 1958, he said in an unquestionable tone: "That gunshot was fired by enemies to create chaos and take the opportunity to clean us up. People from the military sub-region rushed into the hills, and they ran away. It rained heavily that night, but we didn’t panic, and kept the meeting going to the end. The bandits did not dare to do anything about us, they only yelled and screamed on the hilltop. The next day, except for the cooperative’s 32 families, everyone else on the construction site ran into the mountains and became bandits. We sent cooperative members to the county seat to report the situation, but our messengers were intercepted by the bandits. We had to change direction and went to Tianjun [County]."
However, the "Report on reinvestigation of the 1958 Rebellion” submitted by the Gangcha County Party Committee in January 1980, negated one by one the ten issues on which the designation of the Gangcha rebellion was based. Of the ten issues, the most important one is the "Xigeleng shooting incident." The investigation report stated: "The real situation regarding the single gunshot in Xigeleng cannot be found out now, but the location where the gunshot was fired and the point of impact were some distance away from the meeting spot. After the gunshot was fired, the masses present showed no abnormal reaction. Moreover, there was no interception and pursuit during workgroup’s retreat. The supplies left on the site, including guns, were not lost after the rebellion. Therefore, no rebellion took place in Xigeleng."
Regarding the other incident on June 12, namely the "gun stolen from Huangcang workgroup", the review report found that it was obviously a misunderstanding. As for the incident of armed riders gathered on the hilltop on the early morning of the 13th, and herders demanding the workgroup to return their guns and horses, they were indeed sent by Tudan, acting baihu of the Huangcang tribe, and their behavior showed discontent and provocation against the government. But that was all that happened, and matters did not escalate to the point of rebellion.
Gengtai’s remarks in the meeting at Gangcha’s Chaermin Commune held by an investigation team of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission in March 1980 corroborated the points presented in “Report on reinvestigation of the 1958 rebellion”. Gengtai, who was released from prison in 1979, said at the meeting: “Before liberation, I was ‘qiudaihai’ (head of ten households). After liberation, I served as assistant captain of the county’s Self-Defense Force and a member of the public security committee of Xigeleng. In early April 1958, I was working on confiscating weapons as required by the government, and took part in canal construction as well. I got four bundles of guns from Xigeleng, and the original plan was to send them to the county on June 13th. After the gunshot incident on the 12th, I was afraid that I wouldn’t be able to clear myself, so I ran away. On the third day [after the incident], Baihuguan Quehu and I went to the county intending to clear ourselves, but bumped into public security people on the road. They claimed that we were not going to the county to turn ourselves in but were trying to escape and arrested us on the spot and threw us into jail. We were struggled many times, whipped with belts, kicked by [people wearing] boots and were beaten with our clothes stripped off. The Huangcang baihu Yangshijia [Yongtsegye ?], chief Baihu Sangdaihai and Ganba Jiacan [Gyaltsen] all died during the struggle rallies. I could not endure the torture and [falsely] admitted that I was the one who instructed someone to fire the gunshot. The gun was borrowed from Huangcang tribe, for gun confiscation in their tribe hadn’t been completed yet.”
Cairijia [Tseru Gyal], formal headman of Huangcang tribe, who was arrested in 1958, given a life sentence and released in 1962, recalled at the meeting: "From June 12 to 14 1958, acting Baihu Tudan [Tubten] did hold meetings in the tribe quite a few times and proposed not to hand over guns to the government and to expel the workgroup. After the workgroup evacuated, it was true that Tudan organized scripture chanting and incense burning [ceremony] and arranged rotating patrols. Later on, the county sent other tribal chiefs over, urging us not to do this. Eventually Tudan complied. We were focusing on collecting guns when the army arrived. We were summoned to the county and arrested on arrival.” This also confirmed the conclusion of the Report: the Huangcang acting baihu’s activities did not develop into a “rebellion.”
