The Fall of Chamdo --- A Tibetan Account

English translation of

Political and Military History of Tibet

Dharamsala Tibetan Ex-servicemens’ Association 2003

Volume 2 p.159-186

 

Translated by Matthew Akester 

 

A. Defence of the northeastern borders against Chinese Communist invasion

On October 1, 1949 in Peking, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese started using the reincarnation of the ninth Panchen Rinpoche [Chöki Gyaltsen], a boy born in Amdo, as a political instrument. They coerced him to send telegrams to Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, requesting them to “liberate” Tibet.  Although he was only ten years old, his influence extended widely in Dotö (Kham) and Domé (Amdo) regions. The regime announced over the radio that it was soon going to “liberate” Tibet and Formosa.  Although the term “liberation” sounds impressive, inside Mao was hatching a plot to control the people and natural resources of  Tibet, a nation that had existed independently since ancient times and where people lived happily and peacefully in accordance with the principles of the Dharma.
 

     After that, the PLA troops intensified their attacks on the northeastern borders of Dotö and Domé.  In response, the Tibetan government promoted Tsipön [Ngabo] Ngawang Jigme as a Kalön (cabinet minister) and sent him to Chamdo to replace Lhalu Tsewang Dorje as the governor of Kham.  Lhalu was instructed to remain for a while in Chamdo to assist Ngabo, but he sent a petition to Lhasa, saying that he had already handed over to the new incumbent and hurriedly left for Lhasa, giving the impression that he was keen to avoid the drastic situation that was developing. Just after leaving Chamdo, he received an instruction from Lhasa to remain in Lho Dzong, and accordingly stayed there for a while.  At that time, Kalön Donkharwa, the senior Commander-in-Chief, and Commander-in-Chief Dzasak Lama Kalsang Tsultrim were sent to Nagchu and the 39 Hor states respectively to collect new recruits and organize military survey and preparations. A detachment of the Chadang (6^th) artillery regiment, under the command of Rupön (colonel) Rigzin Paljor, was dispatched to deliver machineguns, loaded on mules, from Lhasa to the Tibetan forces in Chamdo.  

     On November 23, 1949, Mao Zedong telegraphed General Peng Dehuai, Chairman of the Northwest Bureau, with the following instruction: 
 

The Northwest Bureau, taking sole responsibility, with the help of the Southwest Bureau, has to first carefully deal with the Panchen Rinpoche’s communities in Qinghai and should employ them skillfully in political campaigning.  You should first march quickly to Xikang (Tibet east of the Drichu) and take control.  Only then should you take control of the areas west of the Drichu. 
 

     The PLA had been divided into three Army Corps, each consisting of 20,000 to 30,000 troops.  Fearing that the invasion of Tibet militarily would attract international attention, Mao hesitated. He flew to Russia to seek support.  After gaining Russia’s support, he sent a telegram through the chief of the Northwest Bureau, General Peng Dehuai, to Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng and He Long [of the Southwest Bureau] on January 2, 1950, telling them to arrange the military expedition into Tibet without further delay.  Mao’s wireless message read:  
 

Though Tibet does not have a large population and strong army, it is large in area and important in international status. We must invade it. You must first take Dartsedo and Tibetan areas east of the Drichu. After that, you should dispatch troops to Tibet in divisions and plan to reach northeastern Tibet within three and a half months. 

According to Chen Yizi’s memoir (TAR CPPCC Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet vol.1) :
 

On 15 September, the army’s advance command convened a meeting on the mobilization.  The leader told us that a few British imperialist spies and separatists in the local government of Tibet had poisoned Getak Tulku, and so closed the gateway of peaceful negotiation on the issue of Tibet.

This is a distortion…
 

Chen goes on to say:
 

Moreover, [the Tibetan government] expanded its army as much as possible, increasing the number of dapon from 14 to 17 (a Dapon is similar to a regiment (Thon), with 500 to 1,000 troops).  Ammunitions and shells were bought or procured.  Local recruits were enlisted and given training.  Further, two thirds of the entire army (7 full brigades and some units of 3 other brigades) and local militias, totaling more than 8,000 troops, were deployed on the  Chamdo borders and the west bank of the Jinsha (Drichu) river. Those troops made Chamdo their stronghold and tried to block the passage of our army along the main road into Tibet.
 

       The entire Nyadang (8^th) regiment and majority of the troops of the Jadang (7^th) regiment plus some troops from the Khadang (2^nd), Ngadang (4^th), Chadang (6^th) and Bodyguard regiments were stationed in Chamdo.  One platoon of the Jadang regiment was posted in Riwoche.  The Gadang (3^rd) regiment and Brigadier Drakto Bulak’s troops were positioned at Yayu Sumdo, Gotö, Khasum Druka ferry and Yichöka, with Sibda as their main base. The Thadang (10^th) regiment was dispatched to Kamtok, Dungpu and Jomda.  The Dadang (11^th) regiment (author: should be Tadang (9^th) regiment) was posted in Markham.  The local recruits were divided amongst the different Tibetan army regiments stationed at various locations. This entire Tibetan force was under the command of the Governor of Kham, appointed by the Tibetan government. Accordingly, the Central Government ordered us to cross the Jinsha river and destroy the Chamdo defences as quickly as possible so as to open the way for our march to Lhasa.

       At the meeting, the leader of the army command mobilized six regiments for a force to invade Chamdo.  It was decided to attack from two sides, north and south, like a pair of pincers, gradually advancing inward, applying more force on the northern side. The third regiment of our division, and the artillery battalion of Army Corpse temporarily under the our divisional command, reconnaissance battalion, engineering battalion and the artillery company of the 54^th division and the cavalry unit at Jyekundo were assigned the task of attacking from the northern side.  Our northern force was divided into three groups: the right flank was composed of the 154^th regiment, Qinghai cavalry, reconnaissance company and artillery company.  This force was to work under the direction of Deputy Political Commissar Yin Fatang, Commander Zhang Limin and the commanders of the 154^th regiment and Qinghai cavalry.  The 154^th regiment and artillery company of the northern group were ordered to cross the river at Denkok, to join the Qinghai cavalry as fast as possible.  Then, after taking the Nangchen road, it was to march straight to Ngenda to block the road to Lhasa, in order to cut off the escape route for enemy troops, as well to block reinforcements. 
 

       The central group was composed of the 155^th and 156^th regiments and central command artillery battalion. Its task was to march with the advance force to attack Chamdo. It was to cross the river at Denkok, then to march through Yayu Sumdo, the Changshi bridge and Gotö up to Sibda, crushing the enemy forces at each point.  Then it was to advance to Chamdo following the shortcut route, where all the groups were to make a combined attack on the enemy’s main base. 

       The left flank was made up of the central command, engineers battalion and artillery company of the 54^th division.  It was under the command of the reconnaissance battalion leader Dong Qing, and Wang Daxuang, the Political Commissar directly appointed by central command. Its mission was to confuse the enemy forces and support the central group.  It was to advance under the cover of artillery, crossing the river at Kamtok (a diversionary advance) and destroy the enemy’s positions at Dungpu and Jomda as quickly as possible, and then to march towards Chamdo.  When they were about to reach Chamdo after a three-day march, one group of troops should follow the upper route to surround Chamdo from the south and wipe out all the enemy’s troops there, and whoever tried to escape from that side.

       The left division of our brigade was comprised of the 157^th Regiment of the 53^rd brigade, the artillery company and engineering company. According to the plan, under the command of Mao Poyi, the Deputy Political Commissar of the 53^rd brigade, it was to cross the Jinsha river at Drupa Lung, west of Batang, and destroy the enemy force at Markham first. Then, the main force was to make for Pomda and Pashö, to block the road for enemy troops who tried to escape from Chamdo towards the south.

       One battalion each from the 125^th and 126^th regiments of the Yunnan Military Region’s 42^nd brigade had already arrived at Kungshen and Dechen, and they were to crush the enemy forces at Yinching, Menkung and Duliang, and then make a diversionary advance to the northwest.  At that time, the Northwest army was also about to advance to Tibet.  In this way, with our forces combined, we planned to destroy the defence of Chamdo in one go and liberate the whole of Tibet. 

       After the meeting, we utilized the short time we had for the mobilization of our troops before we embarked upon our mission.  On one side, our Front army, the 154^th regiment, studied the implementation of minority nationality policy, how to deal with the people, military advance across the high plateau and adapting to the new lifestyle.  On the other, we made military preparations, helped the local people in their work at our best level and learned to live on barley flour (tsampa), butter and cheese, to adapt to the plateau lifestyle. We arranged transport teams of Yak and Dri, which are called “Ships of the Highland”, and learned from the Tibetan masses how to drive them.  We managed to transport some heavy loads and necessary supplies, and made all preparations so that our forces would be able to fight the Chamdo battle with ease.
 

On January 10^th, 1950, Mao Zedong wired a message to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping and He Long, as quoted in Mao’s Notes on the founding of the New China:

Your plan for leading the military campaign into Tibet is excellent. I agree with you and permit you to go ahead. Britain, India and Pakistan’s recognition of the Peoples Republic of China has greatly enabled our advance into Tibet.

By that time, large numbers of PLA troops were already penetrating into the regions of Amdo and Kham northeast of the Dri-chu,  and warned that they were ready to cross over, proclaiming a ten-point document to deceive the public and constantly making radio announcements with no bearing on reality, stating that they were going to expel the foreign imperialist influence and liberate Tibet.

