Translated by Jianglin Li
Edited by Matthew Akester
*All notes and square brackets added by translator*
Forwarding
"Several Opinions on Broader and In-depth Political
Work to Win-over Rebels" by the Party Committee of the Hainan Command
for Suppressing Rebellion
Chairman Mao’s instructions:
Comrades Ke Cheng, Tan Zheng:[1] The document by the Hainan
Headquarters[2]
Party Committee is a Marxist document with profound guiding significance.
Please forward it to party committees in Tibet, Chengdu, and Kunming in the
name of the Central Military Commission, and transmit it to the party committees
of the units engaged in suppressing rebellion under their command, and local
party committees to be studied and implemented according to local conditions.
Mao Zedong
June 2, 1959
Tibet, Chengdu, Kunming
Military Commands, Huang Headquarters[3]
and Lanzhou Military Command Party Committees:
The document “Several opinions
on broader and in-depth political work to win over rebels” by the Hainan Headquarters
for Suppressing Rebellion Party Committee, with the Qinghai Military Command’s and
Chairman Mao’s instructions, is hereby forwarded to you. Please immediately forward
it to the party committees of respective units, and local party committees
(provincial, prefectural and county) for careful study and implementation based
on the local situation.
Military Commission
June 4, 1959
Forwarding “Several opinions on broader and In-depth political work to win over
rebels” by Hainan Headquarters Party Committee
Command headquarters, the
First Cavalry Division, Qinghai Military Command, Gannan Military Sub-command
(cc [Gannan] Prefecture Party Committee) and report to the [PLA] General Political Department:
[This document] has revealed
many important issues in the current struggle against the rebellion, especially
regarding the arrangements for the struggle, the differentiated implementation
of policies for handling [rebels], and the work on the masses. It is worthy of
attention and study. It is hereby forwarded to you for your reference.
Political Department, Lanzhou
Military Command
May 28, 1959
Qinghai Provincial Party Committee’s
comment and reply to Hainan Headquarters Party Committee regarding “Several
suggestions on broader and In-depth political work to win over rebels”
The report by the Hainan
Headquarters Party Committee on May 22 is very important. It has reflected many
of the major problems in the current struggle against rebellion. The opinions
raised are correct. Party committees at all levels are expected to conscientiously
implement them. At present, the main focus of our work in the suppressing-rebellion
area must be striving to win over the masses (including the work of winning
over rebels) to completely eliminate the rebellion and stabilize social order
as soon as possible, properly arrange production and other work, and combine
suppressing rebellion with production and other tasks for mutual improvement.
The practices of the Xinghai County Party Committee are obviously wrong and
should be changed immediately.
According to recent reports
from various localities, while strengthening military operations to clean up
rebel bandits, great efforts have been made in political work to win over
[rebels] and have achieved great results. However, in some regions, some units
had poor understanding of the importance of political work, and prefer military
clean-up operations over political winning-over activities. Such situations
must be quickly turned around. On the basis of mobilizing the masses, all the
areas where suppressing rebellion is underway should take the struggle against
the enemy and political winning-over work one step further. Thoroughly put the
spirit of the Zhengzhou Conference[4] into practice and implement
various resolutions of the 11th plenary meeting of the provincial party
committee: in areas where people’s communes have been established, problems
with the production teams’ ownership system and livestock trade-in for commune
membership[5] must be promptly solved.
Making proper arrangements for people’s life and productivity is the key to
arouse and win-over the masses and to conduct in-depth and broader political
work to win over [the rebels]. Those [“elements”] surrendered or captured on
the battlefield should be treated with leniency, regardless of the magnitude of
their crimes. [The policy of] no killing, no imprisoning, no sentencing, no
struggle, and the awarding of those [surrendered rebels] who had rendered
meritorious service should be applied to all surrendered or won-over rebels. Humiliating
and torturing captives is strictly forbidden. All coerced and deceived masses,
women and children, should be sent back home as soon as they have been interrogated, and make good arrangements for their
life and productive work. Rebel leaders and diehards should be put under collective
surveillance, do not arrest or sentence [them], handle in accordance with each
individual’s behavior after a period of collective re-education training. Meanwhile,
grasp every opportunity and take advantage of all the conditions available to
spread our suppressing rebellion policies broadly and deeply among rebels. It
is only by handling those who surrendered voluntarily with leniency, and those
still recalcitrant with severe punishment, that the political win-over work can
be strengthened, and the complete victory of the struggle against rebellion can
be achieved as soon as possible.
