“Suppressing Rebellion in Tibet” and the China-India Border War
Jianglin Li
Edited by Matthew Akester
From June to August 2017, a
prolonged standoff between Chinese and Indian soldiers took place in the Droklam
grassland in Bhutan, bordering the strategic Chumbi valley in occupied TIbet. Video
clips circulated on social media showing soldiers from the two sides pushing
and shoving each other, but eventually the status quo was restored without
resort to arms. On June 29th, senior Colonel Wu Qian, deputy
director of the Defence Ministry’s Information Bureau and the Ministry’s press
spokesman, warned “certain persons in Indian army to keep historical lessons in
mind”.[1]
Dai Xu, former senior colonel in the PLA air force and a well-known hawk, wrote
in his blog that in 1962 “China only used a knife to kill a chicken [part of an
idiom - “no need to slaughter a chicken with the knife used to slaughter an
ox”] to deal with India the ox, and that was enough to make it run like a mad
cow. This is enough to show that both sides are not at the same level.”[2]
Dai’s implication: India will certainly be defeated in another border war.
No doubt the 1962 border
war was a big defeat for India. In the decades since, numerous books and
articles have been published dealing with its cause, process and result. In
this article, I would like to present a few historical details from Chinese
sources that may have gone unnoticed. These concern the eastern sector of the
conflict, on which some documentary sources are available.
A war for which China was “unprepared”?
In 2005, Military History, a magazine produced for the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, published an interview with Yin Fatang, former first secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee and a veteran of the 1962 war. During the interview, Yin claimed that the PLA had gone into the war unprepared.[3] Ding Sheng, who served as the commander of the 54th Army and led PLA forces on the Walong front of the eastern sector, echoed Yin in his 2008 memoir. He explained that in October 1962, the 130th division of the 54th army, one of the main PLA forces involved, was stationed in Sichuan, and scattered in a dozen locations for agricultural work. On October 28th, he received the order to fight the Indian army at Walong. These troops were hastily mobilized, issued warm clothing and rushed to Tibet for the battle at short notice.[4] Both Yin and Ding gave the impression that all was well along the China-India border until October 1962, when war suddenly broke out.
The China-India border
dispute came about after China occupied Tibet, bringing the two Asian giants
suddenly face to face. The PRC government learned about the McMahon Line in
1952, after the newly formed branch office of China’s Foreign Ministry absorbed
the former foreign office of the Kashag government and acquired its archival
documents.[5]
In the early 1950s, China
needed India’s help to send supplies into Tibet, so that the PLA could consolidate
the occupation. India was quite generous in providing this help. In 1952,
Beijing “used diplomatic channels” to ship 2,500 tons of rice from Guangdong
province to Calcutta, and transport it up to Tibet through Yadong (Dromo). By
April 1953, all the rice had arrived. This basically solved the food supply
problem for PLA troops, and enabled them to establish a preliminary footing in
Tibet.[6]
Zhou Enlai’s 1954
directive on the border issue is recalled by Wang Gui, former director of the Tibet
Military Command Political Department’s liaison office:
China’s Indian policy should be striving for co-existence
with India based on the Five Principles, striving to make it anti-US aggression
and anti-war. India is still under British and American influence, so we want
to win it over. As for the border issue, issues regarding areas such as Tawang ，Lhoyul that
had been excluded by the McMahon Line, and issues regarding the ownership of
other places, should be solved in future at the appropriate time due to
insufficient documents now. The stronger China is, the more solid national
unity is, the more India’s attitude will change.[7]
However, less than three months
after the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement in August 1954, China and India began
to exchange notes, memos and letters on border disputes.[8]
Over the following years, the border issue gradually intensified, leading to
the first armed clash in August 25th 1959, and eventually developed
into a border war between the two countries.
In March 1959, a series of
critical events played out in Lhasa. From March 25th to April 5th, the
CCP Central Committee held an enlarged politburo meeting, and the seventh
plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee in Shanghai. “Pacification of
rebellion in Tibet” and relations with India were two of the issues discussed. Wu Lengxi, who was then head of Xinhua News
Agency and chief editor of the People’s Daily, revealed a glimpse of Mao’s thinking
on the China-India relationship in his memoir: “Let the Indian government commit
all the wrongs for now. When the time comes, we will settle accounts with
them.”[9]
Mao was brooding on
“settling accounts” with India as early as March 1959, yet on May 15th,
he added the following words to a letter from the Chinese foreign ministry to
the Indian foreign ministry:
China’s main attention and principle of struggle is
focused on the east, the West Pacific region, on the ferocious American
imperialism, not on India, the southeast or south Asian countries at all.