     In response, the Tibetan government announced that Tibet was not part of China, that the relations between Tibet and China were only of “priest and patron” nature, and that there were no foreign powers in Tibet. It also announced on Lhasa radio in three languages—Tibetan, Chinese and English—that if China invaded Tibet, just as a big insect eats up a small insect, Tibetans would fight to the last, even if the entire male population were annihilated, leaving only women behind. The radio announcements were made twice daily, in the morning and evening; Ford read it in English, Takla Puntsok Tashi in Chinese and Rimshi Rasa Gyagen in Tibetan.

     Before the talks between the Chinese and Tibetans in Delhi had reached an outcome, as mentioned above, the PLA began invading Tibet in complete violation of the international law on October 7^th 1950, from six different approaches: through Kyegudo and Nangchen into Riwoche, crossing the Dri-chu at the Denkok and Kamtok ferry crossings in Derge; into Markham from Batang; into Tsawarong from Yunnan; and into Ngari from Xinjiang.  The Tibetan defense forces in each location put up a sharp-witted fight, but due to inferiority in numbers and prevailing conditions, they suffered defeats one after another, and lost their ground, as will be briefly described below.

     1. The engineers battalion of the 6^th regiment of the 18^th army, the artillery company of the 54^th division and the 154^th regiment under the Southwest military command joined the Qinghai cavalry led by the Deputy Political Commissar Yin Fatang and Zhang Limin. Their plan was to cross the Dri-chu River north of Denkok, advance on Riwoche through Jyekundo and Nangchen encircling Chamdo from the north, to cut off the Tibetan troops there. When they reached the Chaksamka (Qinghai-Tibet border north of Riwoche), they encountered the Jadang regiment under the command of Dapön Pulungwa and Rupön Drugyal’s forces. After several days of stiff fighting, they ran out of shells and bullets, Dingpön (lieutenant) Kalsang Wangdu of the Jadang regiment, along with some brave soldiers, resorted to swords. Kalsang was taken alive by the Chinese. He was not only severely tortured but was killed in a horrible manner by tying his four limbs to four dzos (a cross breed of yak and cow) and dragging him to his death. With many killed and wounded on both sides, the Tibetan force was then obliged to withdraw towards Riwoche.

     2. Around the same time, the 155^th and 156^th regiments and artillery battalion under the command of Suo Yang and others crossed the Dri-chu at Denkok, and attacked Yayu Sumdo, Gotö and Sibda. On the evening of the 2^nd day of the 7^th Tibetan month, the sound of the gods fighting (the forces of evil in vain) was heard all over Tibet, followed by earthquakes and other bad omens. The junior Gyapön of the Gadang regiment under the command of the Shikatsé Dapön Mujawa fought back this advance, and Gyapön Rongpa Migmar, coming through Dzimo Gön, managed to hold the Chinese at Tsoné Sumdo for several consecutive days, during which both sides suffered high casualties.  The Tibetan forces then regrouped at Yutso, where they remained for a while.
 

     The Tibetans captured two Chinese spies who told them that the Chinese were planning to launch a bigger attack on the Tibetan positions soon. Both were killed in the uproar. Soon the Chinese mounted a strong attack on Yutso, and the Tibetan forces pulled back to Sumdo, bordering Lhatok, where local militias of Shotarlhosum, Powo, Drayab and Gonjo arrived to reinforce them. The Tibetan forces then took positions on the hills either side of the road, dug themselves in, and waited. One day, about one hundred Chinese cavalry came unguardedly along that road, and the Tibetans ambushed them, killing all except for a few who managed to escape.
 

     The following day, there was a continuous flow of Chinese infantry troops through the bank of Yuchu Kha. The Tibetan troops encountered them for several days and nights, until the Chinese lost the courage to go on, and retreated to a distance of one day’s march.  No fighting took place for a few days after that. In this battle, many Chinese soldiers were killed. The Tibetan soldiers and the local people gathered them into a heap and threw them into the Puchu river.  They say there were so many that they stacked up in the water, and blocked the river. 
 

     The Tibetan side also lost about 50 officers and soldiers and many more were injured. The weapons seized from the Chinese were sent with Sonam Tashi, Geding (lieutenant) of the Kadang (1^st) regiment, to the Governor of Kham in Chamdo. Regarding this battle, we find the following passage in Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet vol.1:

One evening, when we were marching through a narrow mountain pass, our comrades of the front army suddenly stopped on the way.  Our reconnaissance platoon had met with a group of enemy troops on the mountainside at a height of 5,000 meters.  Despite the enemy force being stronger, our comrades fearlessly and courageously fought back the enemy force, with great effort. Unfortunately, Zhang Jilin (of reconnaissance platoon) and Tsondru Namgyal, an official of the political department, lost their lives, and platoon leader Wei Xun and others were wounded one after another.  Only three soldiers in the platoon were left there. As soon as our front army (advance troops) arrived, they started taking part in the battle, and the enemy troops were firing at us from their barricades. We immediately ordered our artillery company to take up position on a small hill nearby and help the infantry troops to destroy the enemy.

     Just after this battle, a group of military instructors was sent to Kham from Lhasa.  Soon after their arrival in Chamdo, the same Sonam Tashi of the Kadang Bodyguard Regiment (he still lives in Dharamsala and is known as Kusung Rupön Sotre-la) was sent to Denkok to repair damaged guns and give training to the soldiers.   He fought the above battles and recalls the following, in a transcribed version of his interview, which has been archived at the Department of Security of the CTA,  Dharamsala:

After we finished repairing the machineguns and Bren guns and giving training to the Gadang troops, we returned to Chamdo. Soon Dapön Muja of the Gadang regiment sent a messenger with a request to send Naljor and me over [to his camp] to repair their damaged Lewis guns. We both rode off to Yutsokha to meet him. He received us warmly and gave us food and drink, and arranged a tent for us. The next day, he sent the damaged machineguns to us. We checked them and found their rewind springs had been damaged, so we put in new ones and made them workable.  After that, we requested him to permit us to return to Chamdo immediately, but he told us that since we had come, we could take rest there for two or three days.  One day, not long after that, news came that the Chinese forces had arrived at Sibda and Yutsokha. He immediately began to make defense preparations.  At that time, we three lieutenants—Lhawang-la, Monlam-la and I—voluntarily took one hundred cavalry troops and proceeded to Sibda. We arrived there just before dawn. We immediately attacked the Chinese position and fought the whole day, pushing them back.  The Chinese were badly defeated and they finally fled. The next day, with the help of the local people, we dumped their dead bodies into the river.  People said that there were about 200 dead bodies. We got around 37 guns from them.  In those times, only some Chinese troops had guns. The local people were happy with us and thanked us for saving their lives. Then, we made our way back to Yutsokha.

      At the same time of the Denkok battle, the Tibetan force defending Gotö lost ground and retreated to Yutso, where they joined the Tibetan force deployed in that area. They positioned themselves to block the Chinese advance on the mountain pass and main road at Sumdo, and lay in wait to attack the Chinese. At first, a detachment of 100 Chinese cavalry came following that road. Our forces fired on them fiercely, killing all of them on the spot. Many infantry troops continually came through that road. The Gadang regiment troops and local militias attacked them. Having suffered a bad defeat, the Chinese retreated to a distance of one day’s march. Ten Tibetan officers and soldiers were either killed or wounded in that fight.  No fighting took place for a few days after that, as if the two sides had agreed on a ceasefire.  The Chinese dead were dumped into the river, and weapons seized from the Chinese during the previous battle were dispatched to the Governor under the escort of the lieutenant and the section leader of the Gadang regiment with their soldiers. At that time, we  requested the Gadang Dapön (brigadier) to allow us to return to Chamdo. 

      When we got to Chamdo, the handover to the new Governor had just taken place, and parties went on for several days.  At that time, messengers came in one after another from all over, all of them in haste, which was not a good sign. And at that point,  Lhalu and his retinue hurriedly left Chamdo. 
 

     In his report on the above events, archived at the Department of Security of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Rinchen, a former member of the Gadang regiment, recalls:  

During the Tibetan resistance against the Chinese advance on the mountain northeast of Sibda monastery, under the command of Gyapön (captain) Ogma-la of the Gadang regiment, Namgyal Puntsok and Khabong Migmar Dhondup lost their lives.  They were said to have killed many Chinese soldiers. However, overwhelmed by the large Chinese force, the Tibetan force retreated to Yutsokha, where they joined the Shigatse force and the local militias, and again put up a combined fight against the Chinese for several days. I do not remember how many  Chinese and Tibetan soldiers were killed or wounded in that battle. However, due to a shortage of shells and ammunition, and uncertainty of supplies from Chamdo in time, we were put in a tremendously difficult position and were compelled to pull back to a distance of two days’ march.  When we reached a valley between two passes at Dola-do, 30 yaks loads of shells and bullets arrived from Chamdo. We again made barricades at Sumdo on the pass, and made preparations to hold our position there.   Next morning, more than 100 Chinese cavalry with packhorses appeared from the east As soon as they arrived just below our position, we fired on them from both sides, killing all except for a few who managed to escape. The next day, just after midday, through, a large detachment of Chinese infantry approached our position along the same road and started pounding us with cannonfire. We retaliated with all our force, and the fighting lasted for almost two days.  Some of our troops and officers, including Badungwa Lobsang, Sherab Yeshe and Sa-ngenpa Alo were killed or wounded, but because we had good defense positions and barricades, we did not suffer many casualties. Many of our horses were killed or wounded however.  It became well known in that area that many Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded, and everyone saw the special treatment given to the body of a Chinese commander, carried away on a stretcher. All the weapons seized from the Chinese were loaded on horses and dispatched to the Governor, escorted by Nyugshi Anan Dawa of the Gadang regiment and Rupa Tsingdor.  Most of the bodies of the Chinese soldiers were thrown into the river and the rest were buried in pine needles. 

