“Suppressing Rebellion in Tibet” and the China-India Border War

“Suppressing Rebellion in Tibet” and the China-India Border War

Jianglin Li

Edited by Matthew Akester

From June to August 2017, a prolonged standoff between Chinese and Indian soldiers took place in the Droklam grassland in Bhutan, bordering the strategic Chumbi valley in occupied TIbet. Video clips circulated on social media showing soldiers from the two sides pushing and shoving each other, but eventually the status quo was restored without resort to arms. On June 29^th, senior Colonel Wu Qian, deputy director of the Defence Ministry’s Information Bureau and the Ministry’s press spokesman, warned “certain persons in Indian army to keep historical lessons in mind”.[1] Dai Xu, former senior colonel in the PLA air force and a well-known hawk, wrote in his blog that in 1962 “China only used a knife to kill a chicken [part of an idiom - “no need to slaughter a chicken with the knife used to slaughter an ox”] to deal with India the ox, and that was enough to make it run like a mad cow. This is enough to show that both sides are not at the same level.”[2] Dai’s implication: India will certainly be defeated in another border war.

No doubt the 1962 border war was a big defeat for India. In the decades since, numerous books and articles have been published dealing with its cause, process and result. In this article, I would like to present a few historical details from Chinese sources that may have gone unnoticed. These concern the eastern sector of the conflict, on which some documentary sources are available.  

A war for which China was “unprepared”?

In 2005, Military History, a magazine produced for the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, published an interview with Yin Fatang, former first secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee and a veteran of the 1962 war. During the interview, Yin claimed that the PLA had gone into the war unprepared.[3] Ding Sheng, who served as the commander of the 54^th Army and led PLA forces on the Walong front of the eastern sector, echoed Yin in his 2008 memoir. He explained that in October 1962, the 130^th division of the 54^th army, one of the main PLA forces involved, was stationed in Sichuan, and scattered in a dozen locations for agricultural work. On October 28^th, he received the order to fight the Indian army at Walong. These troops were hastily mobilized, issued warm clothing and rushed to Tibet for the battle at short notice.[4] Both Yin and Ding gave the impression that all was well along the China-India border until October 1962, when war suddenly broke out.

The China-India border dispute came about after China occupied Tibet, bringing the two Asian giants suddenly face to face. The PRC government learned about the McMahon Line in 1952, after the newly formed branch office of China’s Foreign Ministry absorbed the former foreign office of the Kashag government and acquired its archival documents.[5]

In the early 1950s, China needed India’s help to send supplies into Tibet, so that the PLA could consolidate the occupation. India was quite generous in providing this help. In 1952, Beijing “used diplomatic channels” to ship 2,500 tons of rice from Guangdong province to Calcutta, and transport it up to Tibet through Yadong (Dromo). By April 1953, all the rice had arrived. This basically solved the food supply problem for PLA troops, and enabled them to establish a preliminary footing in Tibet.[6]  

Zhou Enlai’s 1954 directive on the border issue is recalled by Wang Gui, former director of the Tibet Military Command Political Department’s liaison office:

China’s Indian policy should be striving for co-existence with India based on the Five Principles, striving to make it anti-US aggression and anti-war. India is still under British and American influence, so we want to win it over. As for the border issue, issues regarding areas such as Tawang ，Lhoyul that had been excluded by the McMahon Line, and issues regarding the ownership of other places, should be solved in future at the appropriate time due to insufficient documents now. The stronger China is, the more solid national unity is, the more India’s attitude will change.^[7]

However, less than three months after the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement in August 1954, China and India began to exchange notes, memos and letters on border disputes.[8] Over the following years, the border issue gradually intensified, leading to the first armed clash in August 25^th 1959, and eventually developed into a border war between the two countries.