…China will not be so stupid as to make enemies with the US in the east, and
make enemies with India in the west. Pacification of rebellion and implementing
democratic reform in Tibet would pose no threat to India whatsoever.[10]
This letter was sent the
next day. Probably this assurance from Mao himself made the Indian government
believe that China would not take border disputes to the level of military
confrontation. It is not clear whether Indian intelligence knew that at the
time Mao made this statement, infantry division 11 was fighting Tibetan
resistance forces in the Chamdo area. Less than four years later, this
battle-hardened division would fight at the Namka Chu, the first battle of the
border war with India.
Over the next few months,
both sides were quite vocal in accusing each other of “expansionism”, meanwhile
thousands of PLA troops were dispatched to Tibet to wage a war of considerable
scale, bloodily suppressing Tibetan resistance. From March 1959 to March 1962, the
PLA fought 12 major battles in central Tibet, targeting resistance forces and
refugees from Kham and Amdo. PLA combat forces included troops under the Tibet
Military Command as well as the 54th Field Army commanded by General
Ding Sheng and troops under the Lanzhou, Kunming and Chengdu Military Commands.
The 130th Division of the 54th Army played a key role in the war, only returning
to Chengdu in December 1961 to take up agricultural production. In other words,
at the time when the border war with India broke out, it had been less than a
year since Ding’s troops pulled back from Tibet after three years of fighting.
In early April 1959, the PLA
launched the battle of Lhoka. In his memoir, Wang Tingsheng, then the assistant
director of the 54th Army Division 134’s scout unit and a veteran of
the battle of Lhoka, published a sketch map indicating PLA movements during the
battle. It shows that PLA soldiers crossed the McMahon Line at three locations
in pursuit of escaping Tibetans.[11]
He also recalled that on April 16th PLA soldiers occupied the Tsona
pass (north of Bum-la). A couple of days later, some Indian soldiers showed up with
a sign reading “this is Indian territory”, and the two sides had a standoff.[12]
The first phase of the Lhoka campaign lasted about three weeks. By the end of April, PLA troops started the second phase: to clear up the rebel remnants, which took over two months. Once PLA troops closed up the “line of actual control”, i.e. the McMahon Line, the next phase of the campaign, “democratic reform” and the establishment of local government organs, could begin.
The first phase of the Lhoka campaign lasted about three weeks. By the end of April, PLA troops started the second phase: to clear up the rebel remnants, which took over two months. Once PLA troops closed up the “line of actual control”, i.e. the McMahon Line, the next phase of the campaign, “democratic reform” and the establishment of local government organs, could begin.
It is not clear how much
the Indian government knew of the PLA’s intense military activities in Tibet, but
given the impact on the Himalayan regions of India, it is little surprise that
tensions escalated in 1959, and remained high until the outbreak of war three
years later.
A “knife to slaughter a bull” in Tibet?
If the PLA used a “chicken knife” to deal with the Indian army, as Dai claims, this was certainly not the case with the army’s treatment of resisting and escaping Tibetans.
In order to understand the scale of the war waged on Tibetans in Kham, Amdo and central Tibet from 1956 to 1962, I was able to gather various statistics, including participating PLA military commands, branches involved, numbers of combat forces and logistical support units, amount of supplies, etc. I also analyzed a number of major battles. Chinese official sources indicate that seven of the twelve military commands were directly involved, and another two of them provided logistic support. The cumulative total of combat forces reached over 200,000, not including logistics personnel, local militia and civilians drafted for transportation, road building, etc. The Central Military Commission sent nearly all PLA military branches to fight in Tibet, even the newly-formed chemical warfare unit.
The question is: why? From the memoirs of PLA commanders and soldiers, it is quite clear that they knew that their enemies were groups of disorganized civilians, including women, children, the elderly and monks. Less than half the members of these groups were “combat capable”, meaning young and middle-aged men having no unified command, using backward weapons and lacking experience of modern warfare. Why did the PLA mobilize such a large combat force to fight a war of considerable scale? Even to fight the standing Tibetan army of the Kashag government, which had a little military training, such a force was unnecessary.