      While we remained there in the hope of holding the area, a messenger from Chamdo came one afternoon to tell us that the Chinese had followed another route and they were preparing to destroy the Dzasam (Mekong bridge) close to Chamdo. The Governor had ordered that the arms depot at  Siltok Tang in Chamdo be set on fire so that the weapons would not fall into the Chinese hands, and was retreating to Drugu monastery. Hearing this terrible news, all our troops, both commanders and soldiers, lost their determination and courage to fight. We abandoned our position and headed for Chamdo, fearing being surrounded by the enemy if we did not move.  We arrived to find Dzasam bridge still intact, but approaching Chamdo we saw clouds of smoke coming from the armoury which was still on fire, and noises of bursting shells could be heard, as if an intense battle was raging. Since it was no use for us to proceed to Chamdo, we went back through Namtso-la pass.

     3. From Horkok, a large Chinese force along with the artillery company of the 54^th regiment, under the command of the battalion commander Dong Qing  and Wa Daxuan, the Political Commissar directly under the central command, attacked the Tibetan positions at the Kamtok Druka ferry crossing in Derge and the Önpo Tö and Önpo Mé area (on the west bank of the river).  The Thadang (10^th) regiment under the command of Brigadier Shagjang Ngawang Gyaltsen tried to block them, and the 1st captain of the Gadang regiment and Tsashonyer Karma lost their lives. Many Chinese troops and officers were also killed or wounded; some of them drowned when their coracles were punctured by gunfire during the river crossing.
 

     The following is a short excerpt from Selected Materials on Tibetan  History and Culture vol.1:

Our left wing crossed the Jinsha at the Kamtok Druka ferry on the 7th October. Enemy forces defending Dungpu and Kamtok kept up a barrage of gunfire to stop us from crossing the river, but we fought our way over undeterred under covering fire.  Unfortunately, one of our coracles was hit, and four of our soldiers were drowned, and died gloriously.

      This does not tell the full story. Actually, several Chinese boats were sunk, and the battle was intense and lasted for several days and nights. Many Chinese troops were killed or wounded, and they were forced to retreat.
 

      After a few days, a large force of Chinese troops came and launched a fresh attack.  The Tibetan force put up strong defence, but were outnumbered, and had to pull back to Jomda.  Hoping to hold Jomda and Kyorshung, they prepared to counter the Chinese attack, but guided by some Tibetan collaborators, the Chinese launched a night attack on the camp of Dapön Karchung of the Gadang no.2 brigade at Kyorshung, killing or wounding many Tibetan officers and soldiers. In the chaos, the Tibetan troops retreated some way, and again attempted to hold their ground, but in the process, Gadang captain Chakjang Ngodrup and other Tibetan troops were taken by the enemy.  Outnumbered, the troops of the Gadang and Thadang regiments and local militia fled towards Chamdo, meeting the 1^st brigade of the Gadang regiment on the way, and went together through Nantso-la pass to Drugu monastery. 
 

     4.  At the same time, the 157^th regiment of the 53^rd brigade and various companies of engineers, under the command of Deputy Political Commissar Mao Poyi, crossed the Drichu from Batang, and launched heavy attacks on the Tibetan positions at Chidzong Gang and Drupa Rong in Markham.  The Tibetan defence force comprised the troops of the Tadang (9^th) regiment under the command of Gyapön Kunga Tsenje, monk volunteers from Gungkar Labrang and local militia.  In this battle, Tadang Gyapön Bagdro and some of his troops were taken by the ebenmy, and in the face of crushing defeat, the rest of the Tibetan troops were forced to retreat.  At that time, disagreement arose between the Tadang Dapön Derge Sé Kalsang Wangdu and Markham Taiji Majawa, leading Majawa to flee to Chamdo. Though he did not lack patriotic spirit, but due to the heavy losses, and prompted by a private letter he had received from Derge minister Jagö Topden, Derge Sé called Tadang Rupön Gonpo to a meeting at Gartok and proposed that surrender to the Chinese was the best option.  They went with some of their soldiers to Political Commissar Ren Xinshing at the 157^th regiment’s camp  to offer surrender, and then returned to Gartok and ordered all his troops to hand over all their weapons and ammunition to the Chinese. One group of solders returned to their homes, but the majority moved to Chamdo with Derge Sé in 1951, where they were based at Tangkar Teng and integrated with PLA troops.

     After that, some of the top Chinese commanders came to Chamdo, the 18^th army commander Zhang Guohua, political commissar Tan Guansen, director of the political department Liu Zhenguo, chief of staff Chen Minyi and deputy chief of staff Li Jowei. Che Jigme of the Nangmagang (Panchen Lama’s government), Jagö Topden, Bapa Puntsok Wangyal, Kalsang Yeshe and others who were in favor of the Chinese complemented Derge Sé, both verbally and in writing, saying that he had made a wise decision in surrendering to the Chinese. But the Tibetan people called him  “shameful Tadang Makpön” and he became an object of derision, as in this satirical song which became popular in Lhasa:

     Ngabo went out there full of zeal     But returned after delivering Chamdo [to China];     Out of a hundred good men,     Dapön Muja was the most capable.     Led on by two-faced Derge Sé,     That guileless Dapön Karchung,     Carried the stink of shit     From the military camps in Kham.  
 

     Amongst the nobles of days gone by,     There were men like tigers, leopards and bears,     Now there are pha ras and wolves,     Who cast the affairs of state to the four winds.

     5. Units of the 125^th and 126th regiments of the 42^nd army under the Yunnan Military Region marched into Kungshen and Dechen respectively and attacked lower Tsawarong. Local militia made their best efforts to defend their position, but they were overwhelmed by the Chinese force, both in terms of numbers and equipment, and driven back to southern Chamdo.

     6. In the autumn of 1950, the first regiment of the cavalry brigade commanded by Li Disan crossed the Kunlun Shan from Xinjiang and entered the Gertse region of Ngari. Drungyik Tseten Pungyal, the acting Governor of Ngari, and the local notables protested against their invasion and warned that if the Chinese did not turn away, they would deploy soldiers and expel them by force. But, as more Chinese reinforcements kept arriving from Xinjiang, their presence became established. 

B. The Fall of Chamdo

As mentioned above, the former and the new Governor of Kham differed in their military and political strategies. After Lhalu left Chamdo, Ngabo stressed initiating peace negotiations with the Chinese, and ignored military preparations. He withdrew all the mountaintop watchposts in and around Chamdo, as if they were not needed.  With the view to opening communication with the Chinese and to discourage their offensive on the Tibetan border, he sent Yeshe Dargye and Pomda Rabga from Markham and Yuga from Denkok to [Kangding]. But as the Chinese had already started attacking the border and Tibetan forces had suffered heavy defeats and lost large areas to the Chinese, dialogue was left at that. Before the arrival of the Liberation Army in Chamdo, Ngabo decided to shift his headquarters temporarily to Lho Dzong, and on the 9^th day of the 8^th (Tibetan) month of the Iron-Tiger year [1950], he and his entourage hurriedly left Chamdo. 
 

     At Lamda, he heard that the Chinese troops from Pasho and Riwoche had arrived in Lagong Ngenda and cut off the escape route. His group then spent the night at Drugu monastery. After general discussion, it was decided to send Khenchung Samkhar Tubten Donyo and Tsedron Tsatrultsang Lobsang Gyaltsen to Chamdo.
 

“When we arrived at Dramdo, we met some PLA scouts based in Lamda. They took us there and introduced us to an officer named Xinggung, a tall, lean young man with a calm temperament.  He was the commander of the PLA unit that came from Xining through Kyegudo. He asked why we had come. We replied, as if we had the authority,

“The governor of Kham sent two of us to the base at Chamdo to talk with the PLA, but on the way, we met these men who brought us here.  We have deployed only a very small number of defence troops along the borders in the hope of reconciliation with China through peaceful negotiation. However, the Chinese suddenly launched massive attacks on Tibetan border areas, scaring the Governor and his aides-de-camp, who had to shift their headquarters to Lagong Ngenda. Though he wished to talk with the commanders of the nearest PLA camp, it was night time, he could not do so, and he is now staying at Drugu monastery. If you wish to hold a peaceful negotiation on the terms of basic Sino-Tibetan cooperation, promise that PLA troops will not move further into Tibet from Chamdo, and we will inform our government.”
 

 The commander replied,
 

“Your governor is staying at Drugu monastery and proposing peace negotiations. That is more useful than 100,000 Tibetan troops to defend the border, and it means that the Liberation Army cannot go further than Chamdo for the moment. I can fully guarantee that neither the governor’s person nor any of his property will be harmed. This evening you two will come with the Liberation Army to Drugu monastery, and you should let it be known to any Tibetan troops we meet along the way that they are not to fire on us. If there is any unfriendly fire we will respond. We had planned a night attack on Drugu monastery, and all Liberation Army units have been given orders, but since you two came and explained the situation, they will have to be pulled back, and then we can discuss at our ease.”