In March 1959, a series of critical events played out in Lhasa. From March 25th to April 5^th, the CCP Central Committee held an enlarged politburo meeting, and the seventh plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee in Shanghai. “Pacification of rebellion in Tibet” and relations with India were two of the issues discussed.  Wu Lengxi, who was then head of Xinhua News Agency and chief editor of the People’s Daily, revealed a glimpse of Mao’s thinking on the China-India relationship in his memoir: “Let the Indian government commit all the wrongs for now. When the time comes, we will settle accounts with them.”[9]

Mao was brooding on “settling accounts” with India as early as March 1959, yet on May 15^th, he added the following words to a letter from the Chinese foreign ministry to the Indian foreign ministry:

China’s main attention and principle of struggle is focused on the east, the West Pacific region, on the ferocious American imperialism, not on India, the southeast or south Asian countries at all. …China will not be so stupid as to make enemies with the US in the east, and make enemies with India in the west. Pacification of rebellion and implementing democratic reform in Tibet would pose no threat to India whatsoever.[10]

This letter was sent the next day. Probably this assurance from Mao himself made the Indian government believe that China would not take border disputes to the level of military confrontation. It is not clear whether Indian intelligence knew that at the time Mao made this statement, infantry division 11 was fighting Tibetan resistance forces in the Chamdo area. Less than four years later, this battle-hardened division would fight at the Namka Chu, the first battle of the border war with India.  

Over the next few months, both sides were quite vocal in accusing each other of “expansionism”, meanwhile thousands of PLA troops were dispatched to Tibet to wage a war of considerable scale, bloodily suppressing Tibetan resistance. From March 1959 to March 1962, the PLA fought 12 major battles in central Tibet, targeting resistance forces and refugees from Kham and Amdo. PLA combat forces included troops under the Tibet Military Command as well as the 54^th Field Army commanded by General Ding Sheng and troops under the Lanzhou, Kunming and Chengdu Military Commands. The 130th Division of the 54th Army played a key role in the war, only returning to Chengdu in December 1961 to take up agricultural production. In other words, at the time when the border war with India broke out, it had been less than a year since Ding’s troops pulled back from Tibet after three years of fighting.

In early April 1959, the PLA launched the battle of Lhoka. In his memoir, Wang Tingsheng, then the assistant director of the 54^th Army Division 134’s scout unit and a veteran of the battle of Lhoka, published a sketch map indicating PLA movements during the battle. It shows that PLA soldiers crossed the McMahon Line at three locations in pursuit of escaping Tibetans.[11] He also recalled that on April 16^th PLA soldiers occupied the Tsona pass (north of Bum-la). A couple of days later, some Indian soldiers showed up with a sign reading “this is Indian territory”, and the two sides had a standoff.[12]

The first phase of the Lhoka campaign lasted about three weeks. By the end of April, PLA troops started the second phase: to clear up the rebel remnants, which took over two months. Once PLA troops closed up the “line of actual control”, i.e. the McMahon Line, the next phase of the campaign, “democratic reform” and the establishment of local government organs, could begin. 

It is not clear how much the Indian government knew of the PLA’s intense military activities in Tibet, but given the impact on the Himalayan regions of India, it is little surprise that tensions escalated in 1959, and remained high until the outbreak of war three years later.

 

A “knife to slaughter a bull” in Tibet?  

If the PLA used a “chicken knife” to deal with the Indian army, as Dai claims, this was certainly not the case with the army’s treatment of resisting and escaping Tibetans.

In order to understand the scale of the war waged on Tibetans in Kham, Amdo and central Tibet from 1956 to 1962, I was able to gather various statistics, including participating PLA military commands, branches involved, numbers of combat forces and logistical support units, amount of supplies, etc. I also analyzed a number of major battles. Chinese official sources indicate that seven of the twelve military commands were directly involved, and another two of them provided logistic support. The cumulative total of combat forces reached over 200,000, not including logistics personnel, local militia and civilians drafted for transportation, road building, etc. The Central Military Commission sent nearly all PLA military branches to fight in Tibet, even the newly-formed chemical warfare unit.

The question is: why? From the memoirs of PLA commanders and soldiers, it is quite clear that they knew that their enemies were groups of disorganized civilians, including women, children, the elderly and monks. Less than half the members of these groups were “combat capable”, meaning young and middle-aged men having no unified command, using backward weapons and lacking experience of modern warfare. Why did the PLA mobilize such a large combat force to fight a war of considerable scale? Even to fight the standing Tibetan army of the Kashag government, which had a little military training, such a force was unnecessary.