To find the answer, I
continued digging into the available sources. Apparently, between 1959 and 1961,
the Central Military Commission sent not only combat troops into Tibet, but
also representatives from all major departments, including the General
Political Department, General Staff Department, General Logistics Department
and major military academies, to conduct research on high-altitude warfare. In
addition, military commands not involved in the battles also sent inexperienced
young officers to Tibet to “be trained and tested”. In 1960, Guangzhou Military
Command alone sent over 300 young officers to Tibet for first-hand battle experience.[13]
This led me to pose the question: did the so-called “suppression of the counter-revolutionary
rebellion” in Tibet have purposes other than overthrowing the Tibetan
government and forcefully implementing “democratic reform”?
Openly published sources show that from
January 22nd to February 19th 1959, Mao Zedong added
written instructions to four reports on the situation in Tibet, in which he
pointed out that “rebellion is a good thing”, as it could be used to “train the
troops and the masses”, and to “harden our troops to combat readiness”.[14]
All these instructions show that even before the March 10th uprising,
Mao had the idea of using “suppressing rebellion” to train PLA troops. All these
instructions were transmitted to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Defence Minister
Peng Dehuai and Chief of Staff Huang Kecheng. It is worth noting that Mao sent
the “army training” instruction dated February 19th 1959 not only to
Peng Dehuai, but specially ordered that it be “sent to the Tibet Work Committee
and Tibet Military Command down to regiment level by clandestine cable”. This
means that by mid-February 1959, about three weeks prior to March 10th,
everyone from the defence minister all the way down to the regimental
commanders of combat troops understood Mao’s intention to use the opportunity of
suppressing Tibetan resistance as a training exercise.
The perfect opportunity?
By analyzing many memoirs,
autobiographies and biographies, openly published, classified or
semi-classified, I found out that the 12 large scale battles fought in central
Tibet from March 1959 to early 1962 were in fact conducted as a thoroughly
organised military training, beyond the actual requirements of a
counter-insurgency operation: individual soldiers were expected to train for combat
on the high plateau, commanders were testing the battle strategies best suited
to the terrain. After each battle, participating PLA units wrote reports
summarizing what they practised and learned from the battle. For example, General
Ding Sheng’s comment on the battle of Mitika (August 27th –
September 15th 1959) was this:
This battle not only ensured the safety of transportation
on Qinghai-Tibet Highway, it also gained
us experience of fighting with the large unit encircling tactic and carrying out
policies in pastoral regions.[15]
The “large unit encirclement” tactic was first used in the battle of
Lhoka (April 2nd – 28th 1959), but failed. It was used
again, successfully, in the battle of Namtso (July 6th – 29th
1959), and in a few other battles, and eventually became the most common tactic
used in Tibet. When Infantry Division 11 summarized the tactical lessons
learned from these battles, the first one was “encirclement”: “…It has been
proved by many experiences that carrying out encirclement is the most effective
method to wipe out large numbers of rebel bandits.”[16]
When it summarized the effective tactics used in the border war, “encirclement”
was the first mentioned.[17]
Xu Yan, a professor at the Chinese National Defence University, believed
that the biggest difference between the Chinese and Indian armies in the border
war was the “combat quality of officers and soldiers”. “Most of the troops of the
[People’s] Liberation Army who fought at the China-India border have a glorious
history”, he commented, “Besides that, they had also acquired rich combat
experience in high and cold mountain regions in the five years from the Khampa
rebellion in 1956 to the end of the suppression of Tibetan rebellion in 1961.”[18]
In addition to combat
units, the General Political Department took the opportunity to find out how to
spread propaganda and how to mobilize the masses, the General Logistics
Department wanted to find out what equipment was needed in Tibet, field
hospitals conducted research on how to avoid and treat altitude sickness, and
so on.
The PLA also took the opportunity to test newly developed weapons, such as the Type 56 rocket launcher copied from the Soviet model. As Xu Yan, wrote in an article published in 2008, “troops gained valuable experience of using various weapons in combat on the high plateau”.[19] During the three-year war in central Tibet, the Tibet Military Command familiarized itself with the terrain, learned about the special needs of high-altitude combat, and mastered battle tactics best suited to the plateau.
The PLA also took the opportunity to test newly developed weapons, such as the Type 56 rocket launcher copied from the Soviet model. As Xu Yan, wrote in an article published in 2008, “troops gained valuable experience of using various weapons in combat on the high plateau”.[19] During the three-year war in central Tibet, the Tibet Military Command familiarized itself with the terrain, learned about the special needs of high-altitude combat, and mastered battle tactics best suited to the plateau.