We said,

“The governor sent us to Chamdo that night, and has no knowledge of what has been said since, so we would like to immediately send two servants with a message for him, and request a letter of passage for them to show any Liberation Army soldiers along the way. Could we come with you early tomorrow morning?”, to which the commander agreed, and the Tsedron made a list of the points mentioned by the commander to despatch to governor Ngabo. Then, we were taken to an inner room of the headquarters at Lamda where there were three Chinese officers and a translator, no-one else, and they questioned us about what we had said to commander Xinggung, and ended by saying that both sides must adhere to what had been agreed. There was a general, a civilian official and a paymaster, but I couldn’t tell you all of their names.”
 

On the morning of the 11^th of the Tibetan month, when the two representatives were on the way to Drugu with the soldiers, they met Ngabo and his retinue being escorted down by a group of soldiers that had come from Chamdo. Then an argument broke out among the Chinese over who would get credit for capturing them, after which the whole party was sent back to Drugu, where they took many photographs of weapons being handed over to the Liberation Army, of the whole group putting their signatures on a Chinese document, and then of the group standing below the monastery with bowed heads.

Then they were all taken to Chamdo, (riding) hemmed in the middle of a Chinese cavalry troop. The 18^th army commander Wang Qimei had just arrived, and there were soldiers all over the town. Ngabo, Samkar Khenchung, Tsogo Se and a few others were put up in a kitchen, and the rest in an army camp, under a sort of house arrest, and for many days they held meetings and asked many questions. One day they started the accusation of Robert Ford, the British radio operator employed by the Tibetan government, for poisoning and murdering Getak Tulku. They put chains around his neck and paraded him up and down in public, maligning him and embellishing their accusations no end.
 

At public meeting in Chamdo which people were forced to attend, Wang Chimei spoke alot trying to trick people into collaborating and deceive them, saying “We have come to liberate the Tibetan people! The Liberation Army serves the people, and would never take even a needle and thread from them. The people have the right to express their ideas. This meeting is for you to say whatever you want about the murder of Getak Tulku.”
 

But not a single person spoke. Then, an old official of Chamdo monastery called Benlok Rinchen Dondrup spoke out honestly and without reserve, saying “It is very kind of the Liberation Army not to oppress the people. We have not heard of (such things happening so far), and please ensure that it stays that way. In the negotiations between China and Tibet, please ensure that the Buddhist religion and the noble rule of the Dalai Lama remain in place. Getak Tulku died in Chamdo of natural causes, and since no-one saw, heard or suspected any involvement by that British radio operator, how can this be justified?”

That night, the Chinese commander summoned Rinchen Dondrup, gave him a talking to and threatened him, and this was the first occasion on which the falsity of these speeches was inevitably revealed.
 

The Chinese gave that British man a really hard time, for political purposes, and then took him away to China. Dingpön Tashi Norbu of the Drapchi regiment, one of governor Ngabo’s bodyguard, was privately questioned about why the armoury was destroyed, and he fearlessly replied that he had done it on the governor’s orders to prevent Tibetan government arms from falling into Chinese hands.
 

By that time, Tibetan troops in Chamdo, Drugu and so forth had been ordered to surrender and hand over their weapons, and the Chinese gave each one that surrendered a ‘certificate of lenient treatment’ and five silver coins (Dayuan) and sent them back home. Those that did not surrender took to the mountains, in Khyungpo and in Sho-Tar-Lhosum, and there they joined with local militia, swearing to defend the country against the Communist bandits, but anyway, by October 19^th 1950, Chamdo was in enemy hands. 

When Lhalu was serving as governor, the Gadang or Shikatse troops had met the Chinese advance across the Drichu from Denkok, but under Ngabo, when they lainched a five-pronged invasion from the northeast with a large body of troops, although we put up a determined fight, we could not contain them and were driven steadily back. The main reasons for this were the different attitudes of the two governors towards armed resistance, poor coordination between the Tibetan troops, and failure to forge unity with the local population. Earlier, the government had not approved plans for an attack under Lhalu’s command, supplies of ammunition and food and troop reinforcements were not in place, and there was no timely planning of strategy and provision, no battle plan laid down by those in charge, while the Chinese were making loud promises about bringing heaven on earth under the fine name of ‘liberation’, and giving out gifts and money liberally to turn the heads of the local leaders and population. They were also skilled at exploiting the internal feuds between the Tibetan government and the Panchen Lama, and between different regions. Most of all, successive governors sent by the government, the Dzong governors and officials and the army stationed (in the east) did not care for the local people and their needs as a religious government should, producing resentment, and as a result some people who came later and did not remember the past sided with the Chinese Communists, causing dissension and spoiling Tibetan unity…
 

…In October 1950, after the PLA captured Chamdo, former governor Lhalu was in Lho Dzong with some of the Drapchi regiment as his bodyguard. Hearing that the Chinese were starting to move towards Lhasa, Lhalu immediately went to Shopando and then to Tar Dzong where he stayed for a few days. The Gyantsé (4^th) regiment was in Khyungpo Karnak Sersum along with the local recruits and some Tibetan troops scattered from various parts of Chamdo. Lhalu entrusted the defense of Khyungpo to the Phadang regiment, along with local militia and the Tibetan troops who had fled from Chamdo. Then he ordered all the troops of the Gyantsé Regiment to rush to Shotarlhosum to defend areas along main roads, and accordingly, the troops of the Gyantsé regiment met at Tengchen, from where they headed down the Gyamo Ngulchu to Shopando, via Ngosho Dargyé monastery. There they were joined by some Tibetan troops of different regiments who had fled Chamdo. From Shopando, they sent scouts towards Chamdo to reconnoitre the situation. Through contact with the monasteries, they gathered local leaders and elders to discuss resistance, and they suggested that the area between Lhatsé and Bari would be defensible, whereas there were no strong positions in Shopando, and if fighting broke out there the monasteries of the area could be destroyed. So the Tibetan troops shifted their base to Lhatsé and occupied the Bari ridgeline, constructing barricades, and preparing to fight.
 

When Lhalu arrived at Lhari-go on his way to Kongpo Gyamda from Tar Dzong, he sent a fake arrow letter to Chamdo.  The letter said, “The government has dispatched five regiments and 5,000 monk volunteers along with arms and ammunitions, and they must be nearly there. The villages and monasteries along their way must extend help to them.”  The letter was sent straight to Lho Dzong and seems to have come into the hands of the Chinese.
 

Around that time, the Tibetan troops heard from their spies that many Chinese troops were advancing towards Shopando along the main road, and immediately took up fortified positions in the forests of Dzimo Gung-la pass in Bari. One morning, the Chinese advance cavalry followed by infantry came straight down the main road towards Gung-la, and on their way, fired on a unit of 10 Tibetan scouts in Bari village, killing their leader Kharkha Wangdu and Dungpa Tangpe Bagdro’s son, and capturing the remaining eight along with their weapons. Then, the Gyantsé commanders at Gung-la - Rupön Puntsok Yugyal, Rupön Kala Migmar Puntsok, Gyapön Lochi Kharsam Gyalpo and Gyapön Taktse Penpa Wangdu— pledged along with their troops that they would never allow the Chinese to pass. Just as the Chinese arrived at the foot of the pass, Rupön Puntsok Yugyal opened fire, and immediately his troops unleashed a barrage of heavy and light arms fire from both sides with whatever weapons they had, and the fighting went on for the whole day. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties, and returned fire as they fled into the nearby forest. By around 5 pm that evening, there was no further exchange of fire and all had gone quiet. On examination, it turned out that they had hurried back to Lho Dzong, either because of the intensity of the attack or because they were panicked by the fake arrow letter sent by Ngabo, stating that the Tibetan government had sent reinforcements to Chamdo. This is from an account given by  Dingpön Khétsun of the Gyantsé regiment:
 

At the time Chamdo fell, our regiment was in Khyungpo. Then, at the instruction of the ex-Governor, we went to defend Shopando.  Our soldiers were deployed on the mountaintops in four directions, and waited there to ambush the Chinese troops. The people and monks of Shopando requested us to shift our position because fighting a battle in Shopando would destroy all their monasteries. Accordingly, we shifted our position to Bari.  On the morning of the 15^th day of the 10^th Tibetan month, more than 300 Chinese troops advancing from Lho Dzong and Shopando arrived near us, and we immediately fired at them. The fighting lasted until midday. In the battle,  ten of our soldiers were captured, and amongst them two were killed and the other eight escaped and returned to our camp in the night.  On the Chinese side, fifty or sixty soldiers were killed or wounded. They hurriedly retreated from Bari.

Our side was unharmed, and with the same weapons, we remained at Sating Dzong and then in Nagsho Driru. After that, on the instruction of the ex-governor of Kham, we went to Kongpo Gyamda where we stayed a few months as his bodyguards. On 27^th day of the 4^th Tibetan month of the Iron-Rabbit year, on the order of the Government, our regiment returned to Lhasa and remained there until the new regime was established.     
 

     It was widely known that many Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded during the battle of Bari. The dead remained unclaimed and were eaten by dogs and birds, or left to rot.  On the Tibetan side, two soldiers died and some soldiers were wounded.
 