To find the answer, I continued digging into the available sources. Apparently, between 1959 and 1961, the Central Military Commission sent not only combat troops into Tibet, but also representatives from all major departments, including the General Political Department, General Staff Department, General Logistics Department and major military academies, to conduct research on high-altitude warfare. In addition, military commands not involved in the battles also sent inexperienced young officers to Tibet to “be trained and tested”. In 1960, Guangzhou Military Command alone sent over 300 young officers to Tibet for first-hand battle experience.[13] This led me to pose the question: did the so-called “suppression of the counter-revolutionary rebellion” in Tibet have purposes other than overthrowing the Tibetan government and forcefully implementing “democratic reform”?

   Openly published sources show that from January 22^nd to February 19^th 1959, Mao Zedong added written instructions to four reports on the situation in Tibet, in which he pointed out that “rebellion is a good thing”, as it could be used to “train the troops and the masses”, and to “harden our troops to combat readiness”.[14] All these instructions show that even before the March 10^th uprising, Mao had the idea of using “suppressing rebellion” to train PLA troops. All these instructions were transmitted to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Defence Minister Peng Dehuai and Chief of Staff Huang Kecheng. It is worth noting that Mao sent the “army training” instruction dated February 19^th 1959 not only to Peng Dehuai, but specially ordered that it be “sent to the Tibet Work Committee and Tibet Military Command down to regiment level by clandestine cable”. This means that by mid-February 1959, about three weeks prior to March 10^th, everyone from the defence minister all the way down to the regimental commanders of combat troops understood Mao’s intention to use the opportunity of suppressing Tibetan resistance as a training exercise.

The perfect opportunity?

By analyzing many memoirs, autobiographies and biographies, openly published, classified or semi-classified, I found out that the 12 large scale battles fought in central Tibet from March 1959 to early 1962 were in fact conducted as a thoroughly organised military training, beyond the actual requirements of a counter-insurgency operation: individual soldiers were expected to train for combat on the high plateau, commanders were testing the battle strategies best suited to the terrain. After each battle, participating PLA units wrote reports summarizing what they practised and learned from the battle. For example, General Ding Sheng’s comment on the battle of Mitika (August 27^th – September 15^th 1959) was this:

This battle not only ensured the safety of transportation on Qinghai-Tibet Highway, it  also gained us experience of fighting with the large unit encircling tactic and carrying out policies in pastoral regions.[15]

The “large unit encirclement” tactic was first used in the battle of Lhoka (April 2^nd – 28^th 1959), but failed. It was used again, successfully, in the battle of Namtso (July 6^th – 29^th 1959), and in a few other battles, and eventually became the most common tactic used in Tibet. When Infantry Division 11 summarized the tactical lessons learned from these battles, the first one was “encirclement”: “…It has been proved by many experiences that carrying out encirclement is the most effective method to wipe out large numbers of rebel bandits.”[16] When it summarized the effective tactics used in the border war, “encirclement” was the first mentioned.[17]

Xu Yan, a professor at the Chinese National Defence University, believed that the biggest difference between the Chinese and Indian armies in the border war was the “combat quality of officers and soldiers”. “Most of the troops of the [People’s] Liberation Army who fought at the China-India border have a glorious history”, he commented, “Besides that, they had also acquired rich combat experience in high and cold mountain regions in the five years from the Khampa rebellion in 1956 to the end of the suppression of Tibetan rebellion in 1961.”[18]

In addition to combat units, the General Political Department took the opportunity to find out how to spread propaganda and how to mobilize the masses, the General Logistics Department wanted to find out what equipment was needed in Tibet, field hospitals conducted research on how to avoid and treat altitude sickness, and so on.

The PLA also took the opportunity to test newly developed weapons, such as the Type 56 rocket launcher copied from the Soviet model. As Xu Yan, wrote in an article published in 2008, “troops gained valuable experience of using various weapons in combat on the high plateau”.[19] During the three-year war in central Tibet, the Tibet Military Command familiarized itself with the terrain, learned about the special needs of high-altitude combat, and mastered battle tactics best suited to the plateau.