CCP Qinghai Provincial
Committee
May 26, 1959
Several
Opinions on Broader and In-depth
Political Work to Win-over Rebels
CCP
Committee of Hainan Headquarters
May 24, 1959
Due to close integration of military
strikes and mobilizing the masses, remarkable results have been achieved in
political win-over work on enemies in Hainan and Huangnan prefectures. From April 4 to May 22, a total of 429 enemies
(excluding 118 women and children liberated) were incapacitated, of whom 217
surrendered, accounting for 50% of the total number. This fact once again
proves the correctness of the suppressing rebellion policy that integrates
military strikes, political winning-over and mobilizing the masses. In order to thoroughly implement this policy,
pushing the political winning-over work to a new stage, larger scale and more
in-depth, adapting it to the current situation in the struggle against the
enemies to achieve greater victories, in addition to training our troops to
carry out political offensives with the masses, on the way to battle, we also learned
and studied the progress of local political win-over work with prefectural and
county party committee leaders, and discussed ideas of how to improve the work.
Our general feeling is that the political winning-over work has been widely
carried out and has achieved great results, but the development is extremely
uneven. Many comrades (local and military) failed to gain full understanding
that essentially political winning-over means to win over the masses.
Therefore, they were timid and hesitant in setting up guidelines for this work,
and new situations and problems brought about by in-depth struggle have not
been universally emphasized and resolved. In certain areas, the practice is
still far behind the need of the struggle, so the political offensive in these
areas has not yet been widely and intensively launched. In order to further
improve this work, we propose the following suggestions:
(1) Issues
concerning the relationship and arrangement between the two major tasks of
counterinsurgency and production:
At present, many local party
committees and leadership organs have not yet properly prioritized the tasks of
counter-insurgency and production, and tend to ease down on counter-insurgency
on a different level. Specifically, they take production as the central task, rarely
getting involved in suppressing rebellion or just getting involved in a
superficial manner, rarely making serious assessment of the situation, lacking
strong leadership in policy implementation, and sidelining the serious task [of
counter-insurgency] to technical departments (mainly the public security
bureaus). Take Xinghai County[6] as an example. Rebel
bandits were scattered in areas covering 70% of the county (a total of more
than 2,600, being the county with the most rebels in Hainan) with aggressive
and arrogant attitude. Until now, rebel bandits are still robbing and
plundering everywhere. Maoduo Township[7] alone lost 130,000 cattle
and sheep and more than a thousand horses to the rebels. Bad people colluding
with bandits are hiding in most of the county’s production teams. The bandits were notified as soon as the
militia cavalry company stationed in Wenquan Township[8] was dispatched, and took
the opportunity to plunder. When the company rushed there, the bandits had
already fled. As a result, the cavalry missed the rebels six times. The masses are
confused, and fail to differentiate between the enemy and ourselves. From
January to May 15th this year, 441 people in the county left home to become bandits,
even in the Daheba[9]
production team, located 25 km from the county seat, more than 50 people ran
away [to join the rebels].
On March 16th, when moving to another pasture, the masses of Oumagou
in Wenquan Township intentionally drove yaks in front and left 660 dri
behind to be driven away by the bandits. Under such a situation, the county
party committee still has not taken suppressing rebellion as a priority. In mid-March,
when the rebels were running rampant, the county’s leading comrades went to Wenquan
Township only to inspect productivity, and made no mention of the political
offensive. On the 15th of May, Nanmutang[10] had more than 2,000 sheep
taken away by bandits, and even the herders ran away with the rebels. When Section
Chief Li of the Hainan Military Sub-Command proposed to the township leaders to
strengthen the struggle against the enemy, the answer was: “nothing can be done,
production is our central task.” Some township party secretaries in this county
are even unwilling to engage in political struggles, claiming that [they are]
“too busy with production, no time for this”. When running out of excuses, they
would say “We will try”. Due to lack of
leadership, the county has not won over a single rebel since February. On the
contrary, from last winter when troops pulled out till now, more than one
thousand people have fled to be bandits. Some of the masses even lived together
with the bandits and failed to report them to the authorities.