     According to the “One-Thousand Kilometer March by the PLA  Advance Troops” published in the first volume of Selected Materials on the History and Culture of Tibet, the author Chen Zeyi recounts the following:
 

. . .We continued our march. Pursuing the troops of the Ngadang regiment to Bari village, we struck them.  Then we headed for Palbar where we crushed the remaining troops of the enemy. . .
 

This is utterly false. The Chinese advance force (called the ‘branch division’) did not reach Palbar until August 8, 1951 after the 17-Point Agreement was signed.  Later, many Chinese veterans were encouraged to write accounts falsifying and covering up what really happened. It is therefore important to examine these and let the truth come out.
 

     When the battle of Bari took place, Lhalu was in Kongpo Gyamda.  From Lhatsé, a capable lieutenant and  section leader were sent to Lhalu to inform him about the battle, the situation of the enemy and to receive further instruction. They did not advance their camp. Thereafter, they moved to Gyéton Sating Dzong.  The regiment’s troops at Khyungpo Sertsa were called back through Tsapung Gang and Chamda, and regrouped at Palbar and Shargung-la pass, where they remained on watch for several months. During that time, there was no advance move from either the Chinese or Tibetan troops in the area. At that time, the Padang Drongdak (élite) regiment was on defence duty at Lhari Go and Nagsho Driru…

      

 

Documents Related to the Battle of Chamdo III

Translated by Jianglin Li

Edited by Matthew Akester

 

 

Document 8

Source:  Liberation of Chamdo. Compiled by Office of Editing and Research, Political Department, Chengdu Military Area Command and Tibet Military Area Command. Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1991. pp. 16-17.

Note: Footnotes added by translator.

Southwest Military Area Command’ Report to CMC

Regarding the 18^th Army Marching toward Chamdo

(October 1, 1950) 

Regarding the current situation of the advance on Chamdo, it is summarized as follows: 

I. The 52^nd division (excluding one battalion) of the 18^th army, joined by a reconnaissance battalion, artillery battalion and a supply regiment, assembled in Ganzi on September 16, and began marching westward. On 26^th the advanced troops reached Songlinkou, over 150 li west of Ganzi. The main force marched through the Baili (白利)-Rongbacha（绒坝岔）line, and is continuing to advance westward. Due to problems in the Ganzi-Kangding road, supplies could not be delivered on time, the 52^nd division had to spend three days repairing the road in the area west of Ganzi, and (troops) could not assemble in Dengke and Dege region on schedule. It is now decided that (troops) will begin to cross the river and advance westward on October 7^th. 

The main force of the 157^th regiment,  53^rd division, began westward movement from Kangding on September 11, and assembled in Ba-an on 29^th, planning to cross the river together with the 52^nd division. Troops of the 14^th Army plan to mobilize one battalion to attack and occupy Mengong and Bitu (northwest of Deqing[1]) and dispatch some troops out of Zayi (four days northwest of Bitu).[2] In addition, four companies will move northward from Deqing, pincer attacking Yanjing together with the northbound troops from Bitu.  

II. Regarding the clothing needed by advancing troops, some fur coats are still in urgent production, the rest of the fur coats and cotton-padded jackets have all been distributed.

By 27^th, two million jin[3] of food had been stored in Ganzi and the areas west (including food powder[4], crackers and egg-yolk sausages[5]), enough for one month’s supply. In order to reduce the difficulty for next year’s advance, it is decided that after the Battle of Chamdo, troops that have already entered Kang (Kham) and Zang (Tibet) areas (the 18^th army and supporting troops, about 20,000 men and 3000 pack animals) will all be kept in Chamdo (3000 men), Ganzi, Ba-an and west of Erlangshan mountain, so they will adapt to life in Kang and Zang area and build roads and airfields. In addition, work such as training and consolidation will be carried out. For this purpose, 10 million jin of supplies need to be delivered forward. With the current number of vehicles working intensively to transport it,  7200,000 jin can be rushed to the front by the end of November. The remaining 2800,000 jin is to be airdropped, supplemented by purchasing some grain and yaks in Ganzi and Chamdo. 

III. Beginning from early September, one engineers regiment rushed to build the road from Ganzi to Zhuqing[6]. By 26^th, small jeeps reached Yulong and will be able to reach Haizishan, southeast of Zhuqing by early October. Transportation from Haizishan to west bank of Jinsha river will be by yak. At the moment 5000 yaks have been assembled in the Yulong and Dengke line to meet the need.  

IV. Since September the Yajiang and Ganzi lines have had constant rain. Majority of the road from Kangding to Ganzi covers pastoral land, and the road bed is not strong enough and roadside drainage is not sufficient either. As a result,  there is a large amount of rainwater on the road, and mud on several sections. The most serious were the four sections of Luanshigang, Ekou, Tagong monastery south of Daofu[7] and Dong-E-luo in the northwest to Yingguanzai (altogether about 12 km). Sludge on those sections is as deep as one meter, most vehicles get bogged down, advancing  one and half kilometers costs four gallons of gasoline and serious damage to vehicle parts.  From Kangding to Daofu normally takes one and a half days, but due to the above-mentioned reason, the delay can even be as long as four and a half days, greatly impairing troops’ advance and transportation. The engineers corps made great efforts to drive in stakes and rushed to set up crossings, and (the troops) can now manage to pass through, but it still takes three days. We could have built the road on the higher land, circling around this section of meadow to avoid vehicles getting stuck, but we were hurrying to build a straight road to pass quickly, and instead it cost more time and effort.

 

Document 9

Source:  Liberation of Chamdo. Compiled by Office of Editing and Research, Political Department, Chengdu Military Area Command and Tibet Military Area Command. Chendu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1991. pp. 18-20. 

The People’s Liberation Army 52^nd Division (Combat) Order

 (Kang Combat Order No. 3)

 

(October 4, 1950)

 

I. Situation: see Intelligence Report No. 5. 

II. In according with the Kang Combat Order No. 2, namely, the Initial Order on Battle of Chamdo, this division has decided to cross the river beginning 7 a.m. on the 6^th day of this month (October) at Dengke, executing the task of liberating Chamdo and annihilating the main force of the Tibetan Army east of the Langqiang River and the Enda, Leiwuqi area. Specific arrangements are as follows: 

A. Right Wing:  being a combination of the Qinghai Calvary detachment, Division Reconnaissance company and all the units of the 154^th Regiment and collectively under the command of Deputy Political Commissar Yin[8] and Chief of Staff Li, it is this Division’s powerful force on the right side of the advance on Chamdo. The significance is that infantry and cavalry can closely coordinate with each other and provide strong points to offset each other’s weakness, quickly circling and outflanking the entire position of Kalon and Lhalu, so the troops of the mid-wing can be broken up, to penetrate and annihilate the enemy.  The key to whether (we) can annihilate over three depons of the enemy force, lay a good foundation for advancing into Lhasa and liberate the whole Tibet depends on how troops of this wing accomplish their tasks (namely, if they encircle more, annihilate more;  encircle less, annihilate less, or otherwise miss the enemy). It is hereby decided: 

Qinghai cavalry detachment (joined by divisional cavalry reconnaissance company,  one platoon of the 154^th regiment artillery company with two recoilless guns)  moves from Yushu on 9^th via Nangqian, passing Nangqian monastery,[9] Zhiya and Duozangka in seven days, encircles the enemy in Leiwuqi first and annihilates the enemy, if (your) own capability and the circumstance allow. If not, leave (the enemy) to the 154^th regiment to handle (if enemies have escaped within one day’s distance, the detachment bears the responsibility to pursue and annihilate them), and push straight to Enda, cutting off the enemy’s route of retreat from Chamdo to Taizhao[10] and blocking enemy reinforcements. 

The 154^th regiment crosses the river at Dengke on 6^th, detouring toward Batang at 50 li south to  Yushu, and then following the cavalry detachment forward to Nangqian, taking the route of Nangqian monastery, Dogongba, Jiazangka[11] and annihilating the enemy in Leiwuqi. After that, (the regiment) leaves one battalion (also organize shelter) there to cut off the enemy’s route of retreat from Chamdo to Heihe, and the main force moves straight to Enda, with the same tasks as the cavalry detachment.  

B. Middle wing: composed of the 155^th and 156^th regiments, division artillery battalion and troops directly under the division headquarters, commanded by the division. Main task: break up, penetrate positions of Kalon and Lhalu, wipe them out one by one (when necessary, battles can be fought by individual companies), and finally reassemble to annihilate the main force of the Tibetan army around Chamdo. It is hereby decided: 

The 155^th regiment crosses the river at 7 a.m. on 8^th from Dengke, by-passing Guode[12] via Kazeduo to deploy at Yayaosongduo.[13]  One battalion circles to areas south of Shengda, coordinating with the 156^th regiment to annihilate the enemy first in the Shengda, Jiakasongduo and Guode line. After completing the task, (the 155^th regiment) continues to advance into Dongdong Zhuka, the main force moves to Fenlu via Maojing, one battalion quickly captures the bridge in Mianda,[14] another battalion moves southward along Jiangxigou, quickly captures Jiangxi Bridge and the bridge at Dedang Gongba, ensuring the main force can cross (the bridges) and encircle escaping enemies from Shengda. After completing the task, this battalion should quickly make a force crossing of the Zachu (Mekong) river, take control of the river bank and ferry west of Dongdong Zhuka, coordinating with the main force of the regiment to cross the river. When all the units regroup, the whole regiment marches down south along the mountain ranges north of Chamdo via Niuchang (southwest of Dongdong Zhuka) straight to Chamdo. 