From these facts emerged the reason why the CCP deployed such a powerful military force, and all branches of the army, to fight farmers and herders in Tibet. Behind all the superficial reasons given by the CCP to justify its military action, there is another unmentionable reason: on the instructions of Mao Zedong, the PLA took the opportunity of “suppressing the Tibetan rebellion” to train its soldiers using Tibetans as a live target, in order to have a battle-hardened army stationed in Tibet.

What was the target of this battle-hardened army? Immediately after the battle of Lhasa (March 20^th-22^nd 1959), the CCP disbanded the Tibetan standing army. Shortly after that, it launched the battle of Lhoka, the second of the 12 battles. This battle targeted the ‘Chushi Gandruk’ guerilla army, the only semi-military Tibetan resistance force, whose headquarters was in Lhoka. As a matter of fact, the battle of Lhoka failed to meet the goal of wiping them out. In April 1959, the main force of Chushi Gandruk escaped the PLA net and retreated into India. 

However, the CCP did not call off the war. Active military engagement followed straight on from the battle of Lhoka. The last major battle was launched in September 1960 and ended in April 1961. Even after this, a number of small-scale military actions continued to clear the remnants of the Chushi Gandruk and sporadic local resistance up to March 1962.[20]

The “Suppression of Tibetan rebellion” and “Democratic Reform” were carried on at the same time. In CCP history, this is referred to as “fight and reform”. The way it was implemented was called “clean up one area, reform one area”.[21] The standard of “cleaning up” was called the “three all-clears”, meaning “all rebels cleared up, all weapons cleared up, all counter-revolutionary documents cleared up.”[22] After the “three all-clears” was achieved, the third and final phase of the campaign would begin by sending work teams to villages and nomad areas to start the actual “reform” work. It was at this time that former PLA officers and soldiers released from military duty and organized into “work teams”, accompanied by military support, reached the border region.

The well-known “Longju incident” of August 25^th 1959, the first armed clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers, took place under such circumstances. The “strong Chinese detachment” (mentioned in the “Note to the Foreign Office of China by the Indian Ambassador”  dated August 28^th 1950)^[23] with which Indian soldiers clashed south of Migyitun was Company 2 of Regiment 1, Shannan (Lhoka) Military sub-Command. This company’s mission was to escort the work team that was to be stationed in Migyitun “for work with the masses”:^[24] their presence was part of the final phase of the campaign following the battle of Lhoka.[25]  

During the “reform” movement, not only firearms were “cleared up”, even knifes, spears and horses were confiscated. Large-scale arrests took place during this time as well. Based on the requirement issued by Tibet Work Committee, at least 2% of the total Tibetan population was arrested and interred.[26] After “suppression” and “reform”, Tibetans were effectively deprived of the ability to launch another armed rebellion. There was no need for a “battle-hardened” army to put out the flames of resistance. So what was the purpose?

Z419  

In the same February 2005 interview, General Yin Fatang revealed that on June 11^th 1962, the Tibet Military Command constituted a special organ called “Tibet Military Command Advance Command Post for China-India Border Self-defence Counter-attack”, commonly known as “Advance Command Post”, code-named Z419 (“Z” stands for “Xizang”=Tibet, also known as T419). Yin was appointed its political commissar.[27]  

Wei Ke, director of Z419’s political department, recalled that in May 1962, Beijing decided to “create conditions for peacefully resolving the border dispute” by “resolutely fighting back” against the advancing Indian army. It was also decided that the main front would be the eastern sector, namely the Tawang and Walong areas.[28] He revealed that on June 7^th 1962, General Tan Guansan, the commander of the battle of Lhasa in March 1959, chaired a military meeting and transmitted directives from the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission regarding preparation for combat with the Indian army on the border. It was at this meeting that Z419 Command was formed.

Regiments 154, 155 and 157 and a few supporting units were under the direct command of Advanced Command Post Z419, code-named “Z419 army”, with a combat force of around 8,000.

