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| Panchen Lama during the struggle session (1964). |
“Achievements
are predominant, mistakes are secondary”:
the Panchen Lama’s meetings with Li Weihan
and Zhou Enlai about his 70,000 character report on conditions in Tibet
Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester
The
10th Panchen Lama’s ’70,000 character report’ on problems with the
‘pacification of rebellion’ and implementation of ‘Democratic Reform’ in Tibet was
the most significant critique of Communist rule in minority regions ever acknowledged
by the Party. It was handled by the United Front (UFWD), the branch of
government charged with coopting and coordinating loyal figures of authority
outside the Party, and its eventual rejection by the central leadership
signalled both the fall of the Panchen Lama, the most eminent such figure in
Tibet, and the end of any meaningful consultative role for the United Front
organisations in minority regions generally.
Background
The
report was submitted to Premier Zhou Enlai, the member of the top leadership who
had sanctioned it thus far, in late May 1962, on conclusion of the
Nationalities Work Conference in Beijing. This event marked a tide of optimism
among some nationality cadres that the spirit of rectifying Leftist mistakes
fostered by the post-Great Leap Forward leadership would now be extended to
their regions. Premier Zhou, however, found that the report came too close to
suggesting that the CCP was deliberately eradicating Tibetan religion and
identity, and asked for a suitably revised version, which was submitted in
early June. A series of high-level meetings was then convened by the central
UFWD, June 21st – 25th, involving the Tibet Work
Committee leaders Zhang Jingwu and Zhang Guohua, and the Panchen’s group, along
with other senior Tibetan officials, notably Ngabo Ngawang Jigme. The
transcripts of those meetings are presented here in English translation.
The
actual contents of the report remained unknown to all but a few insiders until
a leaked copy was published by the Tibet Information Network in London in 1997,
and it is still a ‘state secret’ inside China. It was organised under eight
headings:
1. The ‘pacification of the rebellion’,
dealing with the problem of indiscriminate arrests, and the failure to
implement the Party’s “Four No-s” policy (“no killing, no jailing, no
sentencing, no struggling” of surrendering rebels)
2. ‘Democratic Reform’, dealing with
indiscriminate conduct of ‘struggle’, property confiscation and class
categorisation during the Democratic Reform campaign, and emphasising the low
quality of local cadres and activists
3. Livelihood and economy, dealing with grain
tax, and restrictions on travel and trade, in the context of mass
impoverishment and starvation
4. ‘The ‘United Front’, dealing with the
alienation of ‘upper and middle strata’ and failure to implement the Party’s
policy of ‘winning over’
5. ‘Democratic Centralism’, dealing with the
absence of openness and tolerance in the Communist system, and the dominance of
the Party over other branches
6. ‘Proletarian Dictatorship’, dealing with
punitive reeducation and mass imprisonment
7. Religion policy (the most detailed
section), dealing with the failure to implement the Party’s policy of freedom
of religious belief
8. Nationality issues, dealing with attacks on
Tibetan language, dress and customs, and drastic population reduction.
The petition concluded with a discussion of the situation in ‘fraternal
provinces’, meaning eastern Tibet, principally Qinghai and the Gannan
prefecture of Gansu province, about which the Panchen was most worried, but
which he, as a TAR official, had less authority to discuss. Concerning the
‘pacification of the rebellion’ there, he said too much military force had been
used; on proletarian dictatorship, he commented that 10,000 had been imprisoned
in each area, ‘worse than in Tibet itself...huge numbers died of abnormal
causes, so many that their corpses could not be buried’; discussing nationality
rights, he referred to a ‘blind Leftist tendency at prefecture and county
level’; the state of religious affairs too was worse than Tibet, no monasteries
were left at all; and livelihood was seriously affected by mass imprisonment,
and the hasty collectivisation of the remaining population (‘only women,
infants and the elderly are left’), who were burdened with unachievable
production targets, and had been reduced to eating grass and treebark.
The
outcome of the June meetings was the formulation of four policy documents on
rectification, duly approved by the Central Committee and handed down to the
Tibet leadership. These covered 1. Strengthening relations between Party (TWC)
and government (PCART) to improve Tibet work collectively 2. Regulations on
full implementation of the freedom of religious belief policy
3.
Recommendations for fully implementing regulations on dealing with rebels
4.
More training for local officials.