The 156^th Regiment (excluding one battalion and Army artillery battalion) crosses the river from Dengke on 10^th, taking a shortcut straight to Shengda, and dispatching a small unit to circling areas south of Shengda, coordinating with the 155^th regiment to annihilate the enemy defending Shengda (the third depon commanded by Moxia)[15], then seize Sichuan bridge (on the outskirts of Chamdo) by way of Yiquka and Duolando. After that (the two regiments) jointly attack Chamdo. On the march, attention should be paid to annihilating any enemies escaping westward along the Jinsha river, and keep in contact with the Engineers battalion and the Reconnaissance battalion.  

C. Left wing: composed of Army Reconnaissance battalion, Engineers battalion, the 54^th Division Artillery company and jointly commanded by Commander Su of Reconnaissance battalion and Director Wang of Political Department, Army Headquarters. Crosses the river at 7 a.m. from Gangtuo on 8^th, taking on the tasks formulated in Initial Order for Battle of Chamdo[16] . When troops of this wing advance to within three days of Chamdo, some of the troops should circle to the areas south of Chamdo on the routes they see fit, to prevent enemies from detouring (original text unclear)  or Jingda and Zaya Cheda[17] to escape.

 

III. Communication and logistics all follow the Basic Order.  

IV. Division headquarters will be positioned in Dengke in the first stage, Shengda in the second stage, Dongdong Zhuka in the third stage.

 

Notes:

1. While advancing, all units should seize bridges rapidly, and in case those bridges have been destroyed by the enemy, (units) should find any other way to cross over quickly (leather boats should be carried on departure).

2. One combat map for Battle of Chamdo attached.

3. One mileage map of main transportation route attached.

4. 30 copies of this order are mimeographed.

 

Document 10 

Source:  Liberation of Chamdo. Compiled by Office of Editing and Research, Political Department, Chendu Military Area Command and Tibet Military Area Command. Chendu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1991. pp. 21- 26

Note: Footnotes added by translator. 

Detailed Report on Battle of Chamdo by the 52^nd Division, 18^th Army[18]

(November, 1950)

After crossing the Jinsha river from October 6th to 9^th, troops reached the vast plateau of a thousand li in length and width and in coordination with brother troops, units of this division were divided into three wings, left, middle and right, forming the assault on Chamdo, a powerful pincer attack targetting the 1500-li-long position of the Tibetan army commanded by Chamdo Governor Lhalu.

During the fourteen days of rapid advance and fighting, all units were moving across the unfamiliar plateau without accurate maps. (Soldiers) carried loads of 60 or 70 jin,[19] climbed more than 50 high mountains and crossed rivers over 60 times. On average, foot soldiers cover 72 li , cavalry 80 li[20] a day, those who had to march day and night moved up to 34 hours continuously  without enough food. However, (all units) answered the call by party committees of both the army and the division and endured extreme hardship, annihilated all the defending enemies in Chamdo on schedule, and successfully completed the capture of Chamdo.

The success of this battle, …annihilated five Dapons, the main force of the Tibetan army, and over 2000 militia, liberated the region north to Qinghai, south to Yunnan, east to Jinsha river, west to Luolong and Leiwuqi,  a vast area more than one thousand square li. (The success) further strengthened (our) unity with Tibetans west of the Jinsha river, laid the foundation for advancing next year (1951), struck blows directly and indirectly at the British and American imperialist invaders, inspired people in the near east and repaid the people of the whole country who had warmly supported us.

…Tibetans have warmly supported us (taking in and escorting individual stragglers,  delivering information, guiding the way, providing transportation, building bridges, preparing firewood and fodder, etc.), all of this shows that we had good influence by carrying out the policies conscientiously before the attack and shows the tangible benefits brought  to Tibetans during our westward march.  This is a small accomplishment we achieved in the past, and it is also a major pointer for the future in the liberation and construction of Tibet.

In this battle, troops advanced rapidly for 15 days with heavy loads across the high plateau a thousand kilometers in length and width, wrapping up…entire (enemy?) position  1500 li in length and accomplished the task on schedule, completely annihilated the third (two Dapons), the seventh, the eighth, the fifth and the tenth Dapon, altogether five Dapons (averaging small regiments) under Tibetan Frontier Envoy Commissioner General,[21]  captured…over 3000 men. This victory is fundamentally due to correct leadership by leading officers of the Military Area Command and the Army Party Committee, strong support from the people of the whole country, coordination from brother troops (particularly engineer corps), favourable influence created by advanced detachment through their hard work and carrying out policies conscientiously, and the eight-month long preparation. All of these contributed to the successful conclusion of this battle. Review of the battle process is as follows:

I. Process

(I) Judgement of enemy situation:

(1) Based on information obtained by the advanced detachment and by our own battle experience, in terms of the arrangement of their position, the enemy had no focus, no depth and attached no importance to flanks.

(2) (Enemy) lacks systematic strategic planning and command, (they) fought wherever they were attacked and were easily misled by us. After we crossed the river from Dengke, it was quite possible that the enemy might mistakenly believe, based on historical experience, that we were going to take Lhasa by way of Yushu and Heihe.

(3) The enemy had never experienced large scale battle, had no knowledge of modern military science and was equipped with few heavy weapons. (Their) combat capability was not strong. After our powerful military forces crossed the (Jinsha) river, it was estimated that the following three changes may appear:

① Retreat without fighting and escape without hesitation.  If this happened, it would definitely make it more difficult for us to annihilate the enemy.

②. Scatter at the first contact, and the possibility of scattering everywhere in the mountains and wilderness to entangle us also existed. This would make it even more difficult for us to annihilate the enemy.

③. Concentrate forces and put up strong resistance in strategic locations. This was exactly what we were hoping for, for we were absolutely sure that we would annihilate them thoroughly, straightforwardly and completely.

④. In the Dengke battle, (we) did not seize the moment of strength to strike the enemy a fatal blow. The enemy might mistakenly have thought that our combat capability was not strong, getting arrogant and inattentive enough to confront us.

(II). Determination and Deployment

Liberating Chamdo, annihilating the main force of the Tibetan army in the area east of Lanchang river,  Enda and Leiwuqi lays the foundation  for advance into Lhasa next year (1951) and liberate the entire Tibet. (We) decided to deploy a powerful right-flank encircling force composed of infantry and cavalry, providing strong points to offset each other’s weaknesses, making a detour via Ba-tang and Nanqian and pushing forward vigorously and precipitately. Troops should not be blocked by small numbers of enemy, doing everything possible to clear away obstacles and circle bravely…the entire field, cutting off the enemy’s retreats from Enda to Taizhao and from Leiwuqi to Heihe, the two main escape routes, making it impossible for enemies to escape even if they intended to slip away without fighting. Performance of troops in this wing is the key to success or failure in annihilating more than three Dapons of the enemy force. The middle wing cut into the heart of the enemy position by way of Shengda, Yayaosongduo, Yiquka, Dongdong Zhuka, Duozhiduo, etc,, cutting into the heart of the enemy position, penetrating, separating, surrounding and annihilating the enemy within the entire enemy position and advancing straight to Chamdo. If the enemy did not rest, we wouldn’t  rest; when the enemy took rest, we annihilate them. The left wing force crossed (the river) at Gangtuo, marching slowly by way of Tongpu, Jiangda and Jueyong to draw in the enemy. They seized the Damala Pass and controlled Sichuan bridge. Our slogans were “not to worry about breaking up Tibetan army’s positions, but to worry whether (we can) surround them. Surround more, annihilate more; surround less, annihilate less.”

II. Review of the Battle (omitted)

III. A few experiences from the battle

(I) Experiences of fighting the Tibetan army

A. All Tibetan troops were organized in a comparatively primitive way. Troops have neither (commanding) offices nor maps. Everything was handled by one single officer-in-charge. Special reconnaissance troops and communication tools were very outdated. Everything relied on wula,[22] and as a result the upper and lower could not communicate during the battle.  For example, during the battle when Gaqionba, the third Dapon, retreated in defeat from Jiangda to Chamdo, (he was) surprised to meet Moxia Dapon, and only at that time did he come to know that the Liberation Army had passed Dengke and that Moxia had been defeated too. 

(They) did not fight aggressively and lacked counter attack ability. In several battles we did not find the enemy launching strong counter attacks.

B. Lack of systematic strategic thinking, as expressed by:

① No attention paid to protect flank and rear while deploying the forces. As seen from the deployment of this battle, three Dapons positioned in the front had fallen into our horseshoe-shape encirclement,  200 men were still deployed in the Leiwuqi flank.

② No knowledge of using the terrain to block our advance. While chasing and attacking the enemy, none of the bridges and passes in the route were destroyed, particularly the Sichuan bridge (this bridge is like the gateway to Chamdo). The 156^th regiment was half a day’s distance from the enemy, when they advanced and seized the bridge, it was left intact.

③ No night combat experience. Falling into disorder as soon as fighting began, each man escaping on his own. This was how the enemy behaved in the battle of Jueyong.

No guards posted at encampments.  In Jueyong one squad of our reconnaissance battalion sneaked into the enemy’s tents at night, and only then did they find out and began screaming and running about in disorder.

C. Enemies were slow in climbing mountains: the 156^th regiment was one day’s distance away, the reconnaissance battalion was two days’ distance away from the enemy, but they both caught up the enemy within 100 to 200 li. Their speed was nearly one third faster than the speed of the enemy.