Although the subsequent mass arrests in Gangcha County were ensured by the overall political environment, the hasty and sloppy nature of designating "Gangcha Rebellion" obviously was an inducing factor. At that time, regardless of whether they participated in the rebellion, the ethnic and religious upper-class figures in Qinghai could not avoid guilt by association if they were slightly involved in any aspect. Because of this, when the news of “Gangcha Rebellion” reached Huabaocang, the chieftain of one thousand households, who was hospitalized at the Provincial People's Hospital during that time, he was so frightened that he uttered a cry, and then refused to eat afterwards, starving himself to death. Niangba, the assistant chieftain who lived in the prefecture at the time, simply tied a wool rope on the window and hanged himself after he heard rebellion took place in Gangcha. He knew what he would have to go through would be too hard for him to bear. In fact, of the 768 people arrested at that time, besides the 8 sentenced to immediate execution, the 476 sent to prison for reform-through-labor also died. By the time of the final redress, only 215 survived, less than one-third [of the arrested]. According to Gangtsa County's "Review Report on 1958 rebellion", none of the arrested went through legal procedures at that time. The materials related to the arrests, affidavits and trial transcripts of the procuratorate were uniformly printed with wax boards afterwards.
I would like to add a few words about Hua Baozang, the accused "ringleader of the counter-revolutionary bandits." Before the liberation, he was the chieftain of one thousand households and was appointed head of the Union of “Eight-tribes around the Sea [Qinghai Lake]” by the Ma Family who ruled Qinghai for as long as forty years. He was also a deputy to the National Congress and a central government legislator. Although a feudal lord, he was a devout Buddhist as he had been a "wande" (little monk) in a monastery since he was a child, and had done a lot of generous and enlightened good things. In 1936, three captured West Wing Army soldiers fled to the Gangcha grassland. He secretly ordered the tribes in his jurisdiction to settle them properly. After the liberation, all three became local cadres. In 1941, when Ma Bufang suppressed Tibetans in Guoluo [Golok], more than 40 Tibetan families escaped and were drifting along the banks of Qinghai Lake. It was he who took care of these refugees and arranged for them to become tawa (tenants) of the monastery so they could survive, and were able to return to their homeland later.
As soon as Qinghai was liberated, he followed Master Xirao Gyatso [Sherab Gyatso]’s advice to hand over letters of appointment issued by the Nationalist government and turn in some weapons to the Xining Military Control Commission as submission to the new regime, and returned to Gangcha grassland to help stabilize the situation. After being appointed as deputy head of Gangcha County, deputy director of the Provincial Department of Industry, deputy chairman of Haibei Prefecture, and deputy governor, he actively assisted party and government work. During the "resistance to the United States and aid Korea" movement, he donated 800 silver dollars. In 1955, he donated 200,000 Yuan of idle money. In 1957, he gave up 300,000 mu [20,000 acres] of arable land and 800,000 mu [53,333.3 acres] of grassland of his tribe to establish a state-owned farm. Such a united front figure who had done so many good things for the masses and the government was falsely accused of being a "rebel". Overwhelmed by grievance and resentment, he starved himself to death.
During the suppression of the rebellion, a large number of Qinghai’s last generation Tibetan leaders fell down like Huabaozang:
Qianhu Nanmuqaixiang [Namkha Tsejang], the hereditary chieftain of the Alike tribe in Qilian County, served as the leader of the tribe for 30 years. At the beginning of the liberation, he led his people to Ebao to see General Wang Zhen who was marching into Xinjiang. After receiving ammunition support of dozens of rifles, he organized a self-defense force, and made a contribution by cooperating with the government to clean up bandits. During the Resist the US and Assist the Koreans movement, he donated silver dollars and sheepskins as a demonstration of patriotism. He served as the county magistrate of Qilian and the deputy governor of Haibei Prefecture. However, in 1958, the chieftain who had done a good job in cleaning up bandits was falsely accused of being a "rebel bandit" anyway, arrested, imprisoned and died in prison.
Qiequnjia [Choechok Gyal], the young qianhu of Qianbulu [Kyamru] tribe in Gonghe County, Hainan Prefecture, was a decent and open-minded person, and the tribe thrived under his management. After liberation, he served successively as Gonghe county magistrate and deputy governor of Hainan Prefecture. Not only did he perform outstandingly in the early days of liberation in cleaning up bandits and donating money, what was more, due to his higher educational level, he was good at accepting new things, and had achieved good results in taking the lead in improving sheep breeding and establishing local industries. Even such an upper-class minority leader with innovative spirit could not escape the catastrophe of 1958. He was imprisoned on September 18 and "died" in the provincial prison on April 15 of the following year. He was only 40 years old at the time of his death.