We believe that as the
rebellion gradually subsides, emphasis in local work should be shifted more to
production, in order to develop the economy and improve peoples’ material and
cultural life. This is a necessary condition to consolidate unity of the people.
However, in the situation where the struggle against the enemy is still very
difficult, It is not appropriate to shift the center of work to production too
early, and to conceptually separate production from suppressing rebellion.
Based on the current situation in Hainan (and Huangnan), we suggest that in
areas where suppressing rebellion still is a major task, suppressing rebellion should
be the center of work arrangement (as in Henan,[11] Xinghai etc.), and
production-related work should be arranged under this premise. Areas in which
rebellion has basically settled but still have a few rebel remnants left should
pay equal attention to production and suppressing rebellion, taking care of suppressing
rebellion on the one hand and production on the other, striving to completely
eliminate the remaining rebels as soon as possible (such as Tongde,[12] Zeku,[13] etc.) so as to stabilize
social order and create the necessary social conditions to develop production
on a larger scale. In areas where rebellion has been completely put down, it is
necessary to carry out suppressing rebellion propaganda and class education,
and provide logistic support to the front-line troops at the same time as doing
production-related work. Within a county, focus can also be determined in
accordance with specific situations. However, whether it is based on suppressing
rebellion or on production, it is necessary to unify the two, so they can enhance
each other. In areas where rebellion is still active, our slogan should be to first
defend production, and secondly to develop production. Without defending
production, there is no way to develop production. Therefore, the rebel
bandits’ robbery of cattle (130,000 alone in Maoduo Township) and the loss of
production will not be restored for many years to come. Even in areas where
production is the mainstay, we should also make good use of suppressing
rebellion to educate and mobilize the masses. Therefore, [leaders of] counties
and townships should conduct a comprehensive analysis and study of the current local
situation to formulate clear guidelines and set the focus of work so as to
truly grasp the main issues before manpower can be organized to strengthen the
current struggle, and push other work forward.
II．On policy issues related to
surrendered and captured rebels
Since April, a favorable
situation for political winning-over has emerged, but the results demonstrated
great variance from place to place. The basic reason for this variance is whether
the party’s suppressing-rebellion policy has been correctly implemented. Taking
Tongde and Xinghai counties as an example, Tongde had a deviation in following
the policy last year, which brought adverse consequences for winning-over work.
For instance, in Shizang and Laga areas,[14] the favorable situation of military strikes in
winter was used to win back 79 rebels. However, 51, or 61%, of the surrendered
rebels were quickly arrested. Since then, not a single rebel returned. Later on,
it was only after the policy of no killing, no imprisonment, no sentencing, no struggle,
and awarding those who offer meritorious service, was strictly applied to all
the rebels who surrendered voluntarily, that [winning-over] work was able to
resume again. From January to May 10 this year, the county called back 321 rebels,
and the number of surrendering rebels is increasing month by month: 31 in March,
76 in April, and 91 in the first 10 days of May. Among the surrendering rebels,
ringleaders and key rebels are also increasing month by month: 9 in March (4 ringleaders, 5 key rebels), 44 in
April (10 ringleaders, 34 key rebels), 13 in early May (6 ringleaders, 7 key
rebels). Now the county party committee has proposed that even without troops
stationed in the county to clear [the rebels], they are confident of using the political
offensive to win over all the remaining bandits.