D. In terms of tactics: (enemy) was good at riding horses, highly skillful at shooting and utilizing terrain and landforms, but not good at operation. For example: in the battle of Shengda, the 155th regiment confronted the enemy across the river for more than ten hours, and over ten men were wounded. The distance in between was about 300 meters, but hardly any enemy could be seen (they were all hiding behind rocks and in dense forest). According to our observations in the battle field, beside Jazhangka and Shengda where a few fortifications were made, the other places had no fortifications. The fortifications were very poorly built, mostly piled up stones in the shape of a pigsty, which could be pushed over by hand.

(II) Tactics to be used against Tibetan army

A. To deal with the weak Tibetan army with our current equipment, the key is to encircle the enemy (that is, the more encircled, the more will be annihilated; less encircled, less will be annihilated). No need to worry about breaking through Tibetan army’s positions, the only worry is not being able to encircle them. Since supplies are scarce in Kham-Zang Plateau, once the supply line is cut, (enemy) will retreat in disorder without fighting.

B.   Based on special conditions of the plateau cavalry is the key to annihilate the enemy, and the guarantee of success. Because the loads foot soldiers have to carry are too heavy, they don’t have enough physical strength to walk long distances to encircle the enemy.  As is shown in this battle, the cavalry detachment was able to complete its task on time (to block the enemy), based on the distance, it was impossible for the infantry to complete it.

III. Coordination of Infantry and Artillery

Due to weather conditions on the plateau and our equipment, vigorous activities and rapid charge are not favourable to the troops. Therefore, during combat firepower must be well organized so as to coordinate with foot soldiers continuously and effectively.  In arranging firepower, the focal points should be the flank and rear, for enemy fears our artillery attack more than anything.

IV. Reconnaissance

Since there are no accurate maps available and no accountable mileage for roads, plus there are lots of rivers, forests and mountain ranges in Kang-Zang area, knowledge of enemy situation and terrain through reconnaissance prior to battle is highly important. The method is to inquire from Tibetans familiar with (the area) in various ways, and estimate how far it is based on how many days he covers certain distance. As long as we are nice to him, he would give us such information honestly.

V. How to use artillery in plateau combat should be well studied, particularly how to measure distance. Observation is not easy since too many objects block the view, and as a result, distances are often misjudged as closer (than they actually are). Because the air is thin, the speed of the shells is faster.

VI. Suggestions on army structure and equipment

A. Branches of army:  a division should have a cavalry regiment to fulfill the task of circling and surrounding (the enemy). A regiment should have a mounted reconnaissance company to facilitate communication and reconnaissance. When the regiment engages in individual combat, (mounted reconnaissance company) can perform tasks of circling and surrounding in small actions. In addition, one engineers platoon should be allocated (can be attached to guard company) to take on tasks such as building bridges, handling boats, and clearing away obstacles so as to reduce the trouble of crossing rivers and increase advancing speed.

B. Weaponry: reduce mountain artillery,  increase recoilless guns, high-angle guns, dynamite, detonator, fuse and explosive.

C. Tools: Quality and style of current field tools needs to be improved. Both the shovels and picks the troops are currently equipped with are not practical in combat. Besides being pointed at one end, the other end of the pick should be changed to something that can be used mainly in hacking. Shovel should be changed into American style with removable head, and can be used to dig, scratch and shovel off grass. Besides, since the plateau weather is cold, canteen should be changed into thermal canteen, and more cowhide boats, and bridge-building tools such as saws, hatchets, ropes, etc.

D. Uniform: There are thorns and gravel everywhere on the plateau and clothes are easily torn, the current style of uniform must be changed and quality must be improved, otherwise it will not be able to last the season (until the next uniform issue).

It is better to make the uniform with strong and durable cloth, shoulders, backsides and knees should be reinforced.  It is better that the cuffs are tightened and trousseaus in the style of jodhpurs. Weight of coat should be reduced. Comforter should be changed into soft, warm, damp-resistant, lightweight, larger size wool blanket which can be used as mattress pad as well as comforter. Raincoat and damp-resistant canvas should be combined into one, based on current raincoat size and shape, adding more rubber to make it thicker so it can be used to wear and to spread as bedding.  Quality of shoes should be improved, soles should be softer and the upper should be higher, water-proof and damp-resistant. Headgear should better be helmet (the type used by pilots) with goggles fixed on. Goggle lenses should be made of plastic (at the moment two thirds of the goggles the troops were equipped with have been damaged).

E. Communication tools: Office at regiment and above level should be equipped with larger radio of 50 watt or more. Current radios cannot function at 11. p.m. because signals are too weak.

F. Supply:  Since the current transportation condition is rather difficult, all food should be high quality, low quantity, long-lasting and easy to carry, otherwise it increases soldiers’ burden, reduces their physical strength, slows down marching speed and has negative impact on accomplishing tasks. For example, the powdered food distributed this time was heavy and the quality was poor. Grain powder was not well cooked, ration was not enough to eat, and hard to digest, causing stomach pain, abdominal bloating and diarrhea. As a result, medical patients sharply increased, and a considerable number of soldiers lagged behind.  According to initial statistics, of all the stragglers in the whole division, 80% were because of the food powder.

 

Document 11

Source:  Liberation of Chamdo. Compiled by Office of Editing and Research, Political Department, Chengdu Military Area Command and Tibet Military Area Command. Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1991. P. 35 – 39.

Note: Footnotes added by translator. 

Brief Report on Battle of Chamdo

by Southwest Military Area Command [23]

 

I. Before the battle over four thousand Tibetan regular army and over three thousand militia were stationed in Chamdo area. The main forces were deployed in the Shengda, Jiangda, Tongpu and Leiwuqi line around Chamdo, other troops were placed in the areas of Ningjing, Yanjing, Bitu and Mengong, attempting to block the advance of our army. For the purpose of annihilating the above-mentioned main force of Tibetan army and occupying Chamdo area, creating favourable conditions for liberating entire Tibet in the following year, a faction of the 18th army, cavalry detachment of Qinghai Military Area Command and the 14^th army, altogether over 20,000 men, were deployed to carry out the tasks of Battle of Chamdo. In terms of strategy, every effort was made to circle, surround and annihilate the enemy’s main force in Chamdo and further east. 

Specific arrangement: The entire 52nd division, 18th army, was to cross the river at Dengke. One regiment, together with the cavalry detachment moving down from Yushu, would advance straight to Leiwuqi and Enda via Nangqian to cut off enemy escape routes toward the west and northwest. The main force of the division was to march southwest of Dengke directly to Chamdo by way of Shengda and Dongsong Chuka. Reconnaissance battalion and engineer battalion of 18th army would cross the river at Derge and march westward, assaulting Chamdo head on. Meanwhile the 157th regiment, 53rd division, would cross from Ba-an (Batang), surround and annihilate enemies in Ningjing. The main force would then move on to Bangda and Basu[24] to block enemy escape routes in the southwest.

One regiment of 42nd division, 14th army, would move from Gongchuan and Deqing, Yunnan Province, annihilate enemies in Mengong, Bitu and Yanjing and then pretend to move toward northwest. The above-mentioned troops began action according to schedule on October 6th and 7th respectively, breaking the enemy defenses along the way and won over the 9^th Dapon at Ningjing[25] to stage an uprising. From October 19th to 21st, troops arrived at Chamdo area one after another. …The Battle was completed by October 25th. According to initial statistics, altogether over 5700 enemies were annihilated. Some remnants of the enemy force fled westward to the areas of Luolong and Bianba[26], but was soon annihilated in Luolong by a section of the 154th regiment on November 12 using the tactic of long-range raid, capturing over 30 men including Pusalong[27] the 7th Dapon and occupying the area. 

II. Prior to the battle, we estimated that after the battle began, enemy might make three changes under pressure, namely: 

(1) Draw back their forces to guard strategic positions and fight fiercely with us; 

(2) Dissolve on the spot and engage us in guerrilla war;

(3) After finding out the strength of our force, deploy a rearguard to defend the strategic positions, blocking our advance step by step by step in order to provide cover for the main force to retreat. This is most likely. Therefore, on the one hand we deployed part of our troops specially to circle and surround (the enemies) on both flanks and cut the enemy’s retreat route; on the other hand we ordered troops to be flexible and make proper decisions suitable to the situation, to engage the enemy in the relevant areas and at the same time capture and annihilate them group by group. We also emphasized that when it was clear that the enemies were in retreat, (troops) should catch them up and annihilate them quickly and forcefully regardless of fatigue.

Development of the battle shows that this estimate and our combat strategy were correct. Even though enemies in Chamdo had the intention to defend with every effort, they lacked a comprehensive and detailed combat scheme (the ninth Dapon in Ningjing had lost contact with Chamdo before the battle started). In the beginning they resisted separately, later on they fled westward in haste. In addition, Tibetan soldiers were corrupted, most had been in the army for 20 or 30 years and deeply estranged from their officers. All soldiers had their families with them, resulting in slow and clumsy movement. Their combat capability was rather weak and the (combat) performance was confusing and chaotic. Since our army generally is capable of pursue and assault regardless of fatigue, especially the right wing (cavalry detachment and 154^th regiment of the 52^nd division). Charged with the spirit of bravery, this unit was able to march long distances rapidly and cut off the enemy’s retreat route in time, achieved expected combat result and played a great role in winning the overall victory.