In 1958, Qiebenjia [Choben Gyal], qianhu of Aquhu [A-tsok] tribe in Xinghai County, went through struggle and was thrown into prison, his two uncles were implicated because of him and died in prison. Out of seven of his subordinates, known as “the seven wolves”, four died in prison. Luckily, he had the good fortune to be released in 1962 and was given a position as member of the provincial CPPCC, only to be arrested again during the “four clean-ups” movement and was released after the Cultural Revolution, and given a position as a member of the standing committee of the provincial CPPCC.
Wajia [Wangyel], qianhu of Heri [Hor] tribe, Zeku County in Huangnan Prefecture, was the third biggest herd owner of Qinghai province with 30,000 livestock. On his position as vice chairman of the Huangnan CPPCC, he took the lead in establishing a large-scale Batan ranch, assisted the government in collecting thousands of guns from herders, and organized the masses to build roads for suppressing rebellion troops. "When he heard the news of Gannan rebellion, he actively mobilized people from his tribe to hand over guns to the government, persuading the masses of his tribe to submit their guns to the government and persuaded them not to participate in the rebellion. After the rebellion was put down, he went to the province to participate in the People’s Congress and was awarded a pennant, but was arrested as soon as he returned to the prefecture.” His nephew Lajia [Lagyal?], who was also close to the government and served as deputy head of Zeku County, did not escape the fate of being punished without doing anything wrong. He was also arrested and sent for training.
As representatives of the feudal system which was destined to be eliminated, a dangerous sword of Damocles was undoubtedly dangling over the heads of chieftain and headmen. The sword might strike down at any time. The terrifying reality was that this sword could fall on him whether he was cautious or not. It depended entirely on the needs of the time and policy changes. The different fate of Xiang Qian [Wangchen], qianhu of the Ongla [Nangra] tribe in Jianzha County, Huangnan Prefecture, in different times is a good example. In the early days of the liberation, Xiangqian, together with Ma Bufang’s remaining troops, organized the Second Army of the "Anti-Communist Salvation Army" and launched a rebellion. For two years, he was repeatedly defeated, surrendered then rebelled again.
Despite being so erratic, the government did not simply eradicate them. The Northwest Bureau, represented by Comrade Xi Zhongxun, instructed Qinghai leaders to work patiently for political win-over as many as 17 times. In the end, he amended his erratic ways and wholeheartedly submitted. On August 11, 1952, Xiang Qian bowed down and presented a white silk scarf to Xi Zhongxun in Lanzhou and confessed his guilt. He was granted leniency by the government, and was given the position of county magistrate of Jianzha and the deputy governor of Huangnan Prefecture. This incident was widely circulated at the time and became a classic example of implementing ethnic policies. Even Mao Zedong praised Comrade Xi Zhongxun: "Zhu Geliang captured Meng Huo seven times, you are better than Zhu Geliang.” However, in 1958, the repentant and law-abiding Xiang Qian who had been working for the government was accused of participating in rebellion, and criticized without having done anything wrong. He was dismissed from his government positions and died of illness the following year in distress and anguish.
Among all the fallen Tibetan qianhu, there is an old one who had a special relationship with Wang Luobin, a musician at home and abroad. I have interviewed his descendants and learned a lot about his heart-rending experiences. This is the subject of the next chapter, the story about Mr. Tong Quhu, qianhu of Jinyintan.
 Translator’s note: See Jianglin Li, Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959, chapter 4.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Kangtsa Dzong, Tsojang.
 Quoted from archival mimeograph.
 Translator’s note: today’s Jiermeng Township, Gangcha County.
 Quoted from archival mimeograph.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Wangtsang Sholma, Khotse, Rumang, “Xigeleng” (Siglung?) is probably Shulmo Monastery, a tent monastery belonging to the Xigeleng tribe.
 Translator’s note: a German-made Mauser rifle, popularly known in China as “7-9 rifle” for its 7.92 mm caliber.
 “Idle money” was in fact a government levy from the ethnic and religious upper strata in the name of hydraulic and other public service projects. During an interview with Longzhou (Luncho?) after his comeback (whom I will mention later), he poured out the agony of having to borrow money to pay the large sum of “idle money” levied from him.
 Translator’s note: the site is located in today’s Jiermeng Township in the southwest of Gangtsa County, bordering Tianjun County.
 Baihuguan: literally means “leader of one hundred households”.
 Translator’s note: today’s Khongya Township, Gangtsa County.
 Translator’s note: Tib: Themchen.