The
four documents were never implemented, as within a few weeks of being approved,
Mao Zedong staged a successful counter-attack against his reformist critics,
and began his return to power. Among the first to go were senior United Front
leaders Li Weihan and Xi Zhongxun, the Panchen Lama’s two most senior
interlocutors at the June meetings. At Beidaihe in August, and at the Central
Committee meetings in Beijing in September, Mao accused them of
‘capitulationism’, failing to adhere to ‘class struggle’ in United Front work,
and is said to have denounced the Panchen’s report as ‘a poisoned arrow shot at
the Party by a reactionary serf-owner’.
That
September, the 10th plenum of the 8th Central Committee
coined the slogan ‘Never Forget Class Struggle’, re-asserted the primacy of
class in nationality issues, and cancelled measures designed to ameliorate the
impact of Democratic Reform. At the annual PCART meeting in Lhasa shortly
after, the Panchen Lama was effectively dismissed from office and spent much of
the next 18 months under house arrest, awaiting trial. At almost exactly the
same moment (October 1962), the central leadership opted to go to war over the
Indo-Tibetan border. The Panchen’s chief antagonist in the regional leadership,
Zhang Guohua, was also commander of the PLA forces that scored a thumping
victory over India in the eastern sector where most of the fighting took place.
This strengthened the TWC’s hand in gaining the confidence of the centre, and
further sealed the Panchen Lama’s fate.
The meetings
The
transcripts of the five meetings in June and July 1962 are previously
unpublished, with one exception - an edited and abridged transcript of the July
24th meeting with Premier Zhou appeared in Xizang gong zuo wen xian xuan
bian, 1949 - 2005 [Selected Documents on Tibet Work 1949-2005] Beijing: Zhong yang wen xian
chu ban she, 2005).
They contain no absolute revelations, but do offer an informative and candid
picture of relations between the central leadership and its Tibetan élite.
They show that the meetings were conducted by the UFWD as a high-level
arbitration between the two acrimonious partners in the regional polity – the
hardcore Party-military leaders of the TWC and the softcore symbolic leader of
the PCART – rather than as a substantive discussion of the Panchen Lama’s
report. The tensions between the two sides are evident; the Panchen’s
impatience and youthful impetuousness breaks surface at times, and Zhang Guohua
in particular delivers the requisite acknowledgement of mistakes defensively
and grudgingly. Proceedings are dominated by the chair (Li at the June meetings
and Zhou at the July meeting), with others speaking when invited and as
scripted to do so. Apart from the Panchen himself, the only Tibetan voices are
Ngabo (twice) and Pakpala (once).
The
first meeting on June 8th, chaired by Peng Zheng, is a preliminary
ritual in which both sides listen to an avuncular lecture on the greatness of
the Party, confess their mistakes and pledge to work together.
At
the first working meeting on June 21st, Li Weihan sets out the
Party’s rather sinuous response to the report: he commends the Panchen Lama for
speaking out, saying that pointing out mistakes helps us do our work better,
although the more he reassures the Panchen not to worry about getting into
trouble, the less reassuring he sounds. Suppression of the rebellion was
basically correct, he emphasises. We didn’t want to fight, but war was
inevitable. Of course, mistakes were made, and in Qinghai they were worse than
you say, but this was because local cadres tried to cover them up, and we are
dealing with that (a reference to the dismissal of provincial Party secretary
Gao Feng et al). Achievements are primary, mistakes are secondary. The main
mistake for which he seems concerned to apologise is the subjection of the
Panchen’s family and colleagues to ‘struggle’ during Democratic Reform in
Shigatsé,
although as ‘progressives’ they were supposed to be exempt. His speech also
incidentally refers to now little-known episodes of Tibetan armed resistance to
Democratic Reform, in Rongdrak, Sichuan in 1956, Amchok, Gannan in 1958, and
Tengchen, Chamdo in 1959.
The
June 22nd meeting starts with a ponderous discussion of problems in
minority language teaching and usage, wherein the main concern is with
standardisation and modernisation, not with the Panchen’s contention that “If language,
clothing and customs are lost... a nationality will disappear.” Clothing and
hairstyle, in Li’s view, have no importance. This discussion is conducted
without Tibetan participation.
Li
then switches rather awkwardly to the question of deaths during the suppression
of the rebellion. Betraying some insecurity, he wavers between denial (“Those
who were killed should be considered the responsibility of the rebellious upper
strata, because it was they who incited the rebellion”) and guarded admission
of excessive force (“We should not take life like children playing games”).
Recovering composure, he goes on to concede the Panchen Lama’s concerns on
excesses in religion reform, particularly assuring him that his complaint over the
appointment of anti-religious activists to the Democratic Management Committee
of Tashi Lhunpo monastery will be addressed. The Panchen is clearly less than convinced.