From these facts emerged
the reason why the CCP deployed such a powerful military force, and all
branches of the army, to fight farmers and herders in Tibet. Behind all the superficial
reasons given by the CCP to justify its military action, there is another
unmentionable reason: on the instructions of Mao Zedong, the PLA took the
opportunity of “suppressing the Tibetan rebellion” to train its soldiers using
Tibetans as a live target, in order to have a battle-hardened army stationed in
Tibet.
What was the target of
this battle-hardened army? Immediately after the battle of Lhasa (March 20th-22nd
1959), the CCP disbanded the Tibetan standing army. Shortly after that, it
launched the battle of Lhoka, the second of the 12 battles. This battle targeted
the ‘Chushi Gandruk’ guerilla army, the only semi-military Tibetan resistance force,
whose headquarters was in Lhoka. As a matter of fact, the battle of Lhoka
failed to meet the goal of wiping them out. In April 1959, the main force of
Chushi Gandruk escaped the PLA net and retreated into India.
However, the CCP did not call off the war. Active military engagement followed straight on from the battle of Lhoka. The last major battle was launched in September 1960 and ended in April 1961. Even after this, a number of small-scale military actions continued to clear the remnants of the Chushi Gandruk and sporadic local resistance up to March 1962.[20]
However, the CCP did not call off the war. Active military engagement followed straight on from the battle of Lhoka. The last major battle was launched in September 1960 and ended in April 1961. Even after this, a number of small-scale military actions continued to clear the remnants of the Chushi Gandruk and sporadic local resistance up to March 1962.[20]
The “Suppression of
Tibetan rebellion” and “Democratic Reform” were carried on at the same time. In
CCP history, this is referred to as “fight and reform”. The way it was
implemented was called “clean up one area, reform one area”.[21]
The standard of “cleaning up” was called the “three all-clears”, meaning “all
rebels cleared up, all weapons cleared up, all counter-revolutionary documents
cleared up.”[22] After
the “three all-clears” was achieved, the third and final phase of the campaign
would begin by sending work teams to villages and nomad areas to start the
actual “reform” work. It was at this time that former PLA officers and soldiers
released from military duty and organized into “work teams”, accompanied by
military support, reached the border region.
The well-known “Longju
incident” of August 25th 1959, the first armed clash between Chinese
and Indian soldiers, took place under such circumstances. The “strong Chinese
detachment” (mentioned in the “Note to the Foreign Office of China by the Indian
Ambassador” dated August 28th
1950)[23]
with which Indian soldiers clashed south of Migyitun was Company 2 of Regiment
1, Shannan (Lhoka) Military sub-Command. This company’s mission was to escort
the work team that was to be stationed in Migyitun “for work with the masses”:[24] their
presence was part of the final phase of the campaign following the battle of
Lhoka.[25]
During the “reform”
movement, not only firearms were “cleared up”, even knifes, spears and horses
were confiscated. Large-scale arrests took place during this time as well.
Based on the requirement issued by Tibet Work Committee, at least 2% of the
total Tibetan population was arrested and interred.[26]
After “suppression” and “reform”, Tibetans were effectively deprived of the ability
to launch another armed rebellion. There was no need for a “battle-hardened”
army to put out the flames of resistance. So what was the purpose?
Z419
In the same February 2005
interview, General Yin Fatang revealed that on June 11th 1962, the Tibet
Military Command constituted a special organ called “Tibet Military Command
Advance Command Post for China-India Border Self-defence Counter-attack”, commonly
known as “Advance Command Post”, code-named Z419 (“Z” stands for “Xizang”=Tibet,
also known as T419). Yin was appointed its political commissar.[27]
Wei Ke, director of Z419’s
political department, recalled that in May 1962, Beijing decided to “create
conditions for peacefully resolving the border dispute” by “resolutely fighting
back” against the advancing Indian army. It was also decided that the main
front would be the eastern sector, namely the Tawang and Walong areas.[28]
He revealed that on June 7th 1962, General Tan Guansan, the
commander of the battle of Lhasa in March 1959, chaired a military meeting and
transmitted directives from the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission
regarding preparation for combat with the Indian army on the border. It was at
this meeting that Z419 Command was formed.
Regiments 154, 155 and 157
and a few supporting units were under the direct command of Advanced Command
Post Z419, code-named “Z419 army”, with a combat force of around 8,000.
In October, some troops
belonging to infantry division 11, artillery regiment 308 and engineers
regiment 136 were also commanded by Z419 Command Post, a total of 10,300 men,
responsible for fighting in Kejielang (Nyamjang valley) and Tawang.[29]
On June 18th, the PLA General Political Department issued a Directive on Political Work regarding the Campaign against Military Provocation by Indian Reactionaries. “Z419 army” immediately started political education to “make commanders and soldiers understand the origin and nature of the China-India border issue, and see the true color and essence of the Nehru government as collaborator with anti-China imperialists”, as a way to “arouse soldiers’ patriotic passion and sense of political responsibility.”[30]
On June 18th, the PLA General Political Department issued a Directive on Political Work regarding the Campaign against Military Provocation by Indian Reactionaries. “Z419 army” immediately started political education to “make commanders and soldiers understand the origin and nature of the China-India border issue, and see the true color and essence of the Nehru government as collaborator with anti-China imperialists”, as a way to “arouse soldiers’ patriotic passion and sense of political responsibility.”[30]
From mid-June 1962, Z419
Command Post started to collect intelligence in the battle zone and work on a battle
plan. Meanwhile, it started intensive military training, from individual
soldiers’ battle manoeuvers, coordinating training for each unit all the way to
“real battle exercises” at regimental level. At the same time, based on the
lessons learned from fighting the Tibetan resistance, Z419 replaced physically
unfit officers and soldiers. A group of well-trained rocket launcher operators
were dispatched to Tibet from Wuhan, and artillery personnel were sent from
several military commands. Beijing Military Command sent communications equipment
and operators. Over one hundred English, Hindi and Tibetan interpreters from
different areas were sent to Tibet for the coming “self-defence
counter-attack”.[31]
In early October, Z419
Command Post moved from Lhasa to Tsona, and a location close to the Lhatse pass
(Thag La of the Indian maps), a short distance from the Dhola post where the first
armed encounter had taken place on September 20th.[32]
On October 8th 1962, Mao Zedong called a meeting to discuss the conflict on the border. Attendants included Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, He long, Nie Rongzheng and Luo Ruiqing.[33] The next day, Z419 received the pre-order for battle.
On October 8th 1962, Mao Zedong called a meeting to discuss the conflict on the border. Attendants included Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, He long, Nie Rongzheng and Luo Ruiqing.[33] The next day, Z419 received the pre-order for battle.
On October 13th,
Zhang Guohua, one of the commanders in the eastern sector, flew back to Lhasa
from Beijing. He held a meeting to transmit the Central Military Commission’s
directive on the upcoming battle. The instruction was to “be prudent in the
first battle, and once started, it must be successful.”[34]
Zhang also organized a “Frontline Command Post” to replace Z419 Command Post. In
the afternoon of the same day, Zhang Guohua brought the Frontline Command Post
up to Tsona, ready to command the upcoming battle from there.[35]
This sequence of activity suggests
that the decision to fight was taken at the October 8th meeting, but the date was not yet fixed.
The day after Zhang Guohua
took up his commander role, the Tibet Work Committee set up a “Front Support
Leadership Group” responsible for coordinating and organizing logistical
support for the combat troops.
At 1:30 pm in the
afternoon of October 17th, Mao called and chaired another meeting to
discuss the situation,[36]
and it was at this meeting that the final decision was made.
That same day, the Central
Military Committee issued a Battle Order for Annihilating the Invading Indian
Army.[37]
By this time, Zhang Guohua had already drafted his battle plan which was approved
by the Central Military Commission and Mao himself.[38]
Three days later, the
border war with India broke out. It started with heavy artillery bombardment of
Indian posts, before infantry soldiers pressed down onto the enemy, much the
same tactic employed in the battle of Lhasa a few years earlier, by the same
units.
The main PLA forces fighting
this war were the troops that had been “trained” for several years in the
battles to suppress Tibetan rebels, including Infantry 11 under the Lanzhou
Military Command, and Division 130 of the 54th Army. Z419 was
composed of troops under the Tibet Military Command that had fought in all the
major battles from March 1959 to early 1962. Newly-developed weapons tested against the
Tibetans were put into use. The eastern sector commanders were General Ding
Sheng and General Zhang Guohua, both commanders of the war of suppression. By
the time the border war broke out, transportation routes, field hospitals,
civilian support teams etc. had been readied and trained.