Let us take a look at the
situation in Xinghai. From last year when the troops withdrew till February
this year, 235 rebels were called back in this county. However, due to the failure to properly
implement the policy, random arrests and executions have brought serious
consequences for the work. For example, in Wenquan Township, 10 of the
surrendering elements were arrested and sentenced, among those 4 can be traced
and proved to be wrongly arrested, and 5 wrongly killed. For example, Lashize
[Rakshi Tse?], chief of the Zhiheilang [Tseknang?] tribe, was called back by
county party secretary Daluo [Dhalo] with a written message. He brought more
than 50 rebels back with him when he surrendered, but he was soon arrested and
dealt with. After the head of Kuashike [Kharkor?] tribe was called back, he was
killed on the way while being escorted to Daheba [Tahopa]. At present, due to
insufficient disclosure, it is still impossible to find out how many wrongful
arrests and killings there have been in the county. [In some cases], even the killers
have been found, but the persons responsible [for issuing the order] cannot be
identified. Although the matter took place 6 months earlier, the killings were
witnessed by some people, and a number of corpses have been dug up by the
masses. This created an extremely bad impact. Rebel bandits claimed that “the
communist party ate their words” and refused to surrender. Before the end of
April, the county sent 27 people to try to win over the rebels, but only 1
person returned. Four joined the rebels, and 1 was killed, nine were taken off
to the mountains and detained in shackles. The whereabouts of 12 people was
unknown. In addition, the county did not take suppressing rebellion as the
first priority, and the leadership in the struggle against the enemy is weak. As
a result, since February, not a single rebel was won back. On the contrary, up
to a thousand of the masses have fled to the mountains to become bandits.
In view of the above two situations,
we believe that unifying the cadres' understanding of the political offensive so
as to unswervingly implement the party's policies is the determining condition
for fighting a good political battle. Right now, the bandit ringleaders, key
rebels and ordinary rebels all have various concerns. Those who have blood
debts and committed many robberies are afraid of being executed. Herd owners
believe that the communist party treats the poor well and will not be lenient
to the rich and well-to-do herd owners who have run away to be bandits. Living
buddhas[15] and akha [monks] think that the communist party cannot stand scripture
chanters and they have no doubt that they will be handled as strictly as
possible. Former cadres, party and youth league members worry that the party
and people will not forgive them. Ordinary rebels are afraid that we will kill
them once they surrender. Generally speaking, rebel ringleaders and key rebels
afraid of being executed, or imprisoned and sentenced after surrender were relieved
of these fears, but were still afraid of being struggled, as it is face-to-face
with the masses.
At the moment, the masses in
the areas where our work goes smoothly demonstrate strong hatred for the bandits.
They call the surrendered [rebels] “bandits”, and call their wives “tu mao”
(bandit wife), even the sheep and horses brought back by surrendered rebels are
named “tu lu” (bandit sheep) and “tu shi da” (bandit horse). After Duobo [?] the
bandit ringleader from Tongde [county] surrendered, the masses who had been robbed of cattle and
clothing, and beaten, and whose loved ones were coerced by him to be bandits
and lost their lives, wanted to beat him, announcing that "if the
government does not do anything about him, we will handle him ourselves." Duobo
was under such pressure that he stayed at home less than two days before going
out to call back other bandits, even though the government gave him ten days to
rest. Based on the above-mentioned
situation, for the purpose of dividing the enemy, it is our belief that:
(1) Surrendered
rebel bandits and battlefield captives should be strictly distinguished, and
treated accordingly. For all surrendered
rebel bandits, no matter who they are, the provincial party committee’s policy
of no killing, no imprisonment, no sentencing, no struggle must be resolutely
implemented. However, after surrender, bandit ringleaders and key rebels should
bow to the masses to plead guilty and demonstrate their determination not to
rebel again and to turn over a new leaf through gradually participating in
productive labor and compliance with law. When the masses want to struggle [the
rebels], they must be persuaded [not to do this] while acknowledging their
demand for justice. If surrendered elements rebel again, however, they will be
strictly dealt with. For the battlefield
captives, coerced and deceived general masses should be quickly released after education.
Other than that, ringleaders and key rebels should be strictly dealt with.