Measured concessions are also offered on the issue of training local cadres and
the overbearing role of the Party in government.
The
third meeting on June 25th is chaired by Xi Zhongxun, who reiterates
Li’s approach, and invites the Panchen Lama to speak. The tone shifts
significantly when, after the expected conciliatory remarks, there is an
outburst of frustration. Objecting to his loyalty to the Party being taken for
granted, the Panchen asserts that “I had the power to rebel if I wanted”, that
his support for Democratic Reform is not mere opportunism but a real commitment
to Socialist values. Faced with a flurry of disapproval from the elders, he
backs down with a plea for genuine implementation of any agreed measures, and
for the situation in Qinghai and Gannan to be also taken into account.
Ngabo
is then called upon, and after the expected consensual speech, quite
unexpectedly takes up the cause of Tibetan areas in Sichuan, those least
covered in the report. He concludes with a direct request for the release of falsely
imprisoned Lamas. Ngabo is thought to have been responsible for toning down the
report in the drafting stage, stating more emphatically the recognition of
achievements as primary, and was known more generally for careful and obedient
diplomacy in his dealings with the senior leadership, and yet here we see him
almost sticking his neck out in support of the report.
Emboldened
by this, the Panchen Lama becomes outspoken, protesting that the situation in
Sichuan has been overlooked, that learned people there “have all been locked up
and wiped out.” He then directly accuses Zhang Guohua of failing to release falsely
arrested persons on an agreed list. “Nowadays the system is so rigid, but
orders passed down are still not executed. We are so surprised by such things,
to the point that our heads are about to explode.”
Then
Pakpala Gelek Namgyal is called upon. Few senior Tibetan ‘progressives’ had
less integrity than Pakpala, and yet even he speaks out, about conditions in
his native Chamdo (TAR). Chamdo itself did not rebel, and yet all the
monasteries have been closed down, he reports. “Everyone belonging to the upper
class was jailed; are they all connected with rebellion? are they all under
suspicion? ...after some time they were told that it was a mistake. They got an
apology and were released, only to be jailed again later.”
Faced
with this barrage of discontent from the Tibetan side, the leaders express
concern and suggest an inspection tour, to which the Panchen responds “What’s
the point of us going, since we cannot solve any problems...”
It
is then the turn of the TWC leaders: Zhang Guohua makes the apology for Leftist
mistakes expected of him, and warms to the theme of mistakes in Chamdo where,
he says, battle-hardened PLA units from the Korean front were deployed to crush
rebellion indiscriminately. Zhang Jingwu’s speech, by contrast, is the polished
presentation of a professional diplomat, and concludes with agreement on four
issues, those on which the four policy documents were then formulated.
The
final meeting on July 24th, once the four documents have been
approved, is the occasion for the Premier himself to give his blessing. The
Panchen Lama makes a final plea for the documents to be implemented, and Zhang
Jingwu promises cooperation, gently chiding the Panchen for not trusting in the
Party - a fine reassurance, considering
that within two months, the documents, and the Panchen himself, would be
consigned to political oblivion.
Zhou’s
speech is complex and rich in insinuation, but comes down firmly on the primacy
of the Party’s achievements over its mistakes. After attacking the Dalai Lama
and Nehru, and making a theoretical digression on correct class standpoint, he
concludes that suppression of the rebellion and the violence of Democratic
Reform were justified, and that none need fear the eradication of religion. In
another painfully ironic flourish of rhetoric, he admonishes the Tibetans: “You
should also have faith that comrades in the Work Committee want to build Tibet
well, and are not going there to eradicate the nation and religion. Once these
are eradicated, no people will be left. It is tantamount to wiping ourselves
out. Only imperialism will do such a thing.”
Alongside
the classified transcript of this meeting, we have included a translation of
the much shorter published version, because the differences between the two are
instructive. The highlighted passages are those modified in the published
version, and the italicised passages in the classified
version are those omitted from the published version. The effect of these modifications
and omissions is to downplay admissions of error, and to underline the primacy
of the Tibet Work Committee over the TAR Preparatory Committee. Names of
participants in earlier discussions have been removed, as have Zhou’s remarks
about Nehru.
All
the documents are dated Auguat 8th 1962 on the cover page,
presumably the date of printing. Curved brackets are those used in the
original, square brackets mark additions by the translator. Footnotes are by
the translator.
Download:
June 21-25, 1962 Meeting Record
July 24, 1962 Meeting Record--Classified Version
July 24, 1962 Meeting Record--Published Version
July 24, 1962 Meeting Record--Classified Version
July 24, 1962 Meeting Record--Published Version