 Translator’s note: Hua Baocang, known to Tibetans as Gangtsa Tongpon Palsang, or Gangtsa’s Qianhu Palsang, was the “Qianhu” (“Chieftain of a Thousand Households”) of Gangcha area. In 1953 he was elected head of Gangcha County.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Nyangpa [?], Hua Baocang’s assistant, or assistant Qianhu.
 Translator’s note: Tib. unclear. He was Hua Baocang’s brother-in-law and was chosen by Hua as the general chieftain of a hundred households. Both Nyangpa and Sangdaihai were elected assistant county leaders.
 All four documents are archival mimeographs. At the end of “Special Materials on Bandit Leader Hua Baocang’s Crimes” it was written: “Our opinion is to give him the death sentence and execute him on the spot at a mass meeting of the whole county.”
 Quoted from "Special Materials on Bandit Leader Gengtai’s Crimes”.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Julak.
 This is a document submitted by Gangcha County Party Committee to Heibei Prefecture Party Committee dated January 24, 1980. It presented abundant information and clear opinions. The first part of the report is about the situation based on which Gangcha was identified as a rebellion in 1958. The situation was summarized into ten issues. The second part presents the results from the review, clarifying the ten issues one by one, and demonstrating that no rebellion had taken place in Gangcha County. This article only cited the two most critical issues. The last part of the document is suggestions on how to handle the leftover problems, including appropriate arrangements for some wrongly-handled cadres, workers and ethnic and religious upper-class figures.
 This meeting was held in then Chaermin Commune, Gangcha County. In addition to members of the investigation team, participants include Gengsang [Kunsang] and Dangzeng [Tenzin], secretary and deputy secretary of the commune’s CCP committee. People involved in the 1958 rebellion include Cairijia, former headman of Huangcang tribe, Gengtai, former headmen of Rimang and Xigeleng tribes, both named Gengtai, and others. At the meeting they still had a doubtful and fearful attitude, and were restraint. It is unlikely that they dared to give false testimonies. Their accounts were truthful and trustworthy.
 Translator’s note: Ganba (Tib. Genpa) refers to an elder monk or retired gekoe (monk disciplinarian), who is influential within the monastery but does not hold any formal office.
 Translator’s note: The West Wing Army was formed with the main force of the Fourth Army under Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong’s rival during the Long March. In October 1936 they followed the order of CCP Central Committee to cross the Yellow River to capture Gansu and Ningxia and were confronted by Ma Bufang’s troops. The West Wing Army was defeated in March 1937.
 Source of this paragraph is “Huabaocang before and after the liberation” in Qinghai wenshi ziliao (Qinghai literary and historical materials), vol. 17, compiled and published by Qinghai Provincial CPPCC, 1988. Translator’s note: in Chinese open publications, he is said to have “died of illness in hospital”.
 Translator’s note: Arik, the largest Tibetan tribe in Qilian County.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Ugpao. Today’s Ugpao Township, Qilian County.
 Source of this paragraph comes from “Nanmuka Caixiang at the beginning of the liberation”. This article was published in Qinghai wenshi ziliao jicui: renwujuan (Collection of Qinghai literary and historical materials: biographies), compiled and published by Qinghai Provincial CPPCC, 2001.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Chabcha.
 Source of this paragraph is “ A few anecdotes about Qiequnjia”. This article was published in Qinghai wenshi ziliao jicui: renwujuan (Collection of Qinghai literary and historical materials: biographies), compiled and published by Qinghai Provincial CPPCC, 2001.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Tsikorthang.
 Source of this paragraph is “Oral narration of Qiebenjia”. This article was published in Qinghai wenshi ziliao jicui: zongjiaojuan (Collection of Qinghai literary and historical materials: religion), compiled and published by Qinghai Provincial CPPCC, 2001.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Tsekhok.
 Source of this paragraph is Li Wei: “The serious problem regarding magnification of the 1958 suppressing rebellion.” Translator’s note: This is a report written by Li Wei for Internal Reference, a high-level classified publication for CCP leaders.
 Translator’s note: Tib. Chentsa.
 Translator’s note: Zhu Geliang is a Chinese historical figure. More about him here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhuge_Liang
 Wu Jiang, “Qing Chuan tan Xi Zhongxun ersanshi” (Qing Chuan tells two or three things about Xi Zhongxun). Wenhui dushu zhoubao, June 27, 2008.