During the conflict with
India, the Tibet Work Committee dispatched 1,280 cadres to lead civilian
workers functioning as logistical support teams. 32,237 Tibetans and 1,057 pack
animals were drafted to load, unload and transport supplies, carry wounded
soldiers back from battlefront, clear up battle fields, etc. Over 10,000 civilians
were drafted to repair and construct roads.[39]
It is no surprise that the
PLA won the border war, because the two PLA commanders had to hand not a “knife
used to slaughter a chicken”, but a battle-hardened army that had been trained
in live combat in Tibet for three years.
Until 1951 when the PLA
occupied Tibet, it was for the Chinese a faraway, foreign land full of hardship
and danger. The locations where the China-India border conflict took place are
high plateaux where no Chinese army in history had set foot. The so-called
“pacification of Tibetan rebellion” was a war waged on Tibetans in a land of
which Chinese commanders and soldiers had no previous knowledge or experience.
Only after the war of suppressing Tibetan resistance did the PLA gain the
confidence to fight in the Himalaya. From this point of view, the PLA’s
“suppression of Tibetan rebellion” was an important causal link in the outbreak
of war in 1962.
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[1]
PCR Defense Ministry: http://www.mod.gov.cn/info/2017-06/29/content_4784003.htm
[2]
Dai Xun’s weibo: http://weibo.com/1571497285/FaYOf8GVZ?type=repost
[3]
Yin, Fatang, 756. For the complete interview see Yin, Fatang, pp. 745-762.
[4] Ding Sheng, Jin Guang, and Yu Ruxin. Luonan yingxiong:
Ding Sheng jiangjun huiyilu [A disgraced hero: Memoir of General Ding
Sheng], pp. 315-316.
[5] Zhou Enlai yu Xizang [Zhou Enlai and
Tibet], p. 374.
[6] Details
see Yang Yizhen (ed.), Xizang jiyi – Jinjun Xizang jiefang Xizang huiyi wenxuan
(Remembering Tibet – Collected Recollections of Advancing and Liberating
Tibet). Vol. 2, 433-
[7]
Ibid.
[8] India.
Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the
Governments of India and China, 1954-1959. New Delhi, India: Ministry of External Affairs, 1960.
[9] Wu,
Lengxi. Yi Maozhuxi: wo qinsheng jingli di ruogan zhongda lishi shijian
pianduan [In memory of Chairman Mao: Some major historical events I witnessed],
121.
[11]
Wang, Tinsheng, Wangshi huimou
[Looking back at the past], p. 149.
[12]
Ibid, p. 146.
[15]
Deng, Sheng, p. 305.
[16] Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun bubing dishiyi
shi junzhanshi [History of and battles fought by PLA Infantry Division 11],
p. 256.
[17]
Ibid, p. 278.
[18]
Xu, Yan, Taojin baizhan pingshuo gujin
[Comments and discussions on battles past and present, Chinese and foreign], p.
296. PLA’s suppression of Tibetan rebellion actually started in 1956 in Kham
and finished in central Tibet in March 1962. Major battles ended at the end of
1961, but sporadic battles continued for a few more months.
[19]
Ibid. p. 282.
[20] Yin,
Fatang, p. 748.
[21] Pingxi Xizang panluan [Pacifying
Rebellion in Tibet], 102.
[22] Jiefang Xizang shi, p. 399.
[23] Notes,
memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the Governments
of India and China 1954-1959P. 44.
[24]
“Langjiu shijian” [The Longju Incident]. Baidu baike: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%9C%97%E4%B9%85%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6
[25] Shannan
Sub-Military Command was established in July 1959, after the battle of Lhoka,
commanding 3 infantry regiments, designated as regiments #1, #2 and #3.
[26] Zhonggong Xizang dangshi dashiji 1949-1994
[Chronicle of Events in the History of the CCP in Tibet 1949-1994], p. 127.
[27]
Yin, Fatang, p. 749.
[28] Shijie wuji fengyunlu [Storms on the
roof of the world]. Vol. 3, p. 325.
[29]
Zhang, Zhiyu, Che Junhui, ed. Zhanli
yanjiu. [Studies on battle examples],
P. 126.
[30] Jiefang Xizang shi [History of
Liberating Tibet], p. 477.
[31]
Yin, Fatang, p. 750.
[33] Deng Xiaoping nianpu 1904-1974 [The
Chronology of Deng Xiaoping 1904-1974]., Vol. 3, p. 1728.
[34] Zhao,
Shengyin, p. 134.
[35]
Ibid.
[36] Deng
Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 3, p. 1730.
[37] Jiefang
Xizang shi, p. 478.
[38] Zhao,
Shengyin, p. 135.