In October, some troops belonging to infantry division 11, artillery regiment 308 and engineers regiment 136 were also commanded by Z419 Command Post, a total of 10,300 men, responsible for fighting in Kejielang (Nyamjang valley) and Tawang.[29]

On June 18^th, the PLA General Political Department issued a Directive on Political Work regarding the Campaign against Military Provocation by Indian Reactionaries. “Z419 army” immediately started political education to “make commanders and soldiers understand the origin and nature of the China-India border issue, and see the true color and essence of the Nehru government as collaborator with anti-China imperialists”, as a way to “arouse soldiers’ patriotic passion and sense of political responsibility.”[30] 

From mid-June 1962, Z419 Command Post started to collect intelligence in the battle zone and work on a battle plan. Meanwhile, it started intensive military training, from individual soldiers’ battle manoeuvers, coordinating training for each unit all the way to “real battle exercises” at regimental level. At the same time, based on the lessons learned from fighting the Tibetan resistance, Z419 replaced physically unfit officers and soldiers. A group of well-trained rocket launcher operators were dispatched to Tibet from Wuhan, and artillery personnel were sent from several military commands. Beijing Military Command sent communications equipment and operators. Over one hundred English, Hindi and Tibetan interpreters from different areas were sent to Tibet for the coming “self-defence counter-attack”.[31]

In early October, Z419 Command Post moved from Lhasa to Tsona, and a location close to the Lhatse pass (Thag La of the Indian maps), a short distance from the Dhola post where the first armed encounter had taken place on September 20^th.[32]

On October 8^th 1962, Mao Zedong called a meeting to discuss the conflict on the border. Attendants included Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, He long, Nie Rongzheng and Luo Ruiqing.[33]  The next day, Z419 received the pre-order for battle.

On October 13^th, Zhang Guohua, one of the commanders in the eastern sector, flew back to Lhasa from Beijing. He held a meeting to transmit the Central Military Commission’s directive on the upcoming battle. The instruction was to “be prudent in the first battle, and once started, it must be successful.”[34] Zhang also organized a “Frontline Command Post” to replace Z419 Command Post. In the afternoon of the same day, Zhang Guohua brought the Frontline Command Post up to Tsona, ready to command the upcoming battle from there.[35]

This sequence of activity suggests that the decision to fight was taken at the October 8^th  meeting, but the date was not yet fixed.

The day after Zhang Guohua took up his commander role, the Tibet Work Committee set up a “Front Support Leadership Group” responsible for coordinating and organizing logistical support for the combat troops.

At 1:30 pm in the afternoon of October 17^th, Mao called and chaired another meeting to discuss the situation,[36] and it was at this meeting that the final decision was made.

That same day, the Central Military Committee issued a Battle Order for Annihilating the Invading Indian Army.[37] By this time, Zhang Guohua had already drafted his battle plan which was approved by the Central Military Commission and Mao himself.[38]  

Three days later, the border war with India broke out. It started with heavy artillery bombardment of Indian posts, before infantry soldiers pressed down onto the enemy, much the same tactic employed in the battle of Lhasa a few years earlier, by the same units.

The main PLA forces fighting this war were the troops that had been “trained” for several years in the battles to suppress Tibetan rebels, including Infantry 11 under the Lanzhou Military Command, and Division 130 of the 54^th Army. Z419 was composed of troops under the Tibet Military Command that had fought in all the major battles from March 1959 to early 1962.  Newly-developed weapons tested against the Tibetans were put into use. The eastern sector commanders were General Ding Sheng and General Zhang Guohua, both commanders of the war of suppression. By the time the border war broke out, transportation routes, field hospitals, civilian support teams etc. had been readied and trained.  

During the conflict with India, the Tibet Work Committee dispatched 1,280 cadres to lead civilian workers functioning as logistical support teams. 32,237 Tibetans and 1,057 pack animals were drafted to load, unload and transport supplies, carry wounded soldiers back from battlefront, clear up battle fields, etc. Over 10,000 civilians were drafted to repair and construct roads.[39]  

It is no surprise that the PLA won the border war, because the two PLA commanders had to hand not a “knife used to slaughter a chicken”, but a battle-hardened army that had been trained in live combat in Tibet for three years.

Until 1951 when the PLA occupied Tibet, it was for the Chinese a faraway, foreign land full of hardship and danger. The locations where the China-India border conflict took place are high plateaux where no Chinese army in history had set foot. The so-called “pacification of Tibetan rebellion” was a war waged on Tibetans in a land of which Chinese commanders and soldiers had no previous knowledge or experience. Only after the war of suppressing Tibetan resistance did the PLA gain the confidence to fight in the Himalaya. From this point of view, the PLA’s “suppression of Tibetan rebellion” was an important causal link in the outbreak of war in 1962.  