(2) Considering
that with the victory of the struggle against rebellion, prisoners of war and
surrendering elements in the pastoral areas will surely increase, that widespread
violations of policy regarding captives and surrenders took place in Hainan
last year with lasting impact, also considering that the social foundation of
the enemy still exists in large numbers (according to a survey in Tongde county,
there are 2,500 rebel family members, 1,637 monks returned to lay life, and 1,819
released prisoners and captured rebels, adding up to 5,956 or 36% of the total
population of the county), slight mistakes in implementing policies will cause
considerable impact. Therefore, policies should be handled with prudence.
Policies and the enemy situation should be carefully studied, not handled in a
careless way. At present, some counties have proposed to take advantage of the
opportunity of having troops in the county for military operations to make some
arrests as a way to pursue the suppression of counter-revolution struggle in
depth, but we believe that in order to facilitate the work of winning over
enemies, other than some current
counter-revolutionary conspiracy rebellion cases, it is best not to make arrests in general. In
the cases of arrests that have to be made, it is better to control the number
and make the arrests public, and organize the masses for public discussion of
the cases, so as to distinguish between right and wrong, educate the people and
reduce social impact. Doing this is not to cover up class struggle, but to
attack the enemy with a more ingenious and strategic approach.
(3) We
believe that it is necessary to do a case clean-up as soon as possible. Rebels called
back or captured last year should not have been arrested or sentenced but this
was done mistakenly. A batch of them should be quickly corrected and released, their
lives should be properly resettled in order to reclaim them, as a way to
restore and expand the influence of our policies.
(4) Policy violation in Xinghai County last year
was relatively serious. It has yet to be fully exposed. It is not appropriate
to hastily discipline cadres involved directly or indirectly, to avoid cover-up
under heavy pressure. That will not be to our advantage in distinguishing right
and wrong and educating cadres. Case inspections should be aimed at correcting
mistakes and educating cadres, and it is better to discipline and dispose of
the few cadres who committed serious mistakes with horrendous results.
III.
On the question of mobilizing the masses
and struggling against enemies. The essence of extensive political
winning-over work is to win over the masses. Therefore, we must keep internal
unity, raise [class] awareness, consolidate the confidence for victory, and
organize the masses to fight against the enemy. The following are urgent issues
at the present time:
（1） Take
care of people’s lives. At present, food
shortage in the pastoral areas is quite serious. On top of that, poor
management and the robbery, rumors and instigations of rebel bandits have
created confusion in the minds of the masses. For example, due to insufficient
food, the masses of Wenquan township,
Xinghai County, had to eat the carcasses of sheep that died last winter,
resulting in many cases of sickness and death.
Maode (female) from Shuanglong Gorge ran into six rebels while chopping
firewood. They asked her: [will we be] killed if [we] surrender? Her answer: “There’s
nothing to eat after returning, even if you are not killed you would die of
hunger anyway.” Since last November, 319 people, or 24.7% of the total
population of the township, died of sickness. The masses believed that they
died of starvation (there are actually more causes), and were resentful toward us.
From last December to May 10th of this year, 165 people have run away
to join the bandits. The food issue is very common and has affected the fight
against the enemy. It is reported that the provincial party committee
originally stipulated the standard of rations in pastoral areas to be half a
catty per person per day, but in some areas, in order to save food, the ration
was reduced to 5 liang,[16] coupled with poor
management and failure to actively seek substitute foods, resulting in food
shortage. To improve the masses’ current living condition, we suggest that in
the areas where social order has been restored, ration should be kept at half a
catty [per person per day] and should not be reduced. Food substitutes should
be actively sought as a supplement. In borderland areas where struggle against
enemies [was on-going], consider increasing rations based on the actual
situation. Areas heavily looted by enemies should be given relief. Party
committees at all levels should make the lives of the masses the priority. More
effort should be put into prevention and control of infectious diseases, so as
to quickly stop human and animal deaths.
（2） Strengthen
ideological and political work with the masses. In some areas, education has
basically stopped since last winter, and all effort has been put into
production work. As a result, the masses in many places do not understand the
nature, situation, and policies of the struggle to suppress the rebellion. They
are still uncertain whether we or the enemy will win the victory, and therefore
they are liable to believe the rebels’ rumors. We suggest that the prefecture party
committee make an inspection of this issue, and adopt active measures to
educate the masses. Every place the troops go, they should also do propaganda
work (currently, main focus should be on the ownership issues, and the victories
in suppressing rebellion in Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet).