However, a few units failed to perform according to the above-mentioned principle, some even lost combat opportunity and suffered unnecessary losses for caring too much about fatigue. For instance, on the 12th, the advanced battalion of the 156th regiment had initial contact with 400 Tibetan militia on the outskirts of Guode (over 200 li southwest of Dengke), the enemy took a detour and fled toward Shengda. This battalion did not follow up the victory with a pursuit and did not start advancing till after breakfast the next day. As a result the enemy slipped away. It had been decided that this unit should rush to Shengda within three days, but it delayed as long as two days. The reconnaissance and engineer battalions of the 18th army that crossed river at Derge did not fully understand the principle that “the frontline troops advance at slow pace in order to engage the enemy”, plus psychologically inattentive (off guard) due to underestimating the enemy and eager to win, they did not follow the order issued by the 52nd division to postpone river-crossing for one day but crossed in daytime on the 7th. Since they did not arrange firepower correctly, infantry and artillery were not well coordinated and troops used for circling did not function properly, enemies in Gangtuo were able to hold the position and put up a stubborn resistance for 15 hours, costing us lots of ammunition and over 20 casualties without annihilating the enemy. 

III. Before the battle, troops had gone through comprehensive education on minority policy and conducted work aimed at uniting with the minority people in a planned way. (This work) contributed greatly to accomplishing the battle smoothly.  For example, in the Ganzi, Dengke, Derge to Chamdo line 15,000 yaks were drafted from Tibetans for transportation (excluding those purchased by the army), ensuring that food and other supplies were delivered to the front on time. Transportation from Kangding to Ba-an was also served by yaks belonging to local Tusi and chiefs. When the advanced detachment of the 18^th army arrived in Ganzi at the end of April, (the troop) was assisted by Tusi and chiefs, enabling them to overcome the difficulties caused by food shortage and other problems.   Based on the principle of unity, troops spread the message of Central People’s Government policies and discipline of People’s Liberation Army to Lamas, Tibetan officials, Tusi and chiefs along the way, and received fairly good response. They were willing to assist us with the work of road building and transportation. After entering Ningjing and Yanjing, (troops) immediately started political offensive, successfully getting the deputy magistrate of Yanjing county and magistrate of Ningjing county to return to their offices. More than 700 militia men returned in Yanjing area alone. 

Generally speaking, troops managed to follow policies and discipline properly while on the advance, and won a very favourable response from the Tibetan masses. For example, on the way to Mengong, (troops) released the 10 or more Lamas and militia they captured near Lake-la (southeast of Mengong, east of Nujiang[28]). This immediately won the local masses’ good feeling toward us. People along the way did not run away and provided our troops with all kinds of assistance.  When the troops of the 14^th Army conducted activities in Zhuwagen area, local people voluntarily arrested the Tibetan tax collector and handed him to us. As for provision purchasing, normally it is collectively done with one battalion as a unit. However, such things as individual units and personnel requesting yaks and soliciting wula (transport) services without explicit approval, cutting trees and collecting firewood on sacred mountains did happen. 

IV. A special headquarters responsible for providing support to advancing troops was established in the last third of February under the direct leadership of the area command. To provide provision and supplies for troops entering Tibet, our principle was “to give whatever needed” as long as the usage was reasonable and the requests could be met. Large numbers of pack animals and vehicles were drafted from the whole army to organize transportation units. All the engineer units joined the urgent work of building the Sichuan-Xikang road. The 1300-li section from Ya-an to Ganzi was completed from April 13 to August 26, and the over 200-li section from Ganzi to Zhuqing was completed from September 16 to October 2, making it possible for the troops to advance on schedule. During that period, transportation units from both infantry and air force braved the harsh weather and worked hard with extremely poor road conditions. By the end of November, total provisions delivered westward from west Sichuan were up to over 69,000,000 jin[29]. From May 7 to the end of November, more than 200 flights transported over one million jin[30] of provisions. To encourage and oversee the support work, the area command sent high ranking officers to the frontline several times, both to inspect and to greet (the units). In short, great effort was put into the support effort.  However, due to our lack of experience and unfamiliarity with local conditions, and weak planning, we did make some mistakes. For instance, needed supplies could not be delivered on time due to our misjudgment of the road repairing situation. As a result, the army’s advance was delayed several times. We failed to have a good understanding of driving in winter conditions, and did not acquire antifreeze equipment and necessities to prevent skidding until fairly late. (Tarpaulin) covers were not provided to vehicles on time and driving in rainy season was not properly handled, resulting in food and supplies delivered to the front being damaged by rain. Some food and supplies rotted in warehouses due to poor conditions and bad management. We did not acquire enough knowledge and did not carefully study local conditions. Some of the clothing and bedding were not practical (for the troops). However, at the same time we have learned highly valuable lessons, in particular the engineer units have obtained rich experience in operating in rainy season and in high altitude areas. Most of the supporting units toughed through living and working on the plateau for several months, laying a solid foundation for support work the following year. 

V. The battle proved that high altitude acclimatisation training is vitally important for the troops. The 154^th regiment of the 18^th army (the advance detachment) had been in Ganzi area five months, and the number of people falling behind on the westward march was less than for other troops on the north wing. Other units moving from Ganzi constantly had people lagging behind ever since the march started. After entering Chamdo area, most units had more than half of their people falling behind; in certain units the number was as high as two thirds. Based on such experience, we made a decision that all the units that had moved west of Jinsha river would spend the winter there, in order to conduct acclimatisation training on the plateau.

VI. When combat actions started at the places where the units were concentrated, all units moved rapidly toward the enemy in extremely hard conditions with insufficient provision and supply. The 156^th regiment had only a little zanba to eat. The 1^st battalion of 155^th regiment crossed three high mountains and rushed 180 li[31] in one and half days. The 154^th regiment marched long distances circling through Yushu and entered Enda on time together with the cavalry detachment.  While marching toward Bangda, the 157^th regiment of the south wing crossed four high mountains, and only a couple of men fell behind. All units were in high spirits, determined to execute their tasks despite the extreme hardship. All these were inseparable from the in-depth work of political mobilization. The loads that troops had to carry was rather heavy, average weight for soldiers was over 75 jin, company commander over 30 jin. In the first couple of days soldiers expressed some fear of hardship.  The difficulty (of carrying heavy loads) was overcome after acclimatisation training and political mobilization, and (soldiers’) ability to march with heavy load increased.

 

Documents Related to the Battle of Chamdo I

Documents Related to the Battle of Chamdo II

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[1] Mengong: sMan khungs (Menkung), in present Dzayul county. Bitu: Bul thog (Bultok), in present Dzogang county, Chamdo prefecture. Deqing: bDe chen (Dechen), now Dechen prefecture in Yunnan.

[2] Zayi: Brag yol (Drayoe) in present Dzogang county.

[3] About one million kilograms.

[4] Military ration made of soy bean, wheat and peanut powders roasted with butter, specially produced for troops marching into Tibet.

[5] Canned military ration made of egg-yolk in the shape of a finger. Each can contained 10 pieces.  Food powder and egg-yolk sausages were the basic ration that soldiers carried with them on their march into Tibet.

[6] Zhuqing: rDzogs chen (Dzokchen), in today’s Dege county, Ganzi prefecture.

[7] Tagong: lHa sgang (Minyak Lhagang). Daofu: Ta’u (Tawu), present Tawu county, Ganzi prefecture.

[8] Yin Fatang (1922-  ), the CPC Secretary for TAR from 1980 to 1985.

[9] Nangqian: Nang chen (Nangchen) monastery at Sha mda’ (Shonda), the present Nangchen county town, Yushu prefecture, Qinghai).

[10]  Gyamda Dzong, formerly one of the four Dzongs in Kongpo, was referred to by the Chinese as Taizhao. It is now in Kongpo Gyamda county, Linzhi prefecture, TAR.

[11] Jiazangka: lCags zam kha (Chaksamka), in present Riwochey county, Chamdo prefecture.

[12] Guode: Go stod (Gotoe), northeast of Srib mda’, on the route to Denkok.

[13] Yayaosongduo: Ya yu gsum mdo (Yayu Sumdo).

[14] Mianda: sMan mda’ (Menda) in present Chamdo county.

[15] Muja Dapon

[16] See Document 5.

[17] Jomda and Drayab?

[18] Words omitted in the original text are indicated by ellipsis. Different numerical system used in Part I and Part III are not changed.

[19] c. 30 to 35 kg.

[20] 1 li = 0.5 km.

[21] The Chamdo governor’s title was ‘Domey Chikyap’ (mDo smad spyi khyab), meaning ‘Eastern Commissioner’ or ‘Governor’, one of four or five regional commissioners charged with supervising administration in the provinces. It was a wishful title, since the Lhasa government actually governed no more than half of Dotoe, and none of Domey, in this period.

[22] Wula is Tibetan ’U lag, government requisition of transport services from local villages.

[23] No dates in original text.

[24] Bangda: sPang mda’ (Pangda) in today’s Basu county. Basu: dPag shod (Tsawa Pashoe) county, Chamdo prefecture, TAR

[25] Dege Se Kelsang Wangdu.

[26] Bianba: dPal ’bar , today’s Pelbar county, Chamdo prefecture, TAR.

[27] Phu lung ba

[28] Salwin river (rGyal mo rngul chu). 

[29] 34,500 tons.

[30] 500 tons.

[31] 90 kilometers.