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[1] PCR Defense Ministry: http://www.mod.gov.cn/info/2017-06/29/content_4784003.htm

[2] Dai Xun’s weibo: http://weibo.com/1571497285/FaYOf8GVZ?type=repost

[3] Yin, Fatang, 756. For the complete interview see Yin, Fatang,  pp. 745-762.

[4] Ding Sheng, Jin Guang, and Yu Ruxin. Luonan yingxiong: Ding Sheng jiangjun huiyilu [A disgraced hero: Memoir of General Ding Sheng],  pp.  315-316.

[5] Zhou Enlai yu Xizang [Zhou Enlai and Tibet], p. 374.

[6] Details see Yang Yizhen (ed.), Xizang jiyi – Jinjun Xizang jiefang Xizang huiyi wenxuan (Remembering Tibet – Collected Recollections of Advancing and Liberating Tibet). Vol. 2, 433-

[7] Ibid.

[8] India. Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the Governments of India and China, 1954-1959. New Delhi, India:  Ministry of External Affairs, 1960.

[9] Wu, Lengxi. Yi Maozhuxi: wo qinsheng jingli di ruogan zhongda lishi shijian pianduan [In memory of Chairman Mao: Some major historical events I witnessed], 121.

[10] Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Vol. 8 January 1959 – December 1959. [Mao Zedong’s manuscripts after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 8].  268-269.

[11] Wang, Tinsheng, Wangshi huimou [Looking back at the past], p. 149.

[12] Ibid, p. 146.

[13] Liu, Wenqiao. Suiyue ruliu wei cuotuo [A life not wasted], vol. 2, 109.

[14] See Mao, Zedong，Vol. 8. 11, 12, 46, 47.

[15] Deng, Sheng, p. 305.

[16] Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun bubing dishiyi shi junzhanshi [History of and battles fought by PLA Infantry Division 11], p. 256.

[17] Ibid, p. 278.

[18] Xu, Yan, Taojin baizhan pingshuo gujin [Comments and discussions on battles past and present, Chinese and foreign], p. 296. PLA’s suppression of Tibetan rebellion actually started in 1956 in Kham and finished in central Tibet in March 1962. Major battles ended at the end of 1961, but sporadic battles continued for a few more months.

[19] Ibid. p. 282.

[20] Yin, Fatang, p. 748.

[21] Pingxi Xizang panluan [Pacifying Rebellion in Tibet], 102.

[22] Jiefang Xizang shi, p. 399.

[23] Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959P. 44.

[24] “Langjiu shijian” [The Longju Incident]. Baidu baike: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%9C%97%E4%B9%85%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6

[25] Shannan Sub-Military Command was established in July 1959, after the battle of Lhoka, commanding 3 infantry regiments, designated as regiments #1, #2 and #3.

[26]  Zhonggong Xizang dangshi dashiji 1949-1994 [Chronicle of Events in the History of the CCP in Tibet 1949-1994], p. 127. 

[27] Yin, Fatang, p. 749.

[28] Shijie wuji fengyunlu [Storms on the roof of the world].  Vol. 3, p. 325.

[29] Zhang, Zhiyu, Che Junhui, ed. Zhanli yanjiu. [Studies on battle examples], P. 126.

[30] Jiefang Xizang shi [History of Liberating Tibet], p. 477.

[31] Yin, Fatang, p. 750.

[32] Zhao, Shengyin, Zhang Guohua jiangjun zai Xizang [General Zhang Guohua in Tibet], p. 134.

[33] Deng Xiaoping nianpu 1904-1974 [The Chronology of Deng Xiaoping 1904-1974]., Vol. 3, p. 1728.

[34] Zhao, Shengyin,   p. 134.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Deng Xiaoping nianpu, Vol. 3, p. 1730.

[37] Jiefang Xizang shi, p. 478.

[38] Zhao, Shengyin, p. 135.

[39] Jiefang Xizang shi, pp. 487-488.