（3） Improve
grassroots cadres’ work-style. According to our investigation with some rebels,
one of the reasons they become bandits is due to some grassroot cadres’ forceful
orders and violations of law and discipline. It is recommended that the cadres’
workstyle be readdressed during the process of reorganizing communes and
implementing the [policy of] decentralizing the commune system.
（4）
Allow the masses to conduct legitimate
religious activities in public, and respect Tibetan people’s customs. Last year,
when struggle against religious privilege and atheist debate with the masses
were held, many people had unclear views regarding the party’s religious policy
and dared not conduct religious activities in public. However, hidden religious
activities are easily used by the enemy. Considering that religious beliefs
have profound social and class roots and cannot be eliminated by simple means,
as long as religion is not used to engage in counter-revolutionary activities,
it should be allowed in public. Moreover, akhas who have returned to lay
life but want to continue to chant scriptures should be permitted to do so, and
Tibetan people’s customs should be respected. At present, Tibetan women in some
areas have changed the two-braid hair style back to multiple braids[17] and wore ornaments, and
they should be allowed to do as they wish. This is taking a risk to unite the greatest
possible number of people to fight against the enemy, in order to reach the
goal of quickly eliminating the enemy
and building a new life going forward.
Most of the above are reports on the situation. Due to incomplete assessment, it is inevitable
that the opinions will be one-sided. Please make comments and give instruction
if appropriate.
Document 2
Document 3
Document 4
Document 5
Document 6
[1]
Huang Kecheng （1902-1986）was Deputy
Minister of National Defense at the time.
He was purged a few months later for criticizing the Great Leap Forward
during the Lushan Conference (July-August 1959). Tan Zheng (1902-1983) was
Director of People's Liberation Army General Political Department at the time.
[2]
“Hainan Headquarters” is the short form of Hainan Headquarters for Suppressing
Rebellion, a military command organ established on August 2, 1958, responsible
for suppressing Tibetan rebellion in Hainan (Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture, Qinghai Province. The leadership group was formed by commanders
from the PLA 55th and 134th infantry Divisions and Hainan
Military Sub-Command.
[3]
Huang Headquarters was the command headquarters named after its commander Huang
Xingting, Deputy Commander of Chengdu Military Command, formed at the order of
the CCP Central Committee on March 11, 1959. It was responsible for suppressing
Tibetan rebellion in the Chamdo region.
[4]
It is likely that this refers to the Second Zhengzhou Conference held from
February 27 to March 5, 1959. Mao Zedong made a speech on February 27,
criticizing “left-leaning” mistakes during the People’s Commune Movement.
[5] When herders joined the commune, their
livestock was given an estimated price to be paid back in installments over a
fixed number of years.
[6] （Tib.) Tsigortang.
[7]
Cannot be identified in today’s administrative division, could be a temporary
setup in late 1950s.
[8]
(Tib.) Namtang.
[9]
(Tib.) Tahopa. Today’s Tahopa Township.
[10]
Likely the Chinese transliteration of Namtang, the Tibetan name of Wenquan
Township.
[11]
Henan Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous County. (Tib.) Yulgenyin Sogrig Rangkyong
Dzong.
[12]
(Tib.) Gepa Sumdo.
[13] (Tib.) Tsekok.
[14]
Shizang (Tib. Tsanggar ) is the area
around Tsanggar monastery in Tongde County. Laga is the area around Ragya
monastery in Maqin (Tib. Machen) County, Guoluo (Tib, Golog) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture.
[15]
The Chinese refer to reincarnated lamas as
huofo, literally “living
Buddha”.
[16] From
1932 to 1959, one catty or Jin was 16 liang. One liang was 31.25
grams.
[17]
Two-braid style is Chinese women’s hair style. Tibetan women in Qinghai
pastoral region traditionally wear multiple braids